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Studies on policy adoption have hypothesized that growth management policies are adopted 
in response to growth and community socioeconomic status and under state intervention. 
However, mixed results from empirical studies suggest that varying political processes behind 
policy adoption may translate similar local status into different policies.  
This study focuses on the issue of the influence of direct democracy on local residential 
growth management. Unlike representative democracy, direct democracy allows local residents 
to participate directly in the decision-making process to adopt or defeat growth management 
measures. Three forms of direct democracy—town meeting, initiative, and referendum—are 
particularly examined along with direct democracy in general. This study hypothesizes that 
direct democracy contributes to a more restrictive, exclusionary, and less management-oriented 
growth management framework.  
To test these hypotheses, this study uses a mixed-method approach combining quantitative 
multivariate analyses with two case studies. The quantitative analyses utilize two nationwide 
surveys—a survey of local land-use regulations conducted in 2003 and a survey of local access 
to direct democracy conducted in 2006. Census data from 1990 and 2000 are also included to 
characterize community status and growth characteristics. The case studies further examine the 
interaction between direct democracy and growth management through two cases in 
  
 
Massachusetts—the Town of Westford and the Town of Chelmsford. Findings from quantitative 
analyses have served as criteria for case selection.  
This study demonstrates that direct democracy has a limited effect on growth management 
policies and this effect is related to specific forms of direct democracy and geographic areas.  
While town meeting in New England region is associated with stringent growth policies, 
initiative and referendum do not show connections to policy restrictiveness. Direct democracy 
also works in a limited manner with socioeconomic status to further influence growth policies. In 
addition, the study reveals that direct democracy has a connection to growth policies that have 
exclusionary potential, and that direct democracy is related to less management-oriented growth 
management efforts. The town meeting case studies further indicate that growth management 
emergence is a dynamic result of interaction between growth and resident groups under the 
filtration of town meeting.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Since the first zoning ordinance appeared in New York City in 1916, numerous communities 
in the United States have adopted and implemented different types of land-use regulations to 
control land development. Regulating private land development is often carried out in the name 
of public interest in order to achieve and maintain development integrity, land-use compatibility, 
and desirable community character. Given that local land-use regulations and policies inevitably 
affect private property values and create winners and losers in the land market, the legitimacy of 
land-use regulations have withstood legal challenges and persistent attacks from the private 
property rights movement.  
Since the early 1970s, because of the heightened awareness of the externalities associated 
with land development in environmental, fiscal, and social regards, actions to control or manage 
local land development have proliferated and become more innovative, especially in several fast-
growing areas of the country. Under the rubric of “growth management,” communities are 
assuming a more proactive stance and attempting to control urban growth in a more systematic 
fashion. The goals of growth-management advocates have been expanded to include reducing 
public sector costs of providing infrastructure and services; promoting compact growth; 
managing traffic levels; preserving farmlands; and using other means to improve the overall 
quality of life for communities.  
The efficacy of land-use policies has been constantly challenged in the form of two questions: 
first, whether the policies have brought about desired outcomes; and second, whether the policies 
have led to unanticipated and often adverse consequences. Advocates for strong policy measures 
argue that land-use measures have helped protect the environment, preserve desirable community 
attributes, and assure orderly, fiscally-responsible development. Their critics retort that such 
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measures are ineffective in attaining their stated objectives and, more often than not, are both 
inflationary and exclusionary at the expense of newcomers, especially the less affluent. Thus far, 
there is little available evidence to provide a conclusive answer to either proposition.  
The absence of causal connections between growth policies and their results has led some 
scholars to speculate that the motivations behind those policies may have been incoherent. 
Essentially, in order to construct a better evaluation of policies’ effectiveness and real outcomes, 
researchers need to understand who is involved in making the policy, under what circumstances 
policies are adopted, and how policies are adopted.  Such understanding is also necessary to 
make effective policy changes and to avoid public resistance to the resulting policies.  
This dissertation makes a contribution to the study of the factors and issues involved in the 
policy adoption process. It focuses on an understudied factor—direct democracy—and improves 
our understanding of the role played by three types of direct democracy tools—initiative, 
referendum, and town meeting—in shaping local growth-management policies. To the degree 
that policy outcomes are the aggregation of individual policy preferences, it is reasonable to 
expect that direct democracy, which affects how public preferences are aggregated, could 
influence policy outcome (Gerber, 1991).  
To date, policy adoption studies have generally focused on residents’ socioeconomic status 
and growth-related conditions in explaining policy variation. Available studies about the 
relationship between direct democracy and policies have often been limited to theoretical 
discussion of the structural defects in policy making. A few empirical studies concerning direct 
democracy examine only its effects on state policies, or consider only a limited area and a single 
local land-use policy such as urban growth boundaries. More comprehensive and systematic 
research is needed.  
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A better understanding of direct democracy’s effects on growth policies is also of academic 
concern because of its significance to planning practice. Planning relies on public participation to 
ensure accountable and responsible land-use decisions and to make policies more effective. 
However, direct democracy, an ultimate form of public participation, has put planning in an 
awkward position. While direct democracy has been used in the development and adoption of 
local growth-management policies, many policies adopted through direct democracy have been 
considered unrepresentative and even exclusionary.  
Policy adoption through direct democracy is sometimes criticized as being based in over-
reactive, over-simplified reasoning and its being used by interest groups to further their own 
interests. These criticisms are founded in the structural defects in the implementation or practice 
of direct democracy. Understanding this perspective can potentially lessen the perceived tension 
between two conflicting values concerning the use of direct democracy, thus encouraging public 
participation and promoting a diverse community outcome.  
The goal of this study is to examine the relationship between direct democracy and local 
residential growth-management policies. By comparison with past research that has examined 
the characteristics of policies adopted by means of direct democracy, this study looks at policy 
variation in local land-use planning across communities in the context of the availability of direct 
democracy. I contend that the availability of direct democracy not only provides a tool that can 
be used directly by the electorate, but also serves to influence elected officials in their policy 
making as well. In other words, access to direct democracy tools in a community may shape 
policy outcome, regardless of whether or not the tools have been used to adopt policies.  
This dissertation is guided by two hypotheses:  
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1. Communities with access to direct democracy have a higher level of overall 
restrictiveness in their growth-management efforts.  
2. Communities with access to direct democracy are more likely to have growth-
management measures that have exclusionary potential and to have growth-
management measures that have a growth-control rather than a growth-management 
orientation.  
To test these hypotheses, I designed a mixed-method approach by combining quantitative 
multivariate analyses with a series of case studies. The quantitative analyses are based on two 
surveys: the first survey is a nationwide local land-use regulation survey conducted by Pendall 
and associates in 2003; while the second is a nationwide survey about local access to direct 
democracy conducted by the author in early 2006. I also used census data (Census 2000 and 
Census 1990) to characterize community socio-demographic status and growth characteristics. 
Both logit regression and logistic regression models are applied. Two cases in Massachusetts—
the Town of Westford and the Town of Chelmsford—are selected for the purpose of further 
examining the interaction between direct democracy and growth management. The findings from 
quantitative analyses are utilized as case selection criteria.  
This study demonstrates that direct democracy has a limited effect on growth management 
policies and this effect is related to specific forms of direct democracy and geographic areas.  
While town meeting in New England region is associated with stringent growth policies, 
initiative and referendum do not show connections to policy restrictiveness. Direct democracy 
also works in a limited manner with socioeconomic status to further influence growth policies. In 
addition, the study reveals that direct democracy has a connection to growth policies that have 
exclusionary potential, and that direct democracy is related to less management-oriented growth 
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management efforts. The town meeting case studies further indicate that growth management 
emergence is a dynamic result of interaction between growth and resident groups under the 
filtration of town meeting.  
This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background for this research 
by first reviewing the history of land-use planning and the evolution of growth management in 
the US and then introducing urban and suburban politics. Chapter 2 includes a review of the 
literature regarding policy adoption and a description of ballot box planning. Chapter 3 outlines a 
conceptual framework and introduces research questions and hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the 
research design and methodology, while Chapter 5 discusses quantitative analysis findings. 
Chapter 6 is focused on case study findings, and Chapter 7 contains the dissertation’s conclusion 
and discussion. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of Local Growth Management Policies 
2.1.1 History of Land-use Regulations 
Local governments have long used a variety of approaches to regulate the use of land. 
However, in its early history, urban development was more often a haphazard and incremental 
event than a deliberately planned process. Some early planned communities were basically 
duplicates of European traditional towns and villages (Reps, 1965). Following several influential 
movements in the nineteenth century, such as the Sanitary Reform Movement, the City Beautiful 
Movement and later Howard’s Garden City concept, Americans realized that cities must be 
planned—and planned comprehensively. Gradually, during that period, urban planning began to 
be influenced by the newly formalized disciplines of architecture and civil engineering, which 
began to codify both rational and stylistic approaches to solving city problems by means of 
physical design and planning (Hoch, Dalton, and So, 2000).  
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, zoning ordinances, general plans, subdivision 
controls, and building codes have been the accepted methods of guiding growth. Over time, these 
devices have become more comprehensive and complex as additional concerns, such as 
transportation and public utilities, were recognized as inextricably related to land development, 
and as additional issues, such as design quality and landscaping, were accepted as legitimate 
bases for public action (Deakin, 1989).  
Emerging with modern physical design planning were zoning ordinances and subdivision 
regulations. In 1916, New York City adopted the first zoning regulations to apply city-wide to 
prevent new development from interfering with existing buildings (Bassett, 1929; Fischel, 1987). 
By the late 1920s, most US communities had developed a set of zoning and subdivision 
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regulations, thanks to the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1926.1 While zoning has since 
been criticized for its rigidness and institutionalization of outdated planning theories (Kunstler, 
1998), today’s zoning has evolved into a variety of more flexible categories, such as performance 
zoning and incentive zoning (DeGrove, 1991).  
Zoning ordinances control the type and intensity of land use in specified geographic districts. 
The popularity of these regulations come from their relative effectiveness, ease of 
implementation, long-established legal precedent, and their familiarity to planners and design 
professionals (Fischel, 1987). Even though the appearance of zoning in New York City was 
motivated by a land-use dispute, other municipalities’ later adoption of zoning was determined 
and limited by state legislative authorities through enabling legislation. To a certain extent, 
provisions on zoning ordinance, with comprehensive plan and subdivision regulation, helped 
predict development directions for property owners, exclude incompatible land uses and protect 
local budgets.  
Comprehensive planning appeared after the Standard City Planning Enabling Act in 1928. 
Since the 1950s, comprehensive planning has reached a new phase. The Housing Act of 1954 
started the urban renewal movement. Its section 701 required that local government had to 
prepare a comprehensive plan in order to qualify for urban renewal grants (Hoben, 2001; 
Jackson, 1985). As a result, local municipalities treated comprehensive plans as a routine part of 
their responsibilities. Since then, the planning profession has entered its golden age—both the 
number of planning graduates and the number of planning jobs boomed; this period saw the 
greatest expansion of operational power on the part of urban planners.  
                                                 
1
 However, zoning’s legal stand was established by the famous Euclid case. In 1926, the US Supreme Court upheld 
local zoning in Euclid vs. Ambler, giving its seal of approval to local zoning ordinance.  
 8
Among comprehensive plan elements such as land use, transportation, and housing, capital 
improvement programs have always been a highlight since the middle of the last century. A 
capital improvement program is a blueprint for planning a community’s capital expenditures and 
is one of the most important responsibilities of local government officials. It coordinates 
community planning, financial capacity and physical development. These programs objectivelly 
prepared for the rapid suburban development after WWII.  
Comprehensive planning has a close tie with zoning. These plans are a community’s “vision,” 
while the zoning ordinance contains the rules that govern the path to that vision or, in other 
words, the zoning ordinance makes up part of the plan’s implementation process. Many states 
require that the zoning ordinance be compatible to the plan; in such cases, the plan forms the 
basis upon which zoning decisions are made.  
With the rapid growth of the 1950s and 1960s, the pressures on municipal budgets mounted 
and local public infrastructure were inadequate to support rapid rates of growth. A number of 
communities began to search for additional means of regulating development (Burrows, 1978), 
partially motivated by a number of broad critiques of the rational planning model that had gained 
momentum after the 1960s. Such models, including those of Jane Jacobs, helped to expand the 
domain of urban planning to include economic development, community social planning and 
environmental planning. Concerns over the effects of growth were particularly at issue in cases 
where local governments found that demands for public infrastructure and services were 
outstripping their budgets for such items and outpacing the ability to deliver them even with tax 
increases. New techniques adopted at that time included altered subdivision requirements and 
zoning regulations, expanding requirements for developers to provide public facilities, capital 
programming, and the timing of development approvals.  
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In the 1970s, concerns about urban sprawl, air pollution, loss of open space and farmlands, 
and energy profligacy came to dominate the public agenda. Another round of land-use 
regulations emerged, including restrictions on annexations and the establishment of urban limit 
lines, greenbelts and agricultural preserves. Impact assessments were increasingly used as the 
basis for more extensive developer exactions and impact fees. In some communities, debates 
erupted over the effects of rapid population increases, and caps were established on the number 
of housing units that could be authorized annually. A few places even established overall 
population maximums.  
Planned unit development (PUD) had also emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a standard 
model for suburban residential development. PUD is a means of land regulation, which promotes 
large scale and unified land development. It allows flexibility in the design of a subdivision by 
setting an overall density limit for the entire subdivision as well as allowing the dwelling units to 
be clustered to provide for common open space. This pattern fulfilled the rapid increase in 
housing demand after WWII because it provided an efficient and affordable way of housing 
production2 and at the same time showed the potential for improving the quality of the living 
environment by providing large common spaces and public amenities. PUD also helped with the 
protection of environmental amenities and the creation of variety in the built environment.  
However, some early PUD developments, such as Levittown, New York, were criticized for their 
blandness and racial exclusivity3 (Hales, 2004).  
                                                 
2
 With the full implementation of federal government supports for housing, administered under the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), many developers were able to offer homebuyers a 30-year mortgage with no down payment 
and monthly costs about the same as rentals. 
3
 From the first, the Levittown development was racially segregated; a "covenant" in the original rental agreement, 
which migrated to the sales agreement, stipulated that houses could not be rented or sold to any but members of the 
"Caucasian" race. This covenant conformed to federal requirements that developers using FHA funding had to 
maintain the "racial homogeneity" of their developments. Only after the 1954 racial integration decisions was 
Levittown racially integrated, and even as late as the 1960 census only a tiny fraction of the community was non-
white (Hales, 2004). 
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Since 1970, some states have begun to step into the planning field. Thirteen states have 
initiated statewide growth management programs; however, the intergovernmental structures and 
development goals of such programs vary substantially (Bollens, 1992; Gale, 1992). Many of 
these state and non-local growth management strategies seek to restrict growth with regionally 
detrimental effects, while a growing number also seek to facilitate regionally beneficial growth, 
which is often opposed by local governments. The evolution of state policies has shown a shift 
from state preemptive regulatory intervention to conjoint and cooperative state-local planning 
frameworks and the incorporation of growth-accommodating economic policies into programs 
previously environmentally oriented. This shift is often referred to as planning’s quiet revolution 
(Bosselman and Callies, 1972) and later as the second and third waves of state growth 
management programs (Weitz, 1999).  
Oregon is one of the pioneers of state planning. Under its 1973 statewide planning act, 
Oregon mandates that its localities adopt an “urban growth boundary” to classify land according 
to growth management policy (Abbott, Howe and Adler, 1994). In recent years, several other 
states such as California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington have adopted statewide land-use planning policies in 
order to contain urban sprawl either directly or indirectly (Bollens, 1992; DeGrove, 1984, 1992; 
Gale, 1992; Innes, 1992; Leonard, 1983; Pendall, 2001).  
In the late 1960s through the 1980s, concerns about the fiscal impacts on local budget had 
become a constant theme. Mid-sized to large projects were required to conduct fiscal impact 
analyses, and all land-use regulations had to match local fiscal objectives. In some localities, 
control on the pace of growth has also been introduced to manage fiscal impacts and smooth out 
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such impacts on communities. Another tool, greenbelt, was also invented to control 
infrastructure costs in addition to protecting open space.  
Over time, other issues motivated an increasing number of growth management measures. 
The first was in regard to traffic congestion. Trip generation rates were closely scrutinized, and 
heavy traffic generators often met with community opposition. Controls over the amount of 
commercial space that could be approved, once an issue only occasionally arising in the context 
of a specific development proposal, appeared as general policies in several jurisdictions during 
the mid-1980s. The second was on fair shares of affordable housing in local jurisdictions. The 
Mount Laurel I (1975) and II (1983) decisions by the New Jersey Supreme Court established that 
municipalities were constitutionally mandated to provide low- and moderate-income housing, 
mainly through their zoning powers (Hughes and Vadoren, 1990).  
Beginning in the late 1990s, smart growth became popular. The term first appeared in 
Maryland’s Smart Growth Priority Funding Areas Act of 1997. This act addresses important 
issues of growth management through five components: local funding; infill development; jobs-
housing balance; economic development; and rural land conservation. Along with specific pieces 
of legislation that address each of these components, the state also adopted four goals and ten 
principles of smart growth.4 To encourage the implementation of these guidelines, the PFA Act 
designates specific areas that are eligible for state funding if the plans and approved development 
projects of local governments meet the objectives of these goals and principles. Projects covered 
by the PFA act include highways, sewer and water construction, housing improvement, 
economic development assistance, and state leases or the construction of new office facilities. In 
addition to these state infrastructure subsidies, the Smart Growth legislation also encourages the 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed description, visit the Maryland Department of Planning website at: 
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/smartintro.htm. 
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use of density bonuses for developers who build a percentage of housing units at or below 
market rate.  
Today, a wide range of growth management measures is in use, sometimes under broader 
labels of livability or sustainability (Goldschalk, 2004). They are an accumulation of traditional, 
environmental, fiscal and capacity-related regulations that remain extremely active among 
regional policy analysts and smart growth boosters (Baldassare, 2001). Their objectives are to 
reduce public sector costs of providing infrastructure and services, to promote compact growth, 
to manage traffic levels, to preserve farmlands as well as other means to improve the overall 
quality of life for community residents. While advocates argue that growth management 
measures help to protect the environment, preserve desirable community attributes, and assure 
orderly, fiscally responsible development, critics retort that these measures are inflationary, 
exclusionary and ineffective in attaining their stated objectives and, more often than not, are 
motivated by the desire of existing residents for self-enrichment at the expense of newcomers, 
especially those who are less affluent (Deakin, 1989).  
2.1.2 Definition of Growth Management 
There is no standard definition for growth management5. Godschalk and Brower (Godschalk, 
Brower and McBennett, 1979; Brower et al., 1984) call it a conscious government program to 
influence the rate, amount, type, location and/or cost of development. DeGrove (1989) gives it a 
broader content. The definition of the term “growth management” ranges from the assumption 
                                                 
5
 In the 1970s there were terms used including “growth control,” “slow growth,” and even “no growth.” Regulations 
under these terms aimed at limiting the amount and/or flow of development well below market levels. The term 
“growth management” came in later to reflect an effort to guide or mitigate the effects of growth rather than to 
tightly control growth. In practice, however, the distinction between growth control and growth management is 
much less clear. As Glickfeld and Levine (1992) first observed, most California jurisdictions employ multiple 
approaches, often mixing growth control and growth management programs.. In this study, all these terms are 
pooled together and labeled “growth management.” Meanwhile, such terms as growth management, growth 
management programs, growth management techniques, growth management measures and growth management 
policies are used interchangeably in this study. 
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that it always and everywhere means a citizen-led effort to stop growth absolutely in a particular 
place to more balanced definitions focusing on the need to plan rationally to accommodate the 
impacts of growth that are likely to occur whether or not the it is managed so as to balance the 
needs of the environment with those of development.  
Summarizing from the literature, I provide a tentative definition for growth management: 
Growth management refers to a set of policies designed, under the comprehensive planning 
framework, to control or guide the type, location, timing, quality, scale, rate and/or sequence of 
growth and pursue economically efficient, socially integrated and environmentally sustainable 
development.  
However, the term “growth management” can mean both everything and nothing. Depending 
on one’s perspective, growth management is either a panacea or a hollow promise. Those 
communities that have successfully employed growth management techniques view it as 
everything they always wanted, but never got, from traditional comprehensive planning 
programs. Those who have only initiated growth management strategies after much of the 
damage has been done may view it as a remedial measure at best (Nelson and Duncan, 1995).  
2.1.3 The Policy Goal of Growth Management 
Localities usually combine several growth management tools into a multi-layered policy 
composite. It can be viewed as part of a larger effort—the comprehensive plan—to shape the 
desired community of tomorrow and based on a vision of the future that recognizes global 
resource limits and our responsibilities to sustainability issues. More specifically, the purposes of 
growth management are related to the prevention of urban sprawl, the pursuit of efficient urban 
form, public intervention into the land market, and taxpayer protection.  
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Growth management seeks balanced and efficient development patterns. Many growth 
management techniques can be traced back originally to regulatory responses to the problems 
and processes associated with urban sprawl6 (Nelson and Duncan, 1995) and to achieve more 
efficient urban development patterns. The more efficient an urban development plan is, the 
greater the wealth of the community, as scarce resources will not be wasted. The goals of 
efficient urban patterns include the following:  (1) achieving a job-housing balance; (2) 
integrating socioeconomic classes, as both low- and high-income workers often work in the same 
place; (3) reducing the need for expansion of transportation capacity; (4) enhancing 
redevelopment; (5) minimizing environmental pollution; (6) preventing costly or conflicting 
land-use patterns; and (7) minimizing public facility costs.  
Gradually, growth management has also dedicated itself as a public intervention into an 
otherwise unregulated land market,7 through an attempt to balance supply side with demand side 
of the land market (Fischel, 1990), protect taxpayers from imprudent private investment 
decisions resulting in overbuilding, and mitigate the exclusionary effect of growth which, 
ironically, is often caused by growth management itself (Pendall, 1995).  Government 
intervention through restrictions, economic incentives and disincentives (Lee, 1981) is necessary, 
as developers and lenders have demonstrated their inability to exercise responsible stewardship 
                                                 
6
 The term urban sprawl refers to a premature leapfrog or “highway ribbon” development or low-density scattered 
development that occurs beyond the current perimeter of contiguous development. Studies claim that sprawl is 
caused by federal and state investment policies (Bourne, 1980), local land-use regulations (Clawson, 1972; White, 
1975), average facility pricing (Blewett and Nelson, 1988), and developers’ speculation (Harvey and Clark, 1965; 
Nelson, 1992). Because it is viewed as a waste of land and resources (Daniels, 1986; Nelson, 1992), costly to serve 
(Frank, 1989; Lee, 1981) and damaging to the environment, lowering land values and amenities and to a certain 
extent unsightly, many public policies aim to discourage it. 
7
 The market economy is composed of many interrelated markets, such as markets for housing, industry and 
recreation. Society achieves efficiency among markets when resources are allocated to each market in order to 
generate the largest net benefits. This can be achieved if the output of each market is increased until the marginal 
cost of the next unit of production is just equal to its marginal benefit. However, the ideal assumptions for the 
market to achieve efficiency are never completely present. As a result, urban land markets fail to provide efficient 
development patterns and government intervention in the market through growth management is necessary to 
correct conditions causing inefficiencies. 
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over the real estate market (Dowall, 1986). In many localities and a few, but a growing, number 
of states, planners who are given growth management tools are demonstrating their ability to 
protect taxpayers from unwise development such as sprawl.  
2.1.4 Growth Management Techniques 
Along with the development of modern planning, growth management techniques are 
evolving and a variety of innovative measures have emerged. A vast number of growth 
management techniques are being used throughout the nation; however, it was only in a survey 
of California local jurisdictions in the late 1980s that Glickfeld and Levine (1992) reported 907 
various growth management and growth control measures practiced in the first quarter of 1989.  
Although the total number of observed growth management measures is large, the number can 
be reduced sharply after a careful examination and grouping of such measures. The reason is 
simple—many measures perform similar functions and pursue similar objectives, but under 
different names. Even so, there is still no way to exhaust all growth management measures. 
Following is a summarization of measures most commonly practiced by local municipalities 
(Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Landis et al., 2002; Nelson and Duncan, 1995; Pendall et al., 
2002):  
• Urban containment boundaries with interim development boundaries, urban reserves, 
and urban service limits. These techniques direct urban development into areas 
intended or needed for urban uses and away from areas intended or needed for rural 
and resource areas. Boundaries create a clean break between potentially inconsistent 
urban and rural land uses and thereby protect rural land from urban spillovers while 
also providing important environmental and economic benefits to urban development.  
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• Population or building permit limitations. These measures, if set well below the 
community’s expected growth rate, can severely constrain housing production and 
give developers incentives to build a smaller number of larger and more expensive 
houses.  
• Appropriate capital and operational pricing of public services such as roads and 
schools. The choice of an appropriate financing technique is crucial for the equitable 
and efficient provision of public services. For many services and facilities, this is 
possible through user fee approaches, improvement districts, and various forms of 
impact fees.  
• Capital improvement programs and adequate public facilities standards. These 
techniques ensure that public facilities will be available concurrent with demand and 
that development farther away does not deprive infill and redevelopment projects due 
to inadequate facility capacity. Moreover, when properly configured, these techniques 
give important signals to developers on what can be expected when and where.  
• Zoning ordinances can also be adapted as growth management measures. For 
example, low-density-only zoning can severely reduce the number of allowed 
development units. Localities can also set up minimum density standards through 
zoning to ensure developers a minimum development expectation and thus make 
efficient use of public facilities and services.  
• Political control or voter approval, such as a vote requirement for rezoning or for 
annexation. These measures provide an opportunity for local residents to participate 
in the planning and growth management decision-making process. Although this 
appears to be a neutral action during the development process, in reality it can add 
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additional costs by increasing the risk and uncertainty for developers and property 
owners, thus potentially limiting rather than creating growth.  
There are several other measures available in addition to the above, including growth 
management elements of the comprehensive plan; preservation of land for resource production; 
environmental protection through exclusive-use designations; industrial and commercial floor 
space control; transfer/purchase of development rights; streamlined permitting; and expeditious 
development reviews.  
2.1.5 Effects of Growth Management Programs 
When examining the effects of growth management programs, studies oftentimes focus on 
three common areas: rate of growth (or absolute growth); housing price; and residential 
satisfaction. Pendall (2000) has done a most comprehensive work on this regard and found a 
“chain of exclusion”—certain growth measures limit housing supply and in turn exclude 
minority populations. A large number of studies have also been conducted to evaluate the effects 
of growth management,8 but to date the findings have not proven conclusive (Baldassare and 
Protash, 1982; Donovan and Neiman, 1995; Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Landis, 1992; Levine, 
1999; Logan and Zhou, 1989; Mercer and Morgan, 1982; Staley, 2001; Warner and Molotch, 
2000).  
With respect to controlling growth, some types of growth management programs, principally 
residential caps, annexation controls, and voter-enacted super-majority approval requirements do 
appear to significantly limit population growth in the communities that adopt them. Annexation 
controls and super-majority approval requirements also limit housing construction. Other 
                                                 
8
 When evaluating growth management programs, assessments need to control for changes in largely exogenous 
factors, such as the rate of growth in the national and regional economies, demographic trends and similar data in 
order to reflect local market conditions; to account for not only primary effects but also secondary impacts and 
cumulative effects of the programs, both intended and unintended; and to recognize the possibility of differential 
short- and long-run effects.  
 18
programs, most notably urban growth boundaries (UGB), function mostly to redistribute 
development from fringe areas to more centralized locations.  
Other studies provide different results. Landis et al. (2002) conclude that, in general, growth 
management programs are neither effective at controlling growth, as their advocates have hoped, 
nor as injurious to housing affordability as their detractors claimed, even though there is new 
evidence showing the increased popularity of growth management and the development of 
improved impact-monitoring tools.  
With respect to housing prices, the results are still mixed. Studies do suggest that urban 
containment measures—urban growth boundaries and greenbelts—raise land and housing prices, 
and that the longer they are in effect and the more tightly they are drawn around existing 
development, the more severe this inflationary effect (Dowall and Landis, 1982; Frech and 
Lafferty, 1984; Knaap, 1985). Studies on permit cap also found that the controls raised housing 
prices (Dowall and Landis, 1982; Katz and Rosen, 1987), but they are challenged by later studies 
(Schwartz and Zorn, 1988; Engle, Navarro and Carson, 1992) due to flaws in method.  
The findings on residential satisfaction in growth management communities appear to be 
quite ambiguous. Baldassare (1981) found resident satisfaction to be higher in communities that 
were growing moderately than in either fast-growing or slow-growing jurisdictions, but 
Baldassare and Protash (1982) suggested that those living in growth management communities 
were less satisfied than residents of communities with few controls. It is unclear whether these 
negative reactions are due to perceptions of growth management itself or to the continuing 
presence of conditions which led to municipal growth management actions.  
2.2 Local Politics 
Growth management policies are closely tied to local politics. After discussing growth 
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management policies, the focus will now proceed to the relevant conditions of local politics. As 
major growth and the emergence of growth management policies have been shifted from the 
inner city to suburban areas, this section will place its emphasis on suburban politics. However, 
after several decades of development and changes, suburban politics has been shifting to a theme 
relevant to that of urban politics. I will first discuss urban politics briefly and then compare it to 
the politics found in suburban areas.  
2.2.1 Urban Politics 
Compared with the quiet countryside and the traditional bedroom suburbs, the central theme 
of urban areas is both complex and diverse. In cities there are different types of populations, with 
various races, incomes, education levels and occupations. Many people are part of different 
groups with varying interests; these groups play a variety of roles in the dynamics of urban 
politics. Even within politics itself, there are distinctive fields. For this reason, in this section I 
will particularly focus on development or growth politics.  
In order to understand urban politics under democratic regimes, we need to face a 
fundamental question: “who governs?” Since the early 1960s there has been a debate, known as 
the community power debate, on this question between two schools—the elite theorists and the 
pluralists. The elite theorists believe that in cities the power is held by a small, unaccountable 
oligarchy that persistently exercises local power; in other words, the power is held by a business-
based ruling class rather than elected public officials (Hunter, 1953; Domhoff, 1978). 
Conversely, the pluralists believe that many interest groups compete in urban politics and that 
the power-holders shift among interest groups on an issue-by-issue basis (Dahl, 1961; Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1962).9 These authors do not believe in the power elite but also do not believe that 
                                                 
9
 Although Bachrach (1962) has clarified himself that his point is distinct from either elitist theorists or pluralists, I 
have still classified him into the pluralist camp because by looking at the two faces of power, the capability and 
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every citizen has an equal voice. Additionally, pluralists believe that the government’s role is to 
act as the mediator between these groups.  
The debate between elite theorists and pluralists was further developed into the urban growth 
machine and urban regime theories, both of which are more aligned with development politics. 
The growth machine theory developed by Harvey Molotch (1976) states that in a locality, an 
elite of land-based interests have dominant power in development decision-making. These 
interests may include real estate developers, bankers, local business entities and public news 
media in their connection to growth-promoting local governments. Together, they attempt to 
organize local political and economic resources to make the city an attractive location for outside 
businesses and mobile capital. In contrast, through the urban regime theory, Clarence Stone 
(1989, 2003) contends that the social control theory, in which groups try to assert control over 
each other, is a limited way of viewing power in general and city power in particular. He 
promotes the “power to” rather than the “power over” model and argues that public officials 
need to build and maintain electoral coalitions sufficient both to win office and to govern. He 
suggests a process through which a number of political coalitions, of which the growth coalition 
or growth machine is only one, could emerge, consolidate and formulate a stable governing 
regime.  
However, critics have complained that the above debate has proceeded on the basis that cities 
have substantial room for autonomous decision-making. Both sides suggest that the decisions 
cities have made are the products of the local political decision-making process. In reality, 
Peterson (1981) argues that unlike higher levels of government, cities are fundamentally limited 
by external factors as to what kinds of decisions they can make. Frug and Barron (2008) further 
                                                                                                                                                             
participation of interest groups, the de facto results would be power distribution among those groups that have 
political capability and an interest to participating in local politics. This result is in line with the pluralists’ point. 
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explores how state law, in terms of governmental structures and legal limitations, determines 
what cities can and cannot do to raise revenue, control land use, and improve city schools. They 
find substantial variation from on state to another.  
2.2.2 Suburban Politics 
At its early stage, suburban politics was simple because of its internal homogeneity. The main 
purpose of suburban governments is to provide the package of taxation and services. It is then 
that the consumer voters choose their residential location by voting with their feet. This is called 
the Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956), one of the public choice models. This model has been shown 
to be accurate in certain situations regarding suburban conditions. For example, in areas subject 
to rural flooding, this spatial sorting model explains why affluent residents live in communities 
protected by river levees, while poor residents tend to live without these protections.  
In the Tiebout model, consumer voters are considered passive in package provision, while 
Fischel’s homevoter hypothesis (Fischel, 2005) assumes an active role for homeowners. The 
coined word “homevoter” indicates the connection between homeownership and political 
participation. According to Fischel, homeowners have a financial interest in participating in local 
politics, and their vigilance promotes more efficient municipal governance. This is why local 
governments are more likely to be efficient providers of environmental amenities and why the 
displacement of local taxation by state funds reduces school quality.  
The Tiebout model has been further developed by Schneider (1989). In analyzing the 
behavior of suburban governments, Schneider states that localities pursue not customers but 
investors, either residents or businesses, whose movement into a jurisdiction may bolster the tax 
base. However, local fiscal manipulation such as tax rates, service expenditures and land-use 
regulations make only a small difference in the development pattern. Other stronger forces are 
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also at work. He concludes that the self-interest of governments contributes to even higher 
municipal expenditures, thus political manipulation defeats public choice in the market for public 
goods.  
Furthermore, the Tiebout model assumes that consumers are free to move and have access to 
perfect information. However, this simplification of reality is not accurate even if suburbs are as 
homogeneous as they are assumed to be in a Tiebout model. There are always costs related to 
relocation from one place to another, and one can never have access to perfect information. Also, 
most suburbs that adopt complex growth management measures are much more complex and 
internally heterogeneous than the mosaic of clubs that Tiebout proposes. From this perspective, 
the urban politics discussed in the previous section has become more relevant to suburban 
politics. We will now look at today’s suburbs in more detail.  
First, suburbs are becoming more internally diverse as immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities 
move to suburbs in unprecedented numbers. In the 1980s and 1990s, significant portions of the 
middle class of all ethnic and racial groups have left central cities for the suburbs (Jones-Correa, 
2001). By 1997, almost half of new immigrants lived in suburban areas (Schmidley and Gibson, 
1999). A Brookings report uses 2000 census data to analyze racial and ethnic changes in 102 
large metropolitan areas and finds that minorities make up 27 percent of suburban communities 
in these metro areas, up from 19 percent a decade before (Frey, 2001). However, patterns of 
minority suburbanization vary significantly between different metropolitan areas and between 
different ethnic and racial groups. For example, Monterey Park was a moderately diverse yet 
Anglo-conforming, middle-class Los Angeles suburb until the late 1960s. But by the 1980s, 
Monterey Park was transformed into the “First Suburban Chinatown” in the United States by a 
sizable influx of largely middle-class Asians (Horton, 1998).  
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Some studies even come up with the term “postsuburban” to distinguish a type of more 
diverse and multi-centered suburban areas. A typical postsuburban region would be Orange 
County, California (Kling, Olin and Poster, 1995). It has distinct locations for commerce, 
recreation, shopping, arts, residences and religious activities. These activities are often conducted 
in different places that are linked by private automobiles. Residents of any city travel throughout 
a postsuburban region for work, shopping, worship, recreation and the arts.  
Second, even homogeneous suburbs interact with each other, enacting policies either because 
they are learning from each other or competing with one another. In a study on the adoption of 
growth control policies by cities in California, Brueckner (1998) finds evidence of strategic 
interaction in the choice of growth controls. When nearby cities impose stringent growth 
controls, a given neighboring city is likely to do the same. When nearby growth controls are 
mild, the city is likely to adopt mild controls as well. In a more recent California ballot box 
growth control study, Nguyen (2009) also observes support for strategic interaction—
jurisdictions’ growth control policies influence the growth decisions made by neighboring 
jurisdictions within the same region.  
Third, outside interests may be instrumental in shaping an individual jurisdiction’s policies. 
They may, and often do, become active on controversial issues across suburban boundaries 
within metropolitan regions and sub-regions. These groups include builders, chambers of 
commerce, elected officials and environmental advocates. Some of well-known groups active in 
the San Francisco Bay Area include the Greenbelt Alliance, the Santa Clara County 
Manufacturers’ Group and the Contra Costa Council (Scott, 1985). Local chapters of state and 
national organizations, such as the Sierra Club, also bring the concerns of their national 
organizations into local politics (Frieden, 1979).  
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Last, multiple functioning districts, which at times overlap each other, may cast influence on 
the decision-making process. General-purpose government and school districts are two common 
examples. In most cases, the boundaries of these two entities are not identical but rather overlap 
each other. Thus, the government unit that sets land-use policy is not always the only unit that 
sets tax rates and provides public services. The situation can become even more complex 
because schools may be funded mainly by inter-government transfers from various states, while 
their boards or committees may be separate from city councils.10  
2.3 Factors Affecting Growth Policy Adoption 
For most of the United States, local governments have the power and authority to make 
development decisions and regulations through the “police power” delegated to them by the 
constitutions and legislatures of their states (Fischel, 1999). Police power is regarded as one of 
the inherent powers of government and almost all states grant considerable latitude to local 
authorities. In some areas, state governments and regional entities have also created growth 
management programs and are directly involved in regulating development and environmental 
protection (Bollens, 1992; Gale, 1992).  
There are varying local growth management policies and land-use regulations across the 
nation. Even after taking into consideration the varying influences from each state, one can still 
observe a substantial variation of local land-use programs within a single state. Some of the 
programs are effective at regulating growth, while others are not effective at all, which may 
result in certain side effects (Nelson and Duncan, 1995). Why do the types of programs vary 
from place to place? Why do some of them work effectively as intended while others do not? 
How can policy-makers improve their programs in order to make them function better? In order 
                                                 
10
 This is true for most Western states, but not exactly for states in other regions. For example, in Massachusetts, a 
mayor can be an ex-officio in the school district committee and the main source of budget for their districts is from 
local property tax.  
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to understand these questions, it is essential to look into the policy adoption process and 
understand what factors are involved and how such factors affect policy emergence.  
Scholars from a variety of fields have focused their attention on the adoption of local growth 
control and growth management policies. The significance of this work in the planning field is 
found in two of its aspects: First, it represents an intellectual effort to understand the causes and 
motivations behind the adoption of growth policies in order to make better evaluations of the 
effectiveness and unexpected costs of such policies. Second, among factors that directly or 
potentially lead to sprawl, local growth policy might be the most feasible one to be modified 
under a regional framework for reshaping the current development pattern. This idea is in fact 
the key effort of the current Smart Growth movement (Godschalk, 2004). Before any 
modification or change to growth policy occurs, policy-makers need a comprehensive 
understanding of factors and issues involved in the policy adoption process in order to make 
effective changes and at the same time avoid tremendous public conflicts.  
Several factors have been identified, explicitly or implicitly, as influencing policy adoption in 
the literature, among which resident status, growth, and state intervention are thought to be the 
most important.  
2.3.1 Resident Status 
The status hypothesis states that white, wealthy, well-educated residents tend to adopt 
restrictive growth management polices because they have an interest in maintaining their high-
status communities—socially and fiscally—while maximizing their property values and 
resources by means of economic resources and political skills (Burbank, Heying, and 
Andranovich, 2000; Danielson, 1976; Frieden, 1979). There are two interrelated sets of literature 
focusing on this hypothesis—one looks into the link between personal characteristics and 
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attitudes toward growth restriction, while the other focuses on the relationship between 
aggregated community status and the adoption of growth policy. These two sets of literature 
share the same argument—when residents with certain characteristics, usually higher 
socioeconomic status, tend to support growth limitation, communities with a higher proportion of 
such higher status residents are more likely to adopt measures to restrict residential development.  
Empirical evidence, however, has not provided strong support for the status hypothesis. 
Rather, growth management support/adoption is broadly based; in general, a strong and 
consistent relationship between growth management supports or the incidence of growth 
restriction and residents’ sociodemographic characteristics is lacking. Some studies find partial 
evidence showing that certain indicators of socioeconomic status, such as education and income, 
is positively related to the adoption of growth management (Connerly and Frank, 1986; Gale and 
Hart, 1992; Howell-Moroney, 2004; Knaap, Smith and Johnsen, 1997; Romero and Lisero, 
2002). However, the majority of existing studies indicate a mixed relationship or no relationship 
at all (Baldassare, 1984 and 1985; Baldassare and Wilson, 1996; Bollens, 1990; Gottdiener and 
Neiman, 1981; Knaap, 1987; Logan and Zhou, 1990; Pendall, 2001). Some studies even find that 
some sociodemographic indicators operate in a manner that contradicts the conventional 
expectation (Albrecht, Bultena and Hoilberg, 1986).  
There are concerns with this set of studies. First, if we follow the status hypothesis focusing 
internally on communities, the adoption of growth measures is supposed to be the outcome of 
political struggle between local residents and interest groups such as the growth machine. While 
most policy adoption studies take into account the status of local residents, these studies do not 
control for the influence of the growth machine. This omission may be responsible for the mixed 
empirical results.  
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Second, lower status residents may also have grounds to oppose development. There are 
circumstances under which lower income residents might also be seriously disadvantaged by 
development, by being displaced by gentrification, renewal, or redevelopment policies (Henig 
1982). Lower status communities seeking superior fiscal conditions may also limit access to their 
communities to those contributing a positive net fiscal dividend (Buchanan, 1971). However, 
with limited resources and capacity, lower status residents may only be able to express a growth-
limitation attitude, for there is a higher chance of their failing in a policy adoption battle with the 
growth machine. This may lead to inconsistent findings in both attitude/support and adoption 
studies.  
2.3.2 Growth 
In the growth hypothesis, the pace of growth, population size, growth-related problems and 
residents’ perception of such problems are all expected to influence the attitude toward and/or 
adoption of growth management policies. Rapid population growth can result in dramatic 
changes in the quality of life as well as the so-called “bottleneck effect” in which a community’s 
capacity to keep up with growth is severely taxed (Dowall, 1980). Large population size is 
expected to produce anti-growth sentiment as people react to “size effects” (Dowall, 1980). 
Residents’ perception of growth can also influence their opinion of growth management 
(Baldassare, 1984). If citizens see rapid population growth as limiting their community’s 
capacity to provide adequate public services, then dissatisfaction with local public services may 
be associated with favorable attitudes toward growth control and growth management.  
Studies focusing on the growth hypothesis have also reached mixed conclusions. Only a few 
studies have found that rapid growth positively affects growth policy adoption (Protash and 
Baldassare, 1983; Smutny, 1998), while many have found that objectively-measured growth rate 
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surprisingly does not affect public support for growth management and the adoption of such 
policies (Baldassare and Wilson, 1996; Connerly and Frank, 1986; Logan and Zhou, 1990). 
Residents’ perception of their communities has only a moderate predicting power of growth 
management policies. In an attitude survey, Baldassare (1984) has found that perceived rapid 
growth positively affects local concern about growth, but the perception is only weakly related to 
growth per se. By examining three surveys over time, Baldassare and Wilson (1996) find that the 
influence of perceived rapid growth on growth control support changes over time.  
An apparent problem with this set of studies is that they do not control for the mitigation of 
growth. In the growth hypothesis, it is the negative results from growth, rather than growth itself, 
that cause residents’ dissatisfaction; this attitude may turn into the emergence of growth 
management. Rapid growth may not necessarily result in such problems as traffic congestion and 
school overcrowding if it is well planned and regulated, or the problems might be less severe if 
the community has a higher capacity to accommodate such growth. Thus, indicators of negative 
results from growth, rather than growth itself, should be included in this type of test.  
2.3.3 State Intervention 
State intervention can also shape the local adoption of growth policies. States can directly 
intervene into local growth management efforts in two ways—mandates or incentives (Gale and 
Hart, 1992; Pendall, 2001). Under state mandates, all municipalities will have to adopt certain 
forms of growth management polices with no exceptions. Under state incentives, however, a 
number of communities might be attracted to adopt growth management, although they would 
not do so if there were no state incentives. Whether under mandates or incentives, the question 
therefore is not so much related to policy adoption but rather the contents of adopted polices or 
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policy restrictiveness, since the contents of the policies will reflect municipalities’ true intention 
in controlling growth.  
The state can also indirectly affect local growth policy through structural influences on 
localities’ power and structure. As Frug and Barron (2008) put it, a state’s local government law 
or the law of municipal corporations determines the legal status of local municipalities and 
differs from state to state. For example, the law determines whether cities can act on their own 
initiative or only with the express approval of the state legislature. The law can also define cities’ 
fiscal authority and their powers to regulate land-use development within their boundaries. This 
kind of restriction frames city structure, under which cities operate and carry out policies that 
include growth management.  
2.3.4 Other Factors 
The above review gives us a mixed image regarding the relationship between the three key 
factors—resident status, growth, and state intervention—and policy adoption or policy contents. 
Thus we must ask if there are truly any consistent relationships, or whether some important 
factors influencing policy adoption are missing. Efforts have been made to examine more factors 
such as the local mobilization process, advocacy group formation and local political institutions.  
In response to the above mixed findings, Logan and Zhou (1990) speculate that growth 
management, in some cases, might be “symbolic manipulations used to forestall local 
mobilization on growth issues rather than a consequence of such mobilization” (p. 125) and they 
therefore call for an examination of the political process, particularly citizen mobilization itself, 
behind policy adoption. Efforts have been made in this direction.  
By looking at the policy adoption process marked by growth conflict and citizen mobilization, 
Donovan and Neiman (1992) find that status measures fail to register statistically significant 
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impacts on policy restrictiveness when the systematic components of growth conflict and citizen 
mobilization—both constructed as subjective variables based on the authors’ opinion survey—
are also included in the estimation. However, they argue that no direct relationship between 
status measures and policy restrictiveness in their model suggests that status matters: 
“Community status might affect a city’s policy mix indirectly, through its relationship with 
higher conflict over growth issues that is subsequently translated into effective political 
mobilization” (Donovan and Neiman, 1992, p. 671).  
Attention has also been paid to another more objective aspect in the political process of policy 
adoption—advocacy group formation. Through a series of case studies along Lake Ontario 
embayment communities, Pendall et al. (2005) in an unpublished research focus on the formation 
of environmental advocacy groups and the role they play in policy formation. They contend that 
groups in the policy adoption process can exaggerate their members’ aggregate political 
influence and shift policy outcomes toward their members’ preferences. Thus, they suggest that 
the formation of groups has intermediating effects and may be responsible, at least partially, for 
the inconsistent relationships found in policy adoption literature.  
Putting the above reviewed factors together, I have composed a flowchart showing the growth 
policy adoption process (Figure 2-1). In this flowchart, I have also included an important 
factor—the political institutional setting that constitutes the arena for the political process and 
within which political mobilization occurs and advocacy groups form. However, this political 
institutional factor is rarely focused on policy adoption studies. As policy adoption is the focus of 
this study, I will devote the following section to describing it.  
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Figure 2-1. Growth Management Policy Adoption Process 
2.3.5 Political Institutions 
Using the definition developed by Jackson (1990), we can think of political institutions as a 
set of rules and organizations that facilitate the aggregation and socialization functions of society 
(see also Gerber, 1991). In democratic governments, political institutions facilitate the process of 
preference aggregation, while the nature and design of institutions determine how the policy 
preferences of many individuals are summed up and reflected into policy outcomes (Riker, 
1980). Institutions also provide messages and information by which individuals develop or learn 
their own preferences (March and Olsen, 1984).  
In broad term, there are two types of political institutions—direct legislation and 
representative legislation. Direct legislation is characterized by a relatively simple institutional 
structure in which voter preferences are aggregated directly into a policy outcome. 
Representative legislation is characterized by a more complex institutional environment in which 
voters first elect their representatives and then the representatives represent the interests of their 
constituents in the legislative process.  
By means of affecting individual preference and the preference aggregation process, different 
political institutions may lead to different policy outcomes for a given issue and a given 
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distribution of voter preferences. Gerber (1991) finds that direct ballot institutions lead to 
different policy outcomes than legislative institutions, although legislators do respond to the 
constraints imposed on them by voters in their districts. These differences may be either in the 
substantive areas covered by policy (for example, states with initiative may institute policies in 
the area of government reform, such as term limits, which the legislators themselves would not 
pass) or in the content of policy in an existing substantive area (Gerber, 1991). From this 
perspective, the direct legislation process does matter in affecting policy outcomes provided they 
are successfully employed, meaning that the propositions on the ballot are passed.  
Meanwhile, persistence of initiatives or other direct legislation tools, whether successful or 
not, exert certain influences over the decision-making process and tend to make the legislative 
body more responsive to the opinion of voters. Circulation of a large number of initiative 
petitions is an indicator of voter discontent and a protest against the unresponsiveness of 
legislative bodies to the concerns of certain groups of citizens. The threat of an initiative 
campaign or the collection of the required number of certified signatures may prod a legislature 
to enact policies that activists promote; a direct initiative campaign might be terminated if the 
campaign organizers are satisfied with the enacted policies (Zimmerman, 1999).  
Even the mere existence of a provision for direct legislation may affect the legislative process 
directly (Gerber, 1991). Legislators may anticipate the possibility that a measure will be 
introduced as an initiative if it fails in the legislature and so adapt their legislative behavior 
accordingly. Anticipating a vote by the electorate may lead to shirking on the part of the 
legislator: he or she may avoid taking a firm position on tough issues by voting to send the 
measure to the electorate and “letting the voters decide.” A “yes” vote on a measure that will be 
sent to the electorate (such as constitutional amendments or bond issues) can be justified as an 
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action taken to ensure a citizen vote, not necessarily as an endorsement of the policy. Similarly, a 
“no” vote on regular legislation can be justified as forcing the measure out of the legislature 
through defeat and into the electorate. This sort of strategic behavior will lead to changes not 
only in the total policy outcome, but also to changes in the policy produced by the legislature 
itself.  
The number of studies focusing on the effects of political institutions on growth management 
is limited. By examining urban growth boundaries adopted in a large sample of California 
municipalities, Gerber and Phillips (2005) find that political institutional characteristics such as 
previous initiative use and city councils’ pro-growth preference lead to the adoption of UGBs by 
ballot box; these ballot box UGBs, compared with council-adopted UGBs, are more extreme and 
more difficult to amend or repeal, but do not result in less coherent or more fragmented policy 
regimes.  
Using Florida survey data from 2002 to 2007, Cruz (2009) seeks to understand how local 
government characteristics determine smart growth-related land-use regulations. He finds that 
the characteristics of local government, such as the mayor-council form, proportion of at-large 
seats in the council, and the presence of standing committees and citizens’ boards are all 
determinants of smart growth policy adoption. Further, he also finds that in the presence of the 
mayor-council form of government, interest groups’ influence on smart growth policy adoption 
is affected—homeowner associations have a stronger impact while developers have a weaker 
impact.  
Using data of California ballot box growth controls, Nguyen (2009) tests four hypotheses 
regarding the motivations for local growth control—growth pressures, community status, 
metropolitan hierarchy, and strategic interaction. She finds that jurisdictions’ growth control 
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policies influence the growth decisions made by neighboring jurisdictions within the same 
region.  
In sum, compared to the common representative legislation, direct legislation may exert 
different influences on policy adoption and lead to different policy outcomes. This study focuses 
on such influences and tests both whether and how direct democracy affects growth management 
policies. In the following section, I will move my focus onto direct democracy and its practice in 
the planning field in order to set up a background for this study.  
2.4 Direct Democracy 
2.4.1 Direct Democracy in General 
Direct democracy, also called direct legislation, is a process in which voters directly decide 
issues of public policy by voting on ballot propositions. It is essentially a legislature made up of 
all citizens and in which the citizens are directly engaged in their own self-governance. In a pure 
direct democracy system, the laws passed by the masses are the laws of the land and there are no 
other lawmaking branches of the government. In practice, however, the direct democracy process 
is not the sole lawmaking body; rather it works in conjunction with the state and federal 
legislatures, essentially creating a fourth branch of government.  
Direct democracy takes different forms—initiative, referendum, recall, and town meeting. 
Since recall is a political procedure in which voters can remove their elected officials from office 
and thus not directly related to policy outcome, it is not considered in this study. Following are 
definitions for the three pertinent forms:  
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• Initiative: The process through which the voters, by petition, may propose policies 
such as new charter provisions or ordinances and enact them by direct voting.11 The 
voter response may be binding or non-binding on local government.  
• Referendum: The process through which voters may approve or reject at the polls 
policies such as an ordinance or charter amendment passed by the legislature.12 The 
results may be binding or non-binding on local government.  
• Town meeting: A form of local government mainly practiced in the New England 
region, and in which qualified voters gather periodically to act, by direct vote, as a 
legislative body in matters of town business such as electing public officials, adopting 
local regulations, setting local tax rates and making appropriations.13  
Direct democracy as a legislative principle was not introduced in the United States 
Constitution; however, the theory of direct democracy has been put into practice in a number of 
states. The movement toward direct democracy began in the United States in the late 1800s due 
to a generalized distrust by the people of local government (Fountaine, 1988). The people 
believed that local governments had become corrupted by corporations. This initiative was 
supported by the Progressive movement as a way to battle the power of corporations (Magleby, 
                                                 
11
 There are two types of initiative: direct initiative and indirect initiative. In a direct initiative, after the required 
number of signatures is acquired, the proposal is placed on the ballot for vote in the next election. In an indirect 
initiative, the completed petition is submitted to the legislature for enactment of legislation within a specified period 
of time. If no such action is taken, the measure is automatically placed on the ballot for vote in the following 
election.  
12
 There are two types of referendums: popular and legislative. In a popular referendum, a law passed by the 
legislature will not go into effect for a specified period of time. A petition circulated for signatures during this time 
will determine if a referendum will be held concerning the law. If the required number of signatures is obtained, then 
the law will not be effective until the referendum takes place. In a legislative referendum, the law is referred to the 
polls by the legislature, either voluntarily or according to legislative requirement, for voter approval or rejection.  
13
 There are two types of town meeting: open and representative. An open town meeting means that all of the town’s 
voters may vote on all matters. In a representative town meeting, also called a limited town meeting, all of the 
town’s voters may vote for what are called town meeting members. After the voters elect the town meeting 
members, these elected members conduct and vote on the rest of the town meeting’s business.  
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1984); it was believed that direct democracy would better reflect the free decisions of the popular 
will.  
Today, even though there is no nationwide direct democracy provision and practice, most 
states and local jurisdictions have some form of direct democracy, typically in the form of 
initiatives and referendum, available to their citizens14 either through state constitutions, state 
statutes, or local home rule charters (Caves, 1992). By 2001, every state has some form of 
legislative referendum; 27 states permit the use of initiative and popular referendum at the state 
level: 24 states allow the use of initiatives and 24 states allow the use of popular referendum 
(Waters, 2001). These states are disproportionately concentrated in the West and Midwest.  
At the local level, according to the Initiative and Referendum Institute’s 2005 initiative 
survey,15 over 80% of cities allow initiatives; it is more common for larger cities to have 
initiative provisions than smaller cities. These cities are most likely in the West and least likely 
in the Midwest and Northeast. The survey also shows that cities are much more likely to permit 
initiatives in states that allow statewide initiatives than cities in states that do not allow statewide 
initiatives. As to legislative referendums, according to the International City/County 
Management Association’s 2001 Municipal Form of Government survey, nearly 90% of 
communities have some form of legislative referendum and there is little variation in this figure 
among different types of communities with regard to region, population size, and location; 
However, only slightly over one-third of municipalities reported that they have provisions for 
                                                 
14
 More than 70% of Americans live in states or cities with some form of initiative and referendum authority 
(Matsusaka, 2004).  
15
 Nationwide data on local direct democracy is limited. The Initiative and Referendum Institute (IRI) at the 
University of Southern California and the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) mentioned 
following are the only two found which collect and maintain such data. The IRI collects data on both the state and 
local levels, but its local database contains limited information—only the initiatives in large cities. The ICMA 
conducts a Municipal Form of Government survey every five years, asking a wide variety of questions about 
political structures, including initiatives, referendums, and their usage within cities and counties. Both IRI and 
ICMA issued reports on local initiatives and referendums. 
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popular referendums; this direct democracy tool is prevalent in the West and in larger cities 
(ICMA 2001 survey).  
The practice of direct democracy has been increasing since the 1970s, but its usage is 
generally limited when compared to its wide availability. According to the Initiative and 
Referendum Institute’s 2009 report on state level initiative use, since the late 1970s, with 
California’s tax-capping Proposition 13, each following decade has seen more initiatives on the 
ballot and more initiatives being approved. Furthermore, based on the same report, from 1904 to 
2008 the majority of the initiative states have placed on the ballot, on average, no more than one 
measure a year. During that period seven states have on average practiced initiative more than 
one time and five of these are in the West—Oregon, California, Colorado, North Dakota and 
Arizona.  
Procedures for direct democracy are not uniform, however. How state and local governments 
structure the direct democracy process influences the extent to which the process is used and 
how it is used. State and local provisions affect how many and what types of issues qualify for 
the ballot; the number of signatures required for placing a proposition on the ballot; the 
legislative review procedure; whether voters receive materials from the government explaining 
the ballot measures; the limitations on campaign spending; the number of votes necessary for 
passage and similar questions16. Most importantly, the legislative provisions can set the legal 
base as to whether or not a locality may use direct democracy tools in the planning field.17  
Planning through initiative/referendum or ballot box is also referred to as ballot box planning. 
A parallel practice, the town meeting, is in essence a different form of ballot box planning. Even 
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 For a comparison among state provisions, see Magleby, 1984 (pp. 38-39). 
17
 The situation here is complicated. While a common law jurisdiction may be limited by state provisions on their 
direct democracy practice, a charter jurisdiction in the same state may employ such practice based solely on their 
own charter.  
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though both initiative/referendum and town meeting involve direct legislation by the electorate, 
both have distinct differences that will be discussed separately in the following sections.  
2.4.2 Ballot Box Planning 
Direct democracy has long been practiced in the planning field. It is labeled as “ballot box 
planning,” and is at times also called “do-it-yourself land-use controls,” “grassroots planning” or 
“electoral land-use planning.” Ballot box planning represents the attempts of local residents and 
community groups to develop and approve or disapprove planning policies through the use of 
initiative and referendum. The legislative body, such as a city council or county commission, is 
bypassed in this decision-making process. All land-use actions subject to ballot measures share 
the common goal of wanting to regulate the amount, rate, location, timing and/or quality of 
future development, at least observably.  
However, the ability of voters to engage in ballot box planning is quite limited. First, there is 
no national initiative in the US and it seems unlikely to adopt one in the near future (Cronin, 
1980). Second, rather than such an initiative being a universal and unconstrained right in state 
contexts, only about half of the 50 states allow initiative and referendum rights at the state level18 
(Buck, 1980; Cronin, 1980; Waters, 2001).  Third, some states recognize such powers only over 
statewide but not local issues. The practice of local ballot box planning can be expected in only a 
minority of states. And finally, even in that minority of states, the ballot box planning process 
and outcome have been litigated frequently if not in every case; for this reason the court adds 
additional constraints on the use of ballot box planning.  
2.4.2.1 The Scope 
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 By 2000, the number of states permitting initiative and/or referendum has reached 27 (Waters, 2001).  
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Twenty states19 allow their local jurisdictions to practice ballot box planning. However, 
information on nationwide local ballot box planning practice is extremely limited. Myers (1999 
and 2008) and Myers and Puentes (2001) conducted a series of surveys on ballot box measures 
that appeared on election days; their reports provide valuable information in this regard. 
However, California is an exception in studies on ballot box planning. Massive researches are 
available focusing on the practice and impacts of initiative and referendum in California 
localities, many with particular focus on land use and growth issues.  
According to Myers’ survey, ballot box planning is practiced infrequently across the country 
despite its wide availability. In the 2000 general election, even though over 80% of cities allow 
initiatives, voters placed only 55 initiatives, including state level initiatives, on the ballot box. 
Referendum had a larger number of 520, also including state measures, but it is still far from 
being labeled as common given the large number of US cities, towns and counties.  
However, there is a trend toward a measurable increase in the number of ballot box planning 
measures, and the regional distribution pattern is also clear. Two nationwide comprehensive 
surveys, conducted in 1998 and 2000, revealed a substantial increase in the number and types of 
measures placed on the ballot box (Myers, 1999; Myers and Puentes, 2001). In 1998, there 
were14 state and 226 local ballot measures related to conservation, parklands, and smart growth, 
an increase of more than 50% over 1996. In 2000, 36 state and 539 local ballot box measures 
were identified, more than doubling those of 1998.20 Although ballot box planning practices 
appear across the nation, the regional distribution pattern is clear—most local measures were 
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 While this number appeared in Calavita (1992, p. 4) and Nguyen (2004, p. 93), no citation was provided in either 
source. 
20
 Cautions should be used here. Myers’ 1998 survey only focused on open space measures, while his 2000 survey 
covered more aspects of land-use issues. If comparing only the open space measures, the results indicate only a 
15.7% increase.  
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found in the West, followed by the Midwest, the South and the Northeast (Myers and Puentes, 
2001).  
A variety of growth measures have appeared on the ballot box. The issues include adopting or 
rejecting a general plan; rezoning of a tract of land; building height limitation; open space and 
park-related measures; growth management plans; rental apartment permission in certain areas; 
creating a buffer zone and similar issues (Caves, 1992; Myers and Puentes, 2001). However, 
these issues cannot be generalized to all 50 states. While a particular state may permit some of 
the above issues to be placed on the ballot, another state may prohibit its practice the same way.  
The voter approval rate has been stable over time, and the rates for state and local level 
measures are almost the same. In 1998, voters passed 72% of total measures, a success rate 
similar to that in 1996 (Myers, 1999). In 2000, the approval rate was still about 72% (Myers and 
Puentes, 2001). Looking at regions, the approval rate of local measures in 2000 was highest in 
the Northeast, followed by the South, and then the Midwest and the West. Looking at geographic 
patterns, central cities passed ballot box measures at a rate of 80%, followed by suburban 
localities, which showed more than 75%, while rural areas observed a much lower rate of 60%.  
The measures were placed on the ballot by two different means—legislative referendum and 
citizen initiative.21 The former is widely used and accounted for more than 90%, while the 
initiatives only accounted for less than 10%. However, the smaller number of initiatives 
presented a much stronger influence on the nature of the adopted measures. For example, 
Arizona and Colorado statewide planning proposals were advanced by the Sierra Club and other 
environmental groups; Oregon’s Measure 7, which revamps Oregon’s land-use law, was 
proposed by conservative taxpayer groups.  
                                                 
21
 The exact terms used in the report are “legislative referrals” and “citizen initiatives.” However, Myers did not 
mention popular referendum specifically. According to his description of the two means, popular referendum should 
be included in the second category—citizen initiatives. 
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Local ballot measures have a geographic distribution pattern. Of the local measures, the 
majority (73%) of these were placed on ballots in suburban jurisdictions, while only 12% and 
15% were placed on the ballot box in central cities and rural areas respectively. Growth-related 
measures dominated suburban ballots. 90% of citizen-led ballot initiatives were found in 
suburban areas and more than three-quarters of these were growth management measures. These 
facts may imply that suburbs have a much higher level of controversy in growth politics.  
2.4.2.2 The Court 
The court has played an important role in the development of ballot box planning. While 
federal courts have tended to be supportive of land-use controls passed by initiative and 
referendum, state courts such as those in Utah, Nebraska, Arizona, New Jersey, Michigan and 
Washington have been more restrictive of the use of the ballot box in the adoption and 
amendment of such controls (Settle, 1983). However, California is unique. Its courts have 
defended the right of local voters to utilize these tools of direct democracy for growth 
management (Curtin and Jacobson, 1989), while at the same time decreeing that such activities 
satisfy a number of specified requirements. California voters may apply both initiative and 
referendum to growth control efforts without certain procedural requirements such as notice, 
public hearing, and even the environmental review procedures of the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA); however, they cannot place on the ballot growth measures that unfairly 
discriminate against a particular parcel of property, conflict with the general plan, or will 
interfere with legislation addressing matters of regional or statewide concern (Zovanyi, 1992).  
2.4.2.3 Why Ballot Box Planning 
Voter dissatisfaction with or distrust of their representative government may result in the 
increased use of ballot box planning (Caves, 1992; Lucero, 2003; Magleby, 1984). Many 
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jurisdictions have a pro-growth attitude because they believe the benefits associated with growth, 
such as job and housing opportunities and increases in the tax base, outweigh the costs brought 
about by growth (Caves, 1992).22 Pro-growth jurisdictions are often teamed with the growth 
machine (Deleon and Powell, 1989; Logan and Molotch, 1987). However, local residents may 
view growth from a different perspective—traffic congestion, overcrowded schools, poor 
infrastructure maintenance and similar problems. Accordingly, local residents may turn to the 
ballot box in an attempt to respond to their government’s pro-growth stance in order to preserve 
their quality of life.  
Other factors can also lead to the practice of ballot box planning. The public sector’s failure to 
effectively implement previously-enacted measures can also cause citizens to use ballot box 
planning. Caves (1992) writes from the perspective that “sensing a lack of commitment on 
enforcing current policies, citizens have taken matters into their own hands and formulated 
growth control policies that allow the voters to decide whether new residential, commercial, or 
industrial projects will be approved.” Meanwhile, some particular land use issues such as “local 
unwanted land use” (LULU) or “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) land use may also lead to ballot 
box planning (Collins, Dotson and Waters, 1985). If this kind of activity is planned in a 
community, local residents may develop a ballot box measure that gives them the right to 
approve or disapprove the location of that type of land use.  
Studies have also pointed to strategic use of ballot box planning. Legislators may use the 
ballot box strategically as a “powerful agenda setting tool” (Magleby, 1988). Voters may turn to 
the initiative or referendum to get an issue before the public, dramatize it, and force the city 
council to publicly address the issue (Caves, 1992). The increase of single-issue politics also 
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 However, there are different arguments on this point. For example, Burke (2009) claims that not many state and 
local governments are so pro-development that they ignore the negative impacts of development and fail to plan for 
rational development.  
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leads to the popular use of direct democracy, as in direct democracy single-issue groups do not 
have to worry about unseating politicians and can go directly to the people with their appeals 
(Magleby, 1984).23 The use of ballot box planning could be a response to local legislature 
characteristics or the structural imbalances of the makeup of local government (Gerber and 
Phillips, 2005; Selmi, 2002). Moreover, the contagious effect may be at work here—voters may 
use ballot box planning simply because their neighboring jurisdictions have used it (Nguyen, 
2009).  
2.4.2.4 The Debate 
Ballot box planning has been popularly debated, and the debate mainly focuses on its nature 
and procedures. On the nature debate, proponents hail direct democracy as “real democracy” 
because it reduces the power of political parties, party bosses and special interests. Critics argue 
that direct democracy is in conflict with democratic principles such as openness, accountability, 
competence and fairness. In fact, it may be inefficient, unwise and undemocratic (Burke, 2009), 
as participants are not representative of the whole population and are only concerned with their 
own narrow interests while ignoring the needs of the community. Weinberg (2002) further 
believes that “this type of legislation is reductive in nature; it reduces a complex series of 
problems and issues to a sound bite.”  
Evidence also indicates that direct democracy may lead to the tyranny of the majority, with 
possible exclusionary outcomes. A 1997 study found that voters approve 75% of the direct 
democracy measures that seek to repeal existing civil rights laws such as fair housing and school 
desegregation, or to prevent public officials from enacting such laws (Lucero, 2003). Selmi 
(2002) also claims that the use of direct democracy in the land use context is at its most dubious 
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 The ascendancy of single-issue politics was related to the declining influence of political parties—a conversion 
from ideology-based politics to interest-based politics (Kalt and Zupan, 1984).  
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when automatically triggered and when focused on land-use decisions that have no policy 
aspects to them.  
On the procedure debate, supporters feel that ballot box planning offers “valuable procedures 
for encouraging more direct democratic participation in local planning and zoning issues” 
(McClendon, 1990), and claim that the process can enlighten and educate voters and enable 
officials to hear a variety of opinions about an issue and develop widespread community support 
(Caves, 1992). Opponents point out that planning through the ballot box produces both a 
deliberative failure and a planning failure (Burke, 2009). First, the process ignores the planning 
process such as public hearing and committee review requirements, negotiation and mediation 
among different interests, and lacks the quality of information that complex issues and decisions 
require. Thus, voters cast their votes based primarily on catchy advertisements (Callies and 
Curtin, 1990; Lucero, 2003; Selmi, 2002). Second, ballot box measures jeopardize 
comprehensive planning and upset the delicate structure of land-use decisions. Lucero (2003) 
argues that planners strive to make land-use regulations from a comprehensive and long-term 
perspective that is consistent with a community’s plan, but ballot box voters do not have such a 
perspective.  
In sum, while the normal regulatory process is certainly superior to the use of ballot box 
planning, a strong case can be made in defense of this form of planning. Indeed, direct 
democracy can serve valuable purposes and is not necessarily incompatible with sound land-use 
practices (Selmi, 2002).  
2.4.2.5 The Impact 
Evidence has shown that growth management measures adopted at the ballot box actually 
slow down growth. Employing the data from California ballot measures from 1986 to 1999 and 
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city-level housing and demographic data, Nguyen (2007) finds that cities in which growth 
controls were adopted at the ballot box do have slower rates of housing growth, indicating that 
the adoption of ballot box growth controls is not merely symbolic politics, but can make real and 
measurable impacts on housing growth. The same study also finds that ballot box growth 
controls reduce growth in Hispanic and low-income populations, contributing to the socio-spatial 
segregation of cities by race and income.  
Moreover, using a transaction-cost framework, an empirical analysis of 63 Ohio cities finds 
that cities which subject rezoning decisions to public referendum are more likely to experience a 
lower level of building activity by increasing uncertainty and risk for property owners and 
developers (Staley, 2001). The same impacts hold true whether a community voted for or against 
development.  
In contrast, by examining general election voter requirement ballot measures from a sample of 
California communities taken in 2000, Gerber and Phillips (2004) find that voter requirements 
fail to stop new development; property owners and developers can and do adapt to the 
constraints created by these direct democracy institutions. However, voter requirements change 
the way developers interact with interest groups in the community and force developers to 
compensate current residents for their having to endure some of the negative aspects of growth.  
The impact of ballot box planning suggests that there may be a link between ballot box 
planning and more restrictive growth measures. Nevertheless, the importance and impact of 
ballot box planning should not be overstated. Rather, while ballot box planning provides 
community and environmental groups with a powerful tool in their struggle against the growth 
machine, the potential of this tool depends on the broad political and economic context of growth 
and planning at the local level (Calavita, 1992).  
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2.4.3 Town Meeting 
Established by Puritans in colonial times, the practice of town meeting is almost exclusive to 
the New England region. In use for over 300 years and continuing today, town meeting is 
claimed to be a valuable means for citizens to voice their opinions and directly affect change in 
their communities.  
The concept of the town meeting has undergone several major alterations. In the late 
nineteenth century, a number of municipalities that used town meeting established finance 
committees to advise the electorate. More recently, the open town meeting in some towns has 
been converted to representative town meeting in which only elected town meeting members, 
instead of the electorate at large, can vote on town business. Some towns limit the decision-
making of town meeting only to budget and appropriation rather than a full range of authorities. 
Some other towns have replaced town meeting government completely with a town council 
which possesses full legislative authority. Still several other towns hold only a deliberative town 
meeting supplemented by an official ballot, so that voters subsequently go to the polls to vote on 
town issues. Most surprisingly, a few towns abandoned the representative town meeting for the 
open town meeting, and some even reverted from a town council to town meeting.  
However, not all towns have town meeting. In Massachusetts, for example, most towns do 
have town meeting, but a few towns are governed by town councils.24 Towns with fewer than 
6,000 inhabitants must have an open town meeting. Towns with more than 6,000 inhabitants may 
adopt either open town meeting or representative town meeting at their discretion.  
Each town must hold an annual town meeting. Additional town meetings are called special 
meetings. They may be called as many times during the year as necessary. An annual town 
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 No cities in Massachusetts have town meetings. A city is governed by a city council or a board of aldermen. 
Towns with less than 12,000 inhabitants cannot adopt a city form of government.  
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meeting, unless otherwise provided by special law or charter, must be held in February, March, 
April or May. The Board of Selectman may delay the annual meeting, but it must be completed 
by the end of June.  
In most cases, town meeting makes the following major decisions: the election of public 
officials; the salaries of elected officials; appropriation of the budget; and the town’s local 
statutes, also called by-laws.  
Most towns elect officers25 on one day and begin conducting other business on a later day. 
Many towns wait a week or more between the election of officers and the first business meeting. 
A few towns may elect officers as early as November of one year, and conduct the business 
meeting in the next year. A town may divide its business meeting into two meetings. Towns that 
do so hold one business meeting at the beginning of the year—focused primarily on the budget, 
finances and taxes, and the second in the fall—focused on zoning, planning and by-laws.  
Voters may insert articles into the warrant26 of annual or special town meetings. They must do 
so before the selectmen close the warrant. To insert an article into the warrant, a minimum 
number or a minimum percentage of registered voters of the town must sign a written request.  
2.4.3.1 The Scope 
Nowadays, town meeting is still a distinguished feature of most New England towns.27 
According to Zimmerman (1999),28 413 out of 420 towns, 98% of the towns in Maine, hold town 
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 Town meeting members are not elected by party. Elections are nonpartisan. The party affiliation of a 
candidate for town meeting member does not appear on the ballot distributed at the town meeting. 
 26
 The warrant is a town meeting’s agenda, which lists a meeting’s time, place, and articles. A town meeting’s 
action is not valid unless the subject was listed on the warrant. 
27
 Even though rare, town meeting practice can still be found in towns in other states, especially in the Midwest, 
such as Michigan and Minnesota. However, their system has very limited powers compared with those found in 
New England towns.  
28
 Zimmerman’s data on New England towns and town meeting are the most complete, although they are from a 
decade ago. There is more recent information on those numbers, but it is not complete and shows no significant 
change from Zimmerman’s data. An example can be seen at 
http://www.mma.org/images/stories/AbtLocalGov/formsofgov08.pdf. 
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meeting, while 113 out of 169 towns, 67% of the towns in Connecticut, have town meeting. 
Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire are somewhere in between. The only exception is 
Rhode Island. An even 20 out of 31 towns in Rhode Island hold town meeting, but here it is 
called financial town meeting and has limited authority; it may only act on financial affairs, as 
the towns’ legislative powers have been vested in a town council. The direct democracy tradition 
is now uncommon in Rhode Island, mainly due to a change in the state’s constitution, which has 
led to a greater degree of home rule power in local jurisdictions.  
Open town meeting is dominant in New England towns that hold town meeting, while 
representative town meeting is less common. Further, according to Zimmerman (1999), in 304 
town meeting municipalities in Massachusetts, 262 towns run under open town meeting while 
only 42 towns use representative town meeting. In 113 town meeting communities in 
Connecticut, 106 towns hold open town meeting and only 7 towns have representative town 
meeting. In other New England states, almost all town meeting communities hold open town 
meeting, while representative town meeting is extremely rare.  
Regarding the adoption of land-use regulations by town meeting, there are variations among 
these states in the scope of legislation. Although many towns in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, and Maine adopt and modify land-use regulations and zoning ordinances directly at 
town meeting, in Connecticut most town meeting governments are only permitted to adopt 
zoning as a concept for the town, while the actual writing and adoption of specific regulations 
fall to an elected planning and zoning board created by the town meeting. In Rhode Island, 
financial town meeting cannot make decisions on land use and zoning issues.  
2.4.3.2 The Debate 
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Similar to the debate on direct democracy in general, there are also two profoundly different 
views on town meeting government. Proponents emphasize that town meeting is the purest form 
of democracy and this process can ensure that all policy decisions are in the public interest. 
Citizens have the ability to directly manage public affairs, which bind them together as a 
community. Furthermore, advocates argue that “the meeting maximize citizen participation, 
allows ordinary voters to hold administrative officers directly accountable, provides 
psychological benefits for attendees, preserve local customs, including the town meeting supper 
and citizen service as town officers, and performs citizen education and community-building 
functions” (Zimmerman, 1999).  
Noting that issues in a town meeting are subject to considerable debate, Lowell (1926) argued 
that the citizen voters cannot reach conclusions on how to vote on warrant articles “merely after 
hearing one side stated by his friends, or reading one side in his newspaper, or being simply told 
by his party, or by some other organization.” So for voters, the decision-making process is also 
an educational process. Furthermore, Lowell emphasized that town meeting voters are able to 
question town officers and their proposals prior to voting on warrant articles and can hold the 
officers accountable.  
Critics of town meeting argue mainly from two perspectives. First, voter participation in town 
meeting is exceptionally low in other than very small towns and has been declining sharply 
during the past four decades. In a sample of 1,435 town meetings held between 1970 and 1998, 
on average only 20.5 percent of the registered voters were in attendance, and only 7 percent of 
them spoke out (Bryan, 2004). Furthermore, even this record of low town meeting attendance is 
in decline. In Vermont alone, according to a 2008 poll posted online by the Vermont Secretary of 
State, only a little more than 10 percent of the state population voted at the annual town meeting. 
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In 2009, that number dropped to 7.2 percent. In fact, most New England towns with a population 
exceeding 5,000 have debated whether the town meeting could be reformed; the conclusion was 
that small rural towns might find merit in direct democracy, but larger towns were finding town 
meeting government to be unworkable.  
Community size is the most powerful determinant of voters’ participation in town meeting. In 
small towns the participation rate is high, while in large towns the rate is low. Bryan’s model 
indicates that the size variable explains about 60 percent of the variance in town meeting 
attendance, while the next most important five predictors, such as official ballot use and the 
education index, reduce the variance in town meeting attendance by only an additional 8 percent 
(Bryan, 2004). Some researchers also attribute the decline of the town meeting to the expansion 
of the powers of the state and federal governments which make major decisions, thus limiting the 
scope of town meeting discretionary decision-making and may lead to the attitude among a 
significant number of town voters that the town meeting no longer addresses major issues that 
affect their lives (Alexander and Berger, 1949). Another reason for the decline is that the town 
meeting government places too many time demands on local residents and as a result they may 
become apolitical and leave the solution of town problems to the experts (Wood, 1958).  
Second, critics assume that the low town meeting attendance facilitates control of the 
decision-making process by interest groups that promote their special goals and therefore 
conclude that the assembly is an unrepresentative body. “Informal channels of influence will 
come to dominate decision making; and a large number of those excluded from the informal 
process will feel manipulated, angry, or apathetic, cursed with self-blame” (Mansbridge, 1976).  
Bryan (1995) wrote that a Vermont town meeting is dominated by middle class and 
professional people, while in most towns the number of blue collar and working class people 
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equals that of upscale professionals. The most affluent and the least affluent are less likely to 
attend and oftentimes the disabled, elderly, and single mothers cannot attend (Moroney, 1996). 
One author comments that when a town meeting gets packed, it gets packed more by NIMBYs 
than anyone else. In a 1996 Connecticut town meeting, “barely 50 residents came…and most 
were employees and officials who were there to answer questions. Some people who came in the 
spirit of civic pride were chased away within minutes by the hostile atmosphere” (Gross, 1996). 
There is also political manipulation in town meeting. In Vermont, items that farmers might 
oppose were sometimes placed near the end of the agenda in the hope that they would have gone 
home to milk before the items were called up (Bryan, 2004).  
2.4.3.3 The Impact 
Research on the impact of town meeting is rare, probably because town meeting practice is 
mostly limited to the New England region and does not impact the lives of a large population 
across the country. But still there have been some studies.  
One such study by Zimmerman (1999) reveals that voter superintendence of town affairs has 
proven to be effective, and there is no empirical evidence that the thousands of small towns and 
cities with elected councils in the US which are in the population range of New England towns 
are governed better. He further concludes that town meeting is a de facto representative body and 
makes policies that promote and protect public interests. In fact, an officer of a New Hampshire 
town that adopted a charter providing for a town council with full legislative authority wrote in 
1996 that “[t]he council has made no changes in policies as a result of the change in style of 
government.” On the other hand, Hudson, New Hampshire abandoned a town council and 
reverted to the open town meeting as the legislative body.  
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Today, the linchpin of town meeting government is the committee system, which performs the 
research and reference functions typically performed by committees of a representative 
legislative body. Committee members become subject matter experts and provide advice to the 
town meeting that is followed most of the time. In fact, the town meeting is synergetic, as 
participants debate the pros and cons of controversial warrant articles and may adopt 
amendments that will result in an improved policy decision.  
In a study of zoning ordinances in Massachusetts, Schuetz (2008) finds that during the 1940s 
and 1950s communities governed by town meeting zoned more restrictively for multifamily 
housing than communities governed by a council, while starting in the 1970s smaller and more 
affluent communities were more restrictive. As smaller communities in New England may 
continue to use the better-functioning town meeting, this finding may also imply that town 
meeting communities zoned more restrictively even after the 1970s than communities having a 
council.  
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Chapter 3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation seeks to understand the influence of direct democracy on growth 
management policies. This influence is examined at two levels—a locality’s growth policy 
composite vs. individual policies. A locality would employ all adopted growth management 
measures, rather than any single one of them, as a coherent whole to serve the purpose of 
managing growth. Pooling policies together as a composite could represent the overall 
restrictiveness or stringency of local efforts in growth management. At the individual policy 
level, the purpose of this research is to investigate whether direct democracy is associated with 
particular characteristics of growth management polices—in particular the exclusionary potential 
and management-orientation of such policies. The research also explores the three forms of 
direct democracy—initiative, referendum, and town meeting—to learn whether each of these 
forms influence growth management policies in the same manner.  
3.1 Research Questions 
The key question asked in this study is as follows: what are the effects of direct democracy on 
growth management? This larger question is then broken down into two sets of manageable 
research questions. The first set of questions asks how direct democracy influences a locality’s 
overall effort in achieving growth management:  
• Question 1: What is the effect of direct democracy on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies? 
• Question 1-1: What is the effect of town meeting on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies? 
• Question 1-2: What is the effect of initiative on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies? 
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• Question 1-3: What is the effect of referendum on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies? 
The second set of questions is more exploratory in nature and asks how direct democracy 
influences particular characteristics of growth management policies:  
• Question 2: What is the effect of direct democracy on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies? 
• Question 2-1: What is the effect of town meeting on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies? 
• Question 2-2: What is the effect of initiative on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies? 
• Question 2-3: What is the effect of referendum on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies? 
3.2 Conceptual Model 
I have implemented an interest-based dynamic model to describe growth management 
adoption (see Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2). This model consists of the following elements: a stage—
the political institution; players—local residents, public officials, interest groups; local 
conditions—both existing and evolving conditions related to growth, both observed and 
perceived; regional conditions—neighboring jurisdictions’ competition; background setting—
state provisions. On the stage, under a particular state’s setting, the players with different or at 
times conflicting objectives interact with each other based on their preferences as they relate to 
local conditions. Growth management is the outcome of the interaction process.  
 Local residents, growth and state intervention have been discussed in previous chapters. Here 
I will discuss the role of the stage—direct democracy vs. representative democracy—in the 
 55
model, which is one of the key concepts asked in the research questions. I focus on the working 
mechanism of the two institutions as well as different tools of direct democracy—and then 
generate hypotheses at the end. Since interest groups may exert their influence over policies in 
different ways according to the various stage settings, I will also discuss the role of interest 
groups.  
3.2.1 Direct Democracy vs. Representative Democracy 
In exploring political institutions’ effects on policy outcomes, Gerber (1991) finds that policy 
outcomes are the aggregation of individual policy preferences and that the aggregation process is 
facilitated by political institutional settings which provide the means for the transformation of 
preferences into policy outcomes. Two types of political institutions, legislative democracy and 
direct democracy, may cast different influences into final policy outcomes.  
A legislative democracy, or representative government, tends to adopt growth polices 
reflecting the preference of the median voter (Downs, 1957). In such a political institution, the 
legislature is elected by and responsible to the general electorate. In the policymaking process, 
the legislature with a goal of reelection would maximize its vote by representing the common 
interest, or the preference, of the median voter—the general public—with consideration of the 
community’s well-being for the present and future. In general, the public consists of a full 
spectrum of growth interests where the pro-growth and anti-growth interests will counteract each 
other and lead policy decisions toward a neutral point rather than an extreme one.  
Two factors may alter the propensity of council-adopted growth policies toward a growth-
promoting direction. First, due to structural constraints, in order to maintain a healthy fiscal 
status, local government might be forced to promote developmental policies in order to 
encourage economic activities (Peterson, 1981). Second, the growth machine, including the local 
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government, is often described as the most active and deliberate force in promoting development 
policies and is thus able to utilize the political process and mobilize their efforts to achieve their 
growth goals (Molotch, 1988). These factors may further push the government to adopt less 
restrictive and more growth-accommodating policies. Even so, these two statements are not 
always true, and have received criticism (Stoker, 1995; Burke, 2009). Stoker and Burke find that 
at most the growth policies will move back to a neutral position rather than to a growth-limiting 
intention.  
In contrast, direct democracy may lead to growth-limiting policies. Magleby (1984) finds a 
socioeconomic bias in direct democracy participation. He points out that in direct democracy, 
groups of higher socioeconomic status have been over-represented in voting on legislatively-
proposed statewide propositions and some initiatives, while “poorer and less educated people are 
less likely to participate even on highly salient measures” (p. 121) due to institutional hurdles 
such as the technical and legal language of ballot propositions. Although Magleby focuses his 
scope on the state level, it is reasonable to expand his findings to different government levels 
such as local municipalities. It has been established that higher socioeconomic status groups have 
the motivation and ability to limit growth, especially the types of growth involving lower status 
or minority groups, as reviewed in the previous section (Burbank, Heying, and Andranovich, 
2000; Danielson, 1976; Frieden, 1979). One may therefore conclude that those higher-status 
groups may be more likely to adopt restrictive and sometime exclusionary growth control 
measures to reach their specific goals when given access to direct democracy.  
Moreover, the practice of intense direct democracy, no matter if successful or not, or even the 
mere existence of direct democracy provisions, may exert influence over the legislative body and 
make them more responsive to the opinion of active voters—which are usually the higher 
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socioeconomic groups (Gerber, 1991; Zimmerman, 1999). If direct democracy shifts the policies 
adopted by the legislature in a restrictive and exclusionary direction, then the tendency of the 
overall efforts in growth management is also changed.  
The above reasoning also suggests that the impact of direct democracy on growth 
management may be two-fold: in addition to the direct impact of direct democracy on growth 
policies, there may also be an indirect impact of direct democracy on policies through the 
interaction between direct democracy and the socioeconomic status of local residents.  
3.2.2 Special Interest Groups 
In legislative democracy, interest groups have only limited means to sway policy direction. 
They can make contributions to political campaigns, the direct targets of which are usually the 
decision makers—elected public officials. They may also persuade the general public, and 
through them indirectly apply influence on the elected decision makers. Their efforts through 
these approaches may or may not be successful, but they cannot directly participate in the 
decision-making process.  
However, special interests may take advantage of direct democracy and shift the adopted 
policies toward growth restriction and exclusion. In direct democracy, they can not only 
persuade the decision makers, namely the ballot-voting participants, but also propose measures 
directly as individuals. Some studies have claimed that the true beneficiaries of direct democracy 
will not be the people, but the special interests (Barnett, 1915; Showell, 1952). Those special 
interests with issues at stake will simply adopt direct democracy as the political means to their 
desired ends, as direct democracy allows them to make laws free from electoral accountability 
and structural safeguards, i.e., the protections designed in representative democracy to encourage 
careful deliberation and reasoned decision-making in the legislative process. Often these interest 
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groups will be at the extremes of the political spectrum, proposing ideas of perceived common 
interest such as environmental protection, but in essence promoting narrow or private interests 
and impairing society as a whole, as exemplified by excluding minorities and the poor (Frieden, 
1976; Keefe and Ogul, 1964).  
Interest groups have comparative advantage in strategically utilizing direct democracy to 
reach their goals. Those special interests with their consultants, such as members of the 
“initiative industry,” are capable of conducting sophisticated research on the existing legal 
landscape in order to draft measures to achieve their intended goals with an eye toward future 
judicial review. Furthermore, it is not unusual for them to use focus groups and conduct polls to 
determine how most effectively to promote or spin their measures to the voters. At the same 
time, the role of the people is quite limited in direct democracy. The voters neither write the 
language of ballot measures; nor do they typically engage in meaningful public debate about the 
advisability of a proposed policy. Some voters may not even know anything about a measure 
itself prior to entering the voting booth—they cast their vote based on their understanding of 
information received from media accounts, advertising and ballot pamphlets. All these 
conditions tend to give an advantage to the special interests and to benefit them in proposing and 
adopting policies to gain the results they seek. 
3.2.3 The Working Mechanisms of Direct Democracy Tools 
Three forms of direct democracy are investigated in this study: initiative, referendum, and 
town meeting. The above model applies to each of them in slightly different ways.  
While representative councils occupy one end of the political institution spectrum and feature 
the least citizen involvement in policy adoption, initiative takes the other end of the spectrum and 
has no intermediary structures between voters and adopted policies.  Town meeting is close to 
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initiative, as limited intermediary structures such as representatives and a board of selectmen are 
seen in representative town meeting. Voters in town meeting can question town officers, thus 
allowing some debate during the policy adoption process. Referendum only places a checking 
mechanism on council-adopted policies, thus the policy adoption procedure under this 
mechanism in fact coincides with that under representative councils—the same legal procedural 
requirement and the complex nature of policies discussed above also apply to referendum.  
Matching this structural difference to the conceptual model, it can be concluded that the fewer 
intermediary structures the tool has, the more restrictive and exclusionary growth management 
policies with which it could be associated. Therefore, for resulting policy restrictiveness and 
potential exclusionary impact, I would rank the tools in the following decreasing order: initiative, 
town meeting, and referendum. In fact, growth management adopted through the referendum 
process should be similar to such measures adopted by councils without a referendum check. 
However, when compared with councils, policies adopted through various direct democracy 
tools exhibit similar properties—more restrictive, more likely to have potential exclusionary 
impacts, and less likely to have management-orientation, with the only difference being the 
extent.  
3.3 Hypotheses 
As stated in the above theoretical framework, this study provides hypotheses for the research 
questions commencing with the first set of questions as follow:  
• Question 1: What is the effect of direct democracy on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies? 
Hypothesis: A locality with direct democracy tends to have more restrictive growth 
management policies compared with a locality without direct democracy.  
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• Question 1-1: What is the effect of town meeting on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies? 
Hypothesis: A locality with town meeting tends to have more restrictive growth 
management policies compared with a locality without town meeting.  
• Question 1-2: What is the effect of initiative on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies? 
Hypothesis: A locality with initiative tends to have more restrictive growth 
management policies compared with a locality without initiative.  
• Question 1-3: What is the effect of referendum on the restrictiveness of growth 
management policies?  
Hypothesis: Referendum tends to have a neutral effect on local growth management 
in terms of restrictiveness. 
For the second set of questions:  
• Question 2: What is the effect of direct democracy on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies? 
Hypothesis: Compared with a locality without direct democracy, a locality with 
direct democracy tends to present growth management policies that have potentially 
exclusionary impacts and are less management-oriented.  
• Question 2-1: What is the effect of town meeting on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies?  
Hypothesis: Compared with a locality without town meeting, a locality with town 
meeting tends to have growth management policies that have potentially exclusionary 
impacts and are less management-oriented.  
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• Question 2-2: What is the effect of initiative on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies?  
Hypothesis: Compared with a locality without initiative, a locality with initiative 
tends to observe growth management policies that have potentially exclusionary 
impacts and are less management-oriented. 
• Question 2-3: What is the effect of referendum on the exclusionary potential and 
management-orientation of growth management policies? 
Hypothesis: Referendum tends to exert a neutral influence on the exclusionary nature 
of policies and management-orientation.  
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Chapter 4. Data and Methodology 
This study employs a mixed method—the combination of multivariate analyses and a series of 
case studies—to investigate the relationship between direct democracy and growth management. 
The quantitative multivariate analyses construct regression models based on the proposed 
conceptual framework to test the statistical relationship between direct democracy and growth 
management, while the qualitative case studies complement the models by probing into the 
dynamic local policy adoption process to further understand the interaction between direct 
democracy and growth management. The quantitative analysis is also utilized to inform case 
selection, and the analytical framework helps to analyze and interpret case study results.  
The analysis unit for this study is local jurisdictions with land use and growth management 
authorities. These jurisdictions typically include incorporated cities, towns and villages. In all 
Western US states, counties are responsible for land use regulations in unincorporated areas; 
while in many Southern and Midwest states unincorporated townships or charter townships are 
entitled to adopt their own land use policies. Some of these municipalities are also included in 
this study.  
4.1 Quantitative Analyses 
The quantitative analyses seek to answer the research questions on the effects of direct 
democracy on growth management based on empirical evidence. The datasets utilized to carry 
out these analyses follow.  
First, this study utilizes data from a nationwide land use policy survey conducted in 2003 by 
Dr. Pendall and his colleagues (Pendall, Martin and Fulton, 2002; Pendall, Puentes and Martin, 
2006) to characterize local growth management policies. Second, local direct democracy and 
other political institutional information are compiled from three sources. In early 2006, the 
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author conducted a nationwide survey of planning directors to collect information on local access 
to direct democracy and other institutional structures such as local charters (See Appendix A for 
the 2006 planning director survey instrument). Later that year, the author conducted another 
nationwide survey of APA chapter’s legislative vice-presidents in each state in order to 
supplement the previous survey (See Appendix B for the 2006 APA legislative vice-president 
survey instrument). The author also purchased data from the municipal form of government 
survey conducted in 2001 by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) to 
complement the institutional information (See Appendix C for the 2001 ICMA municipal form 
survey instrument). Third, the study utilizes data from the 1990 and 2000 US Census to 
characterize community socioeconomic status, growth characteristics and other control variables.  
4.1.1 The Policy Survey and Construction of Dependent Variables 
The 2003 policy survey was sent by mail to planning directors29 of local jurisdictions in the 
50 largest US metropolitan areas. The overall response rate of the survey was 58%. It covers a 
comprehensive set of local land use regulations including zoning, comprehensive plan, urban 
containment, infrastructure regulation, permit cap, and affordable housing programs.30 I 
construct restrictive growth management measures based on those regulations.  
4.1.1.1 Measure Grouping and Selection 
In this study, I focus only on growth management measures that are related to limiting local 
growth, which I consider to be restrictive measures. Informed by policy evaluation literature 
(Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Landis, 1992; Levine, 1999; Mayer and Somerville, 2000; Nelson 
and Duncan, 1995), I categorize growth policies into six groups based on their nature and 
objectives and then divide policies among each group based on their “average restrictive 
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 Where a planning director does not exist, the survey was sent to either another staff member (e.g., city manager, 
city engineer, zoning enforcement officer) or a public official (e.g., mayor, planning board chair, clerk). 
30
 For a detailed description on the survey, see Dr. Pendall’s dissertation (Pendall, 1995).  
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potential.” A measure is assessed as having higher average restrictive potential if evidence is 
found in the literature as to whether, on average, the measure is effective in limiting growth or 
ineffective, yet still  having substantial side effects in the constraining of growth. Otherwise, a 
measure is assessed as having a lower average restrictive potential. The six policy groups are as 
follow:  pace of growth; institutional control; zoning ordinance and subdivision regulation; urban 
containment; public service and facilities regulation; and other measures. Policies with higher 
average restrictive potential in each group are characterized as those that “matter” in growth 
issues.  
Based on this evaluation criterion, I select only those surveyed policies that pertain to limiting 
local growth to construct dependent variables—the restrictive growth management measures. In 
the end, the policies chosen as restrictive growth management measures include building permit 
cap, voter approval requirement (both for rezoning and annexation), low-density-only zoning 
(less than 8 units per acre in a jurisdiction’s highest residential density category), mobile home 
and/or apartment prohibition, urban containment (UGB/ULL/USA/USB/greenbelt), public 
service and facilities regulation (impact fee and APFO).31 See Appendix D for growth policies’ 
grouping and evaluation.  
4.1.1.2 Characteristics of Growth Management Policies 
All the restrictive measures considered in this study have, on average, growth limiting impacts 
or side effects on growth, but the way in which they influence growth and the potential 
consequences, either intended or unintended, are different. Although zoning takes a general 
approach to growth management and is applied equally throughout a jurisdiction, nevertheless 
low-density-only zoning can result in racial and social exclusion through reducing residential 
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 Two policies—low-density-only zoning and mobile home/apartment prohibition—are selected from the zoning 
ordinance and subdivision regulation group as dependent variables in order to give zoning more weight, as zoning 
ordinances control both land use types and development intensity in addition to other development characteristics.  
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growth, decreasing the share of multifamily housing, and lowering the proportion of rental units. 
This practice is labeled as a “chain of exclusion” (Pendall, 2000). Another zoning control 
measure, the prohibition of mobile homes and/or apartments, also has exclusionary intention and 
impacts by restricting the construction of mobile homes and apartments whose primary users are 
often minorities and the poor.  
Building permit cap, if set well below the community’s normal growth rate, can severely 
constrain housing production and give builders incentives to build a smaller number of larger and 
more expensive houses (Zorn, Hansen and Schwartz, 1986) as well as contributing to higher 
local and regional housing prices (Landis, 1992; Landis, 2006). Thus, this measure may 
potentially lead to exclusionary consequences through its impacts on housing production and 
prices.  
Unlike the permit cap’s control effects on growth, urban containment and public service and 
facilities regulation aim at promoting more orderly and responsible development. Containment 
measures, by redistributing development from fringe areas to more central locations, attempt to 
contain the extent of urbanization, preserve natural land, and efficiently utilize land in urbanized 
areas (Pendall, Martin and Fulton, 2002). These measures may promote higher-density and infill 
development in urbanized areas (Nelson and Duncan, 1995). Impact fees require that builders 
pay a fee to fund new infrastructure and mitigate the impacts that new development may entail or 
cause. Impact fees aim at promoting more responsible development using the concept that 
“development pays for itself.” APFOs condition the approval of development upon the 
availability of public facilities according to locally-adopted standards or levels of services 
(Nelson and Duncan, 1995). This measure may facilitate development by making new facilities 
available (Altshuler, Gómez-Ibáñez and Howitt, 1993). However, since new facilities’ plans are 
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Measures 
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prohibition 
Management 
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 Impact fee 
APFO 
Control 
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(potentially 
exclusionary) 
Permit cap 
Voter 
Approval 
Vote for annexation, 
Vote for rezoning 
in most cases laid out by the public sector, APFO is oftentimes a tool of the government for 
controlling the location and timing of developments.  
Two other similar measures, the voter approval requirement for rezoning and the voter 
approval requirement for annexation, do not have a specific stated purpose. Rather, they leave 
the decision-making authority to voters and let them decide. They can be stringent on limiting 
growth (Landis, 2006) because they increase the uncertainty in the development process that 
most developers are unwilling to face. However, the voter approval requirement for rezoning can 
also be grouped with zoning controls, and the voter approval requirement for annexation can be 
grouped with containment measures because each pair has overlapping purposes and are 
frequently administered as bundles.  
Figure 4-1 Characteristics of Growth Management Measures 
In sum, low-density-only zoning, mobile home/apartment prohibition, and at times the voter 
approval requirement for rezoning, may be labeled as exclusionary measures (Figure 4-1); permit 
caps, sometimes with voter approval requirements, may be labeled as control measures with 
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potentially exclusionary consequences; and public service and facilities regulations and 
containment measures, sometimes in combination with the voter approval requirement for 
annexation, may be grouped as management-oriented measures that in general do not lead to 
exclusionary results. Voter approval requirements for rezoning and for annexation may also be 
pooled together to represent a new category—voter approval requirements that, on their impacts, 
are close to the control measures.  
4.1.1.3 State Intervention 
The existence of certain growth management measures in some states may be the result of 
state mandates, while the absence of some measures in certain states may be caused by state 
prohibition. Therefore, this information—the existence/absence of certain measures in certain 
states—cannot be foreseen in my hypotheses by predictors such as local socioeconomic status 
and should be excluded from the models. As I do not have information on state intervention, I 
use the following inference procedures to treat these particular measures:  
First, if more than 90% of the respondents to the policy survey from a single state confirm a 
certain policy, this policy is treated as “mandatory” in that state.32 This occurs, for example, in 
the cases of affordable housing density bonuses in California and APFOs in Florida. Local 
jurisdictions do not have a choice—they have to adopt these tools. Cases with these mandatory 
policy tools in that state are dropped entirely from the analyses when modeling such policy tools. 
Second, if 0% of the respondents from a particular state have a planning tool, I assume that state 
law has overridden local institutions. I then treat this tool as "forbidden," and drop these cases 
from the analyses for that planning tool. Third, for other cases with respondents to a policy tool 
between 0% and 90%, I assume there are no state requirements, either “mandatory” or 
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 The fact that many states have a small number of respondents presents difficulties for making these kinds of 
inferences. Here only states with 10 or more responses are used as inferences.   
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“forbidden,” for that tool. These tools are thus suitable to be explained by the models employed 
in this study.  
However, in the first two steps, care has been taken to note situations in which states may 
have permitted or prohibited certain tools for incorporated units, but not for unincorporated units. 
These two types of units are then divided and make inferences separately. I do not use this 
treatment for counties because they usually have too few respondents and therefore there are 
insufficient inferences for them.  
4.1.1.4 Construction of Dependent Variables 
In order to test the hypotheses regarding the exclusionary characteristics of growth 
management measures, I construct the following six growth management policy variables: 
building permit cap; voter approval requirement; low-density-only zoning; mobile 
home/apartment prohibition; urban containment; and public service and facilities regulation. 
They are constructed as dummy variables with 1 meaning present and 0 absent.  
In order to test the restrictiveness hypotheses, I construct a composite variable—the growth 
management restrictiveness index—by adding together the values of the above six variables for 
each municipality. The assumption here is that the more growth management polices a locality 
has, the more restrictive its efforts are to manage growth. If a policy has nothing to do with 
growth management, then the locality will not bother to adopt it as a growth management 
measure. In general, different growth policies deal with different aspects of growth and more 
policies inherently cover more areas concerning growth issues. Thus a larger number of growth 
policies indicate more stringent growth management efforts. Together, these seven variables are 
used as dependent variables for analyses in this study.  
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There are limitations on the constructed dependent variables. First, this restrictiveness index 
does not take into account the local municipalities’ policy context; therefore, its comparative 
power across municipalities might be limited. For example, a density restriction measure might 
be viewed as higher density in a less developed area, while treated as lower density in an already 
densely populated area. Second, there are a variety of informal policy measures in local 
municipalities such as staff level decisions to slow processing; these informal measures work 
together with formal measures to deal with growth issues. In many cases, their importance 
cannot be neglected and should be taken into account. Third, the implementation process, such as 
the issuance of zoning variances, differs dramatically across jurisdictions, and this difference 
blurs the line between the restrictive powers of local growth policies.  
4.1.2 The Direct Democracy Survey and Construction of Direct Democracy Variables  
In 2006, I conducted the direct democracy survey with a popular online survey tool—
SurveyMonkey.33 Utilizing the 2003 policy survey pool, the 2006 direct democracy survey was 
sent to the respondents who had a valid email address in the 2003 survey.34 Before the formal 
survey, a test survey was sent to Cornell alumni of the Department of City and Regional 
Planning. The purpose was to test the feasibility of an online survey and to revise survey design 
based on survey outcomes and comments received. The formal survey was sent out three times in 
three weeks as emails and I received 262 responses in total, a response rate of 31%.35  
The survey asks four sets of questions related to the four direct democracy tools: town 
meeting, initiative, legislative referendum, and popular referendum. Each set of questions 
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 For more information on this survey tool, see its website at www.surveymonkey.com.  
34
 The 2003 policy survey received in total 1844 responses, of which 1204 respondents provided email addresses. 
The 2006 survey was sent to these 1204 email addresses. However, 379 of them were no longer valid and the survey 
email was bounced back.  
35
 This rate is apparently lower compared with that of traditional mail surveys. However, it seems acceptable 
compared with other online survey response rates. In a study analyzing meta-data for 199 surveys conducted using 
the SuperSurveyTM cluster at http://www.supersurvey.com, the median online survey response rate is only 26.45% 
(Hamilton, 2003).  
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contains three layers regarding the tool: general provision, permission of planning decision-
making with the tool, and the practice of the tool in deciding planning policies. A copy of the 
2006 direct democracy survey questionnaire is attached in Appendix A.  
The use of direct democracy is, in many cases, restricted to certain types of policies such as 
home rule charter changes and bond issues. Given this study’s focus on growth management 
policies, the type of direct democracy access in which decision-making on planning issues is 
allowed should be highly relevant to this study. Unless noted otherwise, the term “direct 
democracy,” “access to direct democracy,” “initiative,” “referendum,” and “town meeting” 
thereafter used in this study refer to direct democracy tools wherein planning decision-making is 
allowed.  
Four variables are constructed to represent direct democracy. Three of them are constructed 
from the survey directly to indicate the availability of three direct democracy tools: initiative; 
referendum; and town meeting. A general access variable is then created based on these three 
variables to indicate if there is access to any types of direct democracy tools in a locality. All 
four of the variables are constructed as dummy variables with 1 meaning available access and 0 
unavailable.36 Legislative referendum and popular referendum are pooled together to create a 
new variable—referendum—since these two share a similar characteristic in the mechanism in 
that citizens are only able to stop a measure from being adopted, but cannot propose new 
measures. This characteristic distinguishes these two from town meeting and initiative in which 
citizens can not only cast their votes but also propose new measures.  
It will benefit model testing if we increase the number of direct democracy cases and then 
potentially utilize as many policy cases as possible. The mechanism of state provisions that 
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 To be exactly, 0 means that there is no access to direct democracy or there is access to direct democracy but it is 
not allowed for planning purposes.  
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either allow or forbid local access to direct democracy may facilitate the realization of this goal. 
However, I do not have complete information on such provisions.37 An inference process similar 
to that for the policy measures is used here for direct democracy in order to account for the state 
provisions on local access to direct democracy. This process makes inferences on what direct 
democracy instruments local governments are theoretically allowed to use or prohibited from 
using in a particular state. The procedures are as follows:   
First, if less than 10% or fewer than five respondents38 from a state answer that they have a 
particular direct democracy tool, I make the inference that no local governments in that state 
have access to that tool. Second, if more than 75% from a state say they have a direct democracy 
tool, I assume all respondents in that state have access to that tool. Third, if between 10% and 
75% of the respondents say they have access to a tool, no inference is made; I instead use the 
original survey results in the models. Close attention is paid to the distinction between charter 
jurisdiction and general law jurisdiction. While general law jurisdictions comply with their state 
constitution and statutes strictly, charter jurisdictions can create their own charter and have some 
flexibility within the state statutory framework on deciding if they wish to provide access to 
direct democracy. Therefore, charter jurisdictions are excluded from the inference process.  
Results from the 2006 APA legislative vice-president survey and 2001 ICMA municipal form 
of government survey are utilized to help validate the above inference results. The inference 
result is found to be grounded, as it is consistent with available information from the two survey 
results. I do not use the two survey results directly in making inferences because neither survey 
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 I gave two efforts to collect this information—state APA chapter survey and exploration of state provisions on 
direct democracy. However, information collected from the APA chapter survey was limited. Only 12 of the 39 
states that responded the 2003 policy survey provided firm answers. My efforts in exploring state provisions were 
not so successful either mainly due to the lack of specification on local planning issues in state legal documents.  
38
 Again, for similar reasons as in making policy inferences, only states with 10 or more responses are used as 
inferences..  
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is complete in certain ways. In the 2006 APA legislative vice-president survey, I sent emails to 
all legislative vice-presidents in the US, but only received 12 useful responses. The 2001 ICMA 
municipal form of government survey only asked questions on general access to direct 
democracy, but not questions on whether or not a jurisdiction can use direct democracy tools to 
decide planning measures.  
By utilizing the inferences, I expanded the sample size. However, one tradeoff with the 
inference process is that this procedure may reduce the external validity of model testing. The 
danger might be that the presence of a planning tool in the inference cases might be the result of 
other unobserved factors rather than a direct democracy tool.  
4.1.3 Control Variables 
According to the literature review, resident socioeconomic status, growth, characteristics of 
political institutions and other variables are controlled in the models. The study uses data from 
Census 2000 to characterize socioeconomic status, data from Census 1990 and 2000 together to 
derive growth variables, and data from the ICMA survey to represent the characteristics of 
political institutions. Data for other control variables come directly from Census findings, the 
2006 direct democracy survey, and the 2001 ICMA municipal form of government survey.  
It is worth mentioning that when calculating socioeconomic and growth variables, a weighted 
approach is applied39 on unincorporated municipalities under the following assumption: within 
the geographic boundary of an unincorporated municipality, such as a county, where one or more 
incorporated sections are present, citizens from the incorporated part of the county may exert 
influence on growth management policies adopted by the unincorporated municipality. In some 
states, such as California, citizens living in cities have the legal right to vote on county planning 
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 Both weighted and unweighted variables are tested in the models. However, there are no substantial differences 
observed between the two sets of outcomes.  
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issues and therefore influence decisions on land use regulations beyond their jurisdiction, while 
in other states people residing in incorporated places are not allowed to participate in the 
decision-making process beyond their jurisdiction. In order to account for the varying influence 
exercised by residents in incorporated places on planning decisions made for unincorporated 
municipalities, characteristics of the incorporated sections within unincorporated boundaries are 
weighted based on the population share of the incorporated places over the total of both sections. 
For a description of the data process and the weighted approach, see Appendix E.  
4.1.4 Interaction Terms 
As discussed in the conceptual framework, the effect of direct democracy on growth 
management is two-fold: in addition to the direct impact of direct democracy on growth 
management policies, there is also an indirect impact of direct democracy on policies—through 
the interaction between direct democracy and local resident socioeconomic status. Therefore, 
interaction terms between direct democracy and resident status are also included and tested in the 
models. The assumption here is that given access to direct democracy, resident status matters to a 
different extent compared with situations in which no direct democracy is allowed.  
4.1.5 The Models  
A series of ordinal logistic regression models and binary logistic regression models40 are used 
to examine the empirical relationship between local access to direct democracy and growth 
management policies, while other factors suggested by policy adoption studies are controlled. 
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 Model types are determined by the values of dependent variables. There are two types of dependent variables in 
this study: growth management restrictiveness and the existence of individual measures with values 0-6 and 0/1 
respectively. These are discrete value variables and are suitable for qualitative choice models. The restrictiveness 
variable has ordered and more than two values and fits one of the multiple outcome models—the ordinal logistic 
regression model (the other multiple outcome model—the multinomial logistic regression model—is suitable to 
variables with unordered multiple values). The individual measure variable has only two possible outcomes and fits 
the binary logistic regression model.  
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Interactions between direct democracy and resident socioeconomic status are also included. See 
Table E-1 in Appendix E for a description of all the variables used in the models.  
Interestingly, after a thorough examination of the direct democracy survey results, unique 
patterns of direct democracy tools are found in two geographic areas. While town meeting is 
exclusively popular in the New England region, initiative and referendum are most commonly 
found in areas other than the New England region. See a detailed description in Section 5.2 in 
Chapter 5. Based on this result, the data are split into two sets—New England region vs. Non-
New England region—when testing the relationship between individual direct democracy tools 
and growth management41.  
4.1.5.1 Q1 Models: Growth Management Restrictiveness vs. Direct Democracy 
The aim of these models is to answer the first set of research questions on growth 
management restrictiveness. Ordinal regression models are employed to test the relationship 
between direct democracy and growth management restrictiveness. To determine the differential 
effects of direct democracy and the interaction between direct democracy and resident status, 
these two terms are included in the model additively. In the first step, I include only status and 
growth variables with control variables and compare the results with other studies looking at the 
status and growth hypotheses. Then, in the second step, I add direct democracy variables into the 
model and look at the change of model outcomes—the influence of direct democracy on growth 
management restrictiveness and how this new predictor changes relationships observed in the 
previous step. In the third step, I add interaction terms between direct democracy and status 
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 Because both town meeting and council (with or without initiative/referendum) are mutually exclusive, it makes 
no sense to include town meeting into the models when examining the effects of initiative and referendum, or 
include initiative and referendum in the models when examining the effects of town meeting.  
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variables to further examine the potential effects on the growth management restrictiveness of 
direct democracy. The models are specified as42:  
Step 1: F(Pij) = Bj – [B1*Xi1 + B2*Xi2 + B3*Xi3] + ei 
Step 2: F(Pij) = Bj – [B1*Xi1 + B2*Xi2 + B3*Xi3 + B4*Xi4] + ei 
Step 3: F(Pij) = Bj – [B1*Xi1 + B2*Xi2 + B3*Xi3 + B4*Xi4 + B5*Xi1*Xi4] + ei 
Where: F() is the link function—here I adopt logit form: ln(Pij /(1- Pij)); 
Pij is the cumulative probability of jth growth management restrictiveness category for ith case; 
Xi1 is a set of socioeconomic status variables for ith case; 
Xi2 is a set of growth variables for ith case; 
Xi3 is a set of other control variables for ith case; 
Xi4 is the direct democracy variables for ith case; 
Xi1*Xi4 is the interaction between the direct democracy and socioeconomic status for ith case; 
Bj is the threshold for jth growth management restrictiveness category; 
B1–B5 are coefficients of the predictors; 
ei is the error term.  
 
4.1.5.2 Q2 Models: Growth Management Characteristics vs. Direct Democracy 
These models attempt to answer the second set of research questions regarding the 
characteristics of growth management measures. Binary logistic regression models are employed 
to test the relationship between the characteristics of growth management policies and direct 
democracy. In theory, there is a possibility that a growth management policy might be predicted 
by the existence of other growth management policies in a municipality. However, other policies 
are not included as predictors simply because they are strongly correlated with other predictors in 
the models.  
The design of these characteristic models differs from that of the restrictiveness models in two 
aspects. First, no additive variable inclusion procedure is performed because of the exploratory 
nature of these models. All variables are included in the models directly. Second, no interaction 
terms between resident status and direct democracy are included in the models, given the fact 
that the dependent variables in these regression models have limited variation. The binary 
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 In fact, each model specification for ordinal models represents several equations to estimate the cumulative 
probabilities for each categories in the dependent variable. This makes the interpretation of outcomes from ordinal 
models difficult. However, the signs of the coefficients can still give important insights into the effects of the 
estimators in the model.  
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logistic regression will function poorly when provided with too many predictors. Moreover, 
adding interaction terms will make the interpretation of model results more complicated, 
spinning away from the straightforwardness of the exploratory nature of these models.  
The models are run for each of the six growth management measures specified in section 
4.1.1. When testing the relationship between individual direct democracy tools and growth 
management, split datasets are used. The models take the following format:  
ln(Pi/(1-Pi)) = B0 + B1*Xi1 + B2*Xi2 + B3*Xi3 + B4*Xi4 + ei 
Where: Pi is the probability of ith case having a specific growth management policy; 
Xi1 are the direct democracy variables for ith case; 
Xi2 is a set of socioeconomic status variables for ith case; 
Xi3 is a set of growth variables for ith case; 
Xi4 is a set of other control variables for ith case; 
B0 is the constant; 
B1–B4 are coefficients of the predictors; 
ei is the error term. 
 
4.2 Case Studies 
The quantitative analyses look at an extensive range of growth management policies and the 
general relationship between direct democracy and growth management. The large sample size 
makes the statistical relationship robust. However, the quantitative studies cannot account for the 
details and nuances involved in passing growth management through direct democracy, 
including perceived growth problems, the interest groups involved, informal growth management 
measures, and the policy implementation process. Qualitative studies—in this study called 
comparative case studies—then become necessary to complement the quantitative analyses. The 
case studies create a larger conceptual framework in order to understand the nature of locally 
adopted growth management measures, the complex interaction among status, growth, direct 
democracy, and state intervention, as well as the effects of direct democracy on growth 
management. In addition, the case studies may generate further research questions. Findings 
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from quantitative analyses also inform the case selection criteria and help analyze and interpret 
the case studies. 
The following case selection criteria are adopted. First, this study will only conduct a series of 
case studies focusing on town meeting, as town meeting is rarely the focus of growth 
management literature. Second, the cases will be selected from a single state to eliminate the 
state contextual influence. Third, the state should have had moderate population or housing 
growth from 1990 to 2000 or at least should not have experienced population loss during that 
period. In this study, the purpose of the cases is to understand the complex political process 
centering on growth-related issues; as a result of the process, growth management measures 
emerge. A case may reveal an unusual impetus if growth management was adopted without 
growth. This type of unusual case could be my interest for the next step after this study. Fourth, 
the cases are targeted in three situations:  
• A case in which there is the town meeting form of government and restrictive 
measures have been adopted; 
• A case in which there is the town meeting form of government but less restrictive 
growth management measures are present; 
• A case in which there is the council form of government but restrictive measures have 
been adopted.  
Results in the first case are under expectation. The focus is given to a thorough analysis of 
causes and procedures of policy adoption under town meeting. Results in the second and third 
cases are unexpected and are worth further study as to why the results are unexpected. In all 
three cases, the link between town meeting and measures with potentially exclusionary effects 
will also be examined in detail. In all case studies, I will particularly focus on factors that were 
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not captured by surveys, including informal polices, the policy implementation process, the 
stakeholders/interest groups involved, the arguments brought to bear in the debate, unique local 
conditions, and the role of perceived threats to community character.  
There are three New England region states in my database: Massachusetts, Connecticut and 
New Hampshire. Massachusetts is selected as the case study state. First, it has the typical town 
meeting form of government. In Massachusetts, the town meeting functions to its full extent—
many towns adopt and modify land use regulations and zoning ordinances directly at town 
meeting. Second, communities in Massachusetts have a good population range—from 20,000 to 
100,000, suggesting a reasonably complicated and interesting setting for growth studies.  
After examining the survey results, I focused on a set of three cases in Massachusetts. 
However, after further investigation into these cases and their regional context, I dropped two of 
the cases and replaced them with two new cases. An example will explain my decision to make 
the changes. One case was selected as a less restrictive case with only two growth measures. 
However, when looking into its zoning code, I found that the minimum lot size requirement for 
its residence district is 60,000 square feet, close to one and a half acres, yet in its neighboring 
jurisdiction, this number is only 14,400 square feet. This measure is surely growth limiting from 
any perspective. Further research on this case found that although the population is increasing 
rapidly, this jurisdiction is still considered a rural-suburban community. There are many working 
farms, but golf course is a large category in its zoning code. This jurisdiction has a strong 
intention of keeping its open space characteristics and recreational amenities. This case is in fact 
restrictive in its growth management efforts, completely contradicting my intention. In the end, 
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the three cases I selected are the Town of Westford, the Town of Chelmsford, and the City of 
Leominster, all in Massachusetts43.  
After the selection of cases, I began to systematically collect background materials for them. 
Two types of data are collected: the broader contextual data and the targeted subject data. The 
contextual data include the following: local history; geographic location and the physical 
environment; population and socio demographic status; economy and industries; local politics 
and interest groups; growth and related issues; state laws; and conditions of neighboring 
jurisdictions. These data are collected through the US Census, state and local government 
websites, newspaper archives and other channels. The targeted data include two parts: local 
growth management measures and government form (town meeting vs. council). For growth 
management measures, a document review is conducted: local charters, zoning ordinances, 
master plans, subdivision regulations, and other growth management measures. To determine 
government form, I examine local charters, government websites, and town meeting or council 
minutes.  
After the collection and digestion of contextual and subject data, I conducted telephone 
interviews. The purpose here is to gather detailed information on the local political process, the 
perception of threats from growth, the participants of local growth politics, the motivations of 
local residents and interest groups, and the functioning of town meeting or city council. The key 
informants were identified during the data collection and review process. They include the most 
influential figures in local growth politics, planning directors, town board selectman, city 
councilmen, interest group leaders from both pro-growth and anti-growth groups, and local 
activists. I proposed different sets of questions for different interviewees in different 
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 The Leominster case was unsuccessful and dropped later due to lack of key materials regarding its growth 
management polices and historical conditions.  
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communities, because different communities have different situations and different interviewees 
have different specialty areas. The questions cover local land use policies, their adoption process, 
the working mechanism of town meeting or council, affordable housing, and town or city budget. 
For a list of interview questions, see Appendix H.  
I also give some consideration to improving the quality of my case studies. There are four 
common tests addressing the quality issue of empirical social research including case studies 
(Yin, 2002): construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. Following 
Yin’s suggestions, I use some of the tactics offered in his book to address the four tests. For 
construct validity, I use multiple sources of evidence and have some key informants review my 
case study report. For example, I collected information for local land use regulations from at 
least three sources: the policy survey, document review, and telephone interview with public 
officials such as planning directors. For internal validity, I develop a conceptual model based on 
related studies to logically describe and explain the policy adoption process. For external 
validity, the logical conceptual model and the large sample quantitative analyses, which 
informed the case selection and interpretation, can help in making meaningful and logical 
inferences from the case study results. For the last test, the well-developed case study protocol 
insures the reliability of the case studies.  
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Chapter 5. Findings from Quantitative Analyses 
After a careful examination of collected information, I have found evidence suggesting the 
existence of patterns regarding direct democracy admittance as well as relationships between 
direct democracy and growth management. This chapter first provides descriptive analyses of 
growth management policies and the availability of local direct democracy based on information 
from the cited surveys. These analyses set the background for model findings and discussion of 
the results. My findings on the relationship between growth management and direct democracy 
are then presented in detail.  
5.1 Distribution of Growth Management Measures44 
In the previous chapter I constructed in total seven variables to represent growth management 
measures and overall restrictiveness. These seven variables combine to create one composite 
variable—the growth management restrictiveness index—and six individual measures: building 
permit cap; voter approval requirement; low-density-only zoning; mobile home/apartment 
prohibition; urban containment; and facilities regulation. This section describes the distribution 
of these policy measures and lays down a framework for understanding the variations in such 
measures. It should be noted that the focus here is on the chosen measures rather than being a 
full-scale comprehensive assessment of all surveyed measures, particularly when the original 
survey conductor has already done such excellent work on them.45  
5.1.1 The Composite Restrictiveness Index 
The growth management restrictiveness index is the sum of six types of individual measures 
and has a theoretical value ranging from 0 to 6. However, its maximum value is in reality 5, 
                                                 
44
 The percentages in section 5.1 and 5.2 are of the survey respondents. They are not weighted to represent all 
jurisdictions.  
45
 For a complete and detailed description of the surveyed measures, see Pendall (1995).  
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which indicates that no communities have adopted more than five types of growth management 
measures. The national mean value is 2.1, showing that on average a community utilizes slightly 
more than two growth management measures (see Table 5-1). The majority of communities 
(more than 80%) have adopted one to three measures and about 10% have four measures. 
Communities with five measures are rare (less than 1%) and about 6% of communities make no 
growth management efforts at all. If communities with more than an average number of 
measures (2.1) are treated as restrictive communities, then approximately one third (35%) can be 
viewed as restrictive communities.  
Table 5-1. Distribution of Growth Management Restrictiveness Index 
Growth Management Restrictiveness Index 
(Number of Measures) 
  None One Two Three Four Five 
Less 
Restrictive 
(0-2) 
More 
Restrictive 
(3--5) 
Mean 
Value 
Nationwide 5.8% 24.7% 34.5% 24.7% 9.5% 0.7% 65.0% 35.0% 2.1 
By Region          
Northeast 2.0% 15.7% 30.9% 31.7% 17.7% 2.0% 48.6% 51.4% 2.5 
Midwest 8.4% 25.6% 33.4% 24.7% 7.8% 0.0% 67.4% 32.6% 2.0 
South 5.5% 34.5% 38.0% 15.5% 5.5% 1.0% 78.0% 22.0% 1.8 
West 6.2% 24.8% 38.6% 25.5% 4.8% 0.0% 69.7% 30.3% 2.0 
By Jurisdiction Type          
Unincorporated 7.2% 27.2% 29.7% 23.3% 11.5% 1.1% 64.2% 35.8% 2.1 
Incorporated 5.2% 23.7% 36.6% 25.3% 8.6% 0.6% 65.4% 34.6% 2.1 
By Population Size          
Under 50,000 5.4% 22.2% 33.2% 27.1% 11.3% 0.8% 60.8% 39.2% 2.2 
50,000 or more 7.1% 32.7% 38.4% 17.5% 3.8% 0.5% 78.2% 21.8% 1.8 
 
Regionally, communities in the Northeast are the most stringent in growth management 
efforts, while Southern communities seem the least restrictive. In the Northeast, the share of 
restrictive communities is more than half, much higher than that in the other three regions, where 
the highest share is less than one third. In the South, restrictive communities only account for 
less than a quarter (22%). Communities in the Midwest and the West are similar to each other 
and are positioned between the Northeast and the South in terms of growth management 
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restrictiveness. This result can also be reflected from the mean values of each region’s 
restrictiveness index.  
The jurisdiction type makes no substantial difference regarding growth management 
restrictiveness distribution. The percentage of restrictive cities, towns and villages among 
incorporated communities is close to one third, similar to that of restrictive towns, townships and 
counties among unincorporated communities; this percentage matches the national figure. As a 
result, the average restrictiveness values are the same, equaling the national average of 2.1.  
However, population size makes a significant difference—smaller communities tend to be 
more restrictive compared to larger communities. The percentage of restrictive communities 
among smaller jurisdictions with a population of less than 50,000 is almost double the share of 
restrictive communities among larger jurisdictions with a population of more than 50,000 (about 
40% vs. 20%). This finding is somewhat surprising, as larger communities should have more 
issues and thus a more complex system for dealing with such issues. Therefore, they are 
expected to have more measures in their growth management efforts. One possible explanation is 
that this pattern may coincide with the regional distribution of restrictive communities, as many 
communities in the Northeast tend to be smaller, particularly when compared to those in the 
West and South.46  
5.1.2 Individual Growth Management Measures 
Different growth management measures enjoy different levels of popularity. The results are 
compiled in Table 5-2. From a nationwide perspective, the facilities regulation measure is the 
most popular within the US—60.7% of local municipalities either charge impact fees or have 
adopted an APFO, indicating a close tie between housing development and the provision of 
                                                 
46
 The percentage of smaller communities with a population of less than 50,000 in each region is as follows: 88.60% 
in the Northeast; 88.90% in the Midwest; 61.00% in the South; and 51.90% in the West..  
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public infrastructure and services. Zoning-related growth management measures are also 
popular.47 More than half of local communities prohibit the construction of either mobile homes 
or apartments. In their zoning ordinances, approximately one third of communities have low-
density-only provisions, which require less than 8 units per acre in a jurisdiction’s highest 
residential density category. The vote requirement on rezoning, together with the vote 
requirement on annexation, accounts for 45% of the total number of municipalities.48 Urban 
containment is less common compared to facilities regulation and zoning measures, but still 
about one quarter of communities have some form of urban containment, either a UGB, a ULL, a 
USA, or a green belt. Building permit cap is the least common type of growth management 
tool—only 8 percent of communities employ this measure.  
Table 5-2. Distribution of Individual Growth Management Measures 
  
Permit  
Cap 
Vote 
Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulation 
Nationwide 7.9% 45.0% 32.2% 53.8% 24.3% 60.7% 
By Region       
Northeast 8.2% 58.5% 48.5% 74.6% 8.2% 52.8% 
Midwest 2.7% 43.3% 29.6% 59.2% 17.6% 56.8% 
South 8.9% 32.1% 14.9% 39.9% 31.2% 70.6% 
West 12.7% 38.2% 6.0% 21.5% 49.7% 73.8% 
By Jurisdiction Type       
Unincorporated 4.6% 44.3% 41.8% 44.6% 23.6% 54.8% 
Incorporated 9.0% 45.2% 27.1% 57.7% 24.6% 63.3% 
By Population Size       
Under 50,000 7.2% 49.4% 36.6% 60.5% 19.8% 58.6% 
50,000 or more 10.3% 30.3% 9.6% 32.7% 37.1% 69.5% 
 
Regional distribution of these measures presents interesting patterns, with the Northeast and 
the West as the two extremes in almost all situations. Three measures (permit cap, urban 
containment, and facilities regulation) are the most common in the West (12.7%, about half, and 
                                                 
47
 Zoning ordinances dominate the regulatory landscape across the US—99% of localities have zoning. In most 
situations zoning is the result of state mandate and not necessarily a component of growth management.  
48
 In fact, 33.7% of local municipalities require a vote on rezoning specifically, but Table 5-2 does not report this 
number.  
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three quarters respectively) and the least common in the Northeast (8.2%, 8.2%, and 52.8% 
respectively) following the descendent order of West, South, Midwest and Northeast. There is 
only one exception—permit cap is relatively more popular in the Northeast (8.2%) than in the 
Midwest (2.7%). In contradiction to these patterns, the other three measures (low-density-only 
zoning, mobile home/apartment prohibition, and vote requirement) are the most common in the 
Northeast (half, three quarters, and about 60% respectively) and the least common in the West 
(6.0%, 21.5%, and 38.2% respectively) following the exactly reverse order of the above 
observations—Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Yet there is one exception—vote 
requirement is slightly more common in the West (38.2%) than in the South (32.1%).  
The extent of each measure’s popularity among the four regions is different. While facilities 
regulation, vote requirement, and mobile home/apartment prohibition present reasonable regional 
differences, urban containment and low-density-only zoning show dramatic variations across 
regions (close to half vs. less than 10%). Permit cap is actually uncommon everywhere, probably 
due to its nature of over-stringency and its propensity to be under legal challenges.  
In contrast to the previous section, the jurisdiction type makes a difference on certain 
measures. The biggest differences occur in the cases of low-density-only zoning and permit cap. 
While low-density-only zoning can be observed at a much higher rate in unincorporated 
communities than in incorporated places (42% over 27%), permit cap is more likely to be seen in 
incorporated places than in unincorporated communities (9% vs. 4.6%). Facilities regulation and 
mobile home/apartment prohibition show fewer differences in observations across the 
jurisdiction type, while urban containment and vote requirement measures are equally utilized in 
both incorporated and unincorporated jurisdictions.  
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Small and large municipalities present various patterns in the distribution of growth 
management measures. Smaller communities tend to use zoning-related measures, including 
low-density-only zoning, mobile home/apartment prohibition, and vote requirement. The most 
uneven distribution occurs in low-density-only zoning. While more than one third of smaller 
communities have this zoning measure, less than 10% of larger communities employ it. Larger 
communities tend to adopt urban containment, facilities regulation, and permit cap. The rate of 
37% of  larger communities employing urban containment is almost double that of smaller 
communities (slightly less than 20%).  
5.2 The Landscape of Direct Democracy 
This section describes findings from the direct democracy survey, which are divided into two 
layers—one applicable to any local issues and the other applicable to planning issues such as 
adoption of or amendments to comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and other land-use 
regulations. I call the first layer direct democracy in general or general direct democracy, and the 
second layer direct democracy for planning or planning direct democracy.  
5.2.1 Direct Democracy in General  
Results from the direct democracy survey are similar to the findings of the IRI and ICMA 
surveys. Today direct democracy has become a common political phenomenon in local 
municipalities across the country. Almost all surveyed communities (97.4%) have some form of 
direct democracy, whether town meeting, initiative, or referendum (see Table 5-3). One can find 
direct democracy almost evenly across regions, no matter if in incorporated or unincorporated 
jurisdictions, and no matter whether in large or small communities.  
The different forms of direct democracy hold varying levels of popularity. Referendum is the 
most popular form nationwide—83% of communities have provisions for referendum, either 
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legislative referendum or popular referendum. Initiative takes second place, with about two 
thirds of communities adopting this tool. Town meeting is uncommon across the nation, with less 
than 10% of communities having adopted this form of government.  
Table 5-3. Distribution of Direct Democracy Access 
 
Direct 
Democracy 
Town 
Meeting Initiative Referendum 
Nationwide 97.4% 9.4% 66.5% 83.0% 
By Region     
Northeast 95.0% 69.8% 10.9% 13.8% 
Midwest 97.7% 1.8% 52.6% 94.9% 
South 97.9% 4.1% 74.4% 95.2% 
West 97.6% .8% 95.2% 95.6% 
By Jurisdiction Type     
Unincorporated 97.7% 11.0% 70.6% 80.7% 
Incorporated 96.6% 5.1% 45.5% 89.8% 
By Population Size     
Under 50,000 97.4% 10.9% 58.0% 80.3% 
50,000 or more 97.8% 5.9% 82.7% 90.6% 
 
These forms of direct democracy present certain patterns across regions. With the exception 
of its popularity in the Northeast, town meeting is rarely seen in other regions. Initiative is very 
common in the West (95%), then has a descendent order in popularity in the South and Midwest, 
and is least common in the Northeast (11%). Referendum enjoys a high level of popularity across 
regions with the exception of the Northeast, where only 13.8% of communities have access to 
this form of government. It should be pointed out, however, that the reported unpopularity of 
initiative and referendum in the Northeast is due to the classification between town meeting and 
initiative/referendum—these forms are classified as mutually exclusive even though at its core 
town meeting embraces both initiative and referendum.  
There are further issues in regard to town meeting. Even within the Northeast, the distribution 
of town meeting is still uneven. It is a common form of government in New England states such 
as Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connecticut but not common in other Northeastern states 
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such as New York and Pennsylvania. Since town meeting and council forms of government are 
mutually exclusive, in later regression tests on the relationship between growth management and 
different forms of direct democracy, the New England region is divided from other US areas.  
Even though direct democracy is almost evenly distributed over incorporated and 
unincorporated jurisdictions, different forms of direct democracy show different patterns of 
distribution over these two jurisdiction types. While both town meeting and initiative are more 
likely to be seen in unincorporated jurisdictions than in incorporated jurisdictions, referendum is 
more common in incorporated places than in unincorporated jurisdictions.  
The distribution of different forms of direct democracy over population size also presents 
different patterns. While town meeting is more likely to be seen in smaller communities with a 
population of less than 50,000, both initiative and referendum are more common in larger 
communities with a population equal or greater than 50,000.  
5.2.2 Direct Democracy for Planning 
This portion of my findings is unique in that it is the first attempt, on a nationwide scale, to 
look at local direct democracy provisions through which planning-related measures can be 
adopted. Attention should be paid to the magnitude of the findings rather than the specific 
numbers due to the technical limitations such as relatively small sample size, as mentioned in the 
Methodology chapter. The findings are presented in Table 5-4.  
Planning direct democracy is becoming popular across the country, especially in the West. 
From a nationwide perspective, half of municipalities can practice planning direct democracy 
through town meeting, initiative, or referendum. In the West, 87% of local communities allow 
the use of direct democracy to adopt or change comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, and 
other planning measures. This fact provides a sufficient background context for the West, where 
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numerous hot issues and controversies have emerged around ballot box planning. The lowest 
share of planning direct democracy communities can be found in the South and the Northeast 
(30% and 35% respectively), highlighting the public sector’s domination in local land use issues 
in such regions. The Midwest is somewhere in between with a slightly higher percentage (54%) 
of planning direct democracy communities compared to the national average.  
Table 5-4. Distribution of Direct Democracy (Applicable to Planning Measures) 
 Direct Democracy Town Meeting Initiative Referendum 
Nationwide 50.5% (51.8%) 6.5% (69.1%) 28.2% (42.4%) 49.3% (59.4%)
By Region         
Northeast 35.2% (37.1%) 34.0% (48.7%) 4.0% (36.7%) 8.1% (58.7%)
Midwest 53.8% (55.1%) 1.4% (77.8%) 24.2% (46.0%) 52.0% (54.8%)
South 29.7% (30.3%) 2.0% (48.8%) 3.2% (4.3%) 28.1% (29.5%)
West 87.0% (89.1%) .8% (100.0%) 85.4% (89.7%) 84.1% (88.0%)
By Jurisdiction Type         
Unincorporated 48.5% (49.6%) 3.9% (35.5%) 17.5% (24.8%) 46.0% (57.0%)
Incorporated 51.5% (53.3%) 4.7% (92.2%) 33.7% (74.1%) 51.0% (56.8%)
By Population Size         
Under 50,000 48.2% (49.5%) 8.4% (77.1%) 24.2% (41.7%) 46.3% (57.7%)
50,000 or more 59.2% (60.5%) 1.2% (20.3%) 40.8% (49.3%) 59.7% (65.9%)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the percentage of planning direct democracy communities 
over direct democracy communities. 
    
Regional distribution of planning direct democracy conforms only partially to the regional 
pattern of the growth management restrictiveness index, which has been discussed in the 
previous section. The evidence that communities in the South have the lowest likelihood of 
planning direct democracy and that they are the least restrictive in growth management efforts 
may indicate a positive relationship between the presence of direct democracy and growth 
management restrictiveness. However, the fact that communities in the Northeast also have a low 
likelihood of planning direct democracy, while at the same time being the most restrictive among 
the four regions, may suggest a negative relationship between direct democracy and growth 
management. This contradicts the hypothesized relationship and thus adds complexity to the 
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study. Underlying factors may be at work, and comprehensive statistical analyses are thus 
required to disentangle the relationships.  
The jurisdiction type presents only a miniscule difference regarding the share of planning 
direct democracy communities between incorporated and unincorporated jurisdictions. Among 
incorporated jurisdictions, 52% have planning direct democracy while among unincorporated 
jurisdictions this percentile is 49%. This pattern actually matches the distribution of growth 
management restrictiveness between jurisdiction types.  
Population size has a larger gap in terms of the distribution of planning direct democracy 
jurisdictions between smaller and larger communities. Larger communities with a population of 
50,000 or more tend to be more likely to have planning direct democracy compared to smaller 
communities with a population of under 50,000 (59% vs. 48%). Interestingly, we have already 
observed that smaller communities tend to be more restrictive in growth management efforts 
compared to larger communities. A tentative conclusion regarding the relationship between 
direct democracy and growth management from the above observations seems contrary to my 
hypothesis. I will also leave this question to the later regression analyses.  
Regarding different forms of planning direct democracy, initiative is less likely to be allowed 
for planning usage when compared with town meeting and referendum. Across the country, 
approximately two thirds of communities have access to initiative, but only 28% can use 
initiative to adopt plans and land use regulations. In other words, less than half (about 42%) of 
direct democracy communities are planning direct democracy communities. However, this figure 
for town meeting and referendum are both more than half, 69% and 59% respectively.  
Across the four US regions, the most impressive observations are found in the West, as both 
initiatives and referendums are commonly allowed to decide planning policies (about 90% in 
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initiative and referendum communities respectively). In the South these two direct democracy 
tools, especially initiative, are less commonly applicable to planning and land use issues despite 
their popularity in that region—only 4.3% of initiative communities in the South can adopt or 
amend planning policies. The shares of initiative and referendum communities with applicability 
to planning issues in the Northeast and the Midwest fall between the brackets of the West and 
South. Among the 70% town meeting jurisdictions in the Northeast, about half (one third of total 
jurisdictions in the Northeast) can adopt or change planning and land use decisions. This type of 
jurisdiction is not easily found in other areas, as town meeting communities are rare in other 
regions.49  
The jurisdiction type has an interesting relationship with planning direct democracy. While 
town meeting and initiative are more likely to be seen in unincorporated communities as 
discussed in the previous section, the relationship is reversed regarding the applicability of these 
two tools to planning measures. In incorporated places, the share of town meeting communities 
that can decide planning issues is higher than in unincorporated jurisdictions (4.7% vs. 3.9%) 
and town meeting is also much more likely to be used to adopt and amend planning policies in 
incorporated places compared to unincorporated jurisdictions (92% vs. 36%). Initiative is similar 
to town meeting, and in incorporated places the percentage of communities having initiative 
provisions applicable to planning and land use issues is almost double that number in 
unincorporated jurisdictions (34% vs. 18%). Furthermore, the likelihood that initiative can be 
used to vote on planning policies in incorporated places is almost triple that in unincorporated 
communities (74% vs. 25%). There is only a minor difference in the share of referendum 
                                                 
49
 The reader may have observed that the percent of town meeting communities that can decide planning issues are 
substantially higher in the West and Midwest than in the Northeast. However, since the sample size is exceptionally 
small in those regions, these high percentage numbers are not of great significance..  
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communities that can use referendum to check planning measures and the possibility of 
referendum usage on planning issues between incorporated and unincorporated jurisdictions.  
As regards the population size of communities, the distribution of the different forms of direct 
democracy applicable to planning matters is similar to that of the different forms of direct 
democracy, whether or not applicable to planning issues. Town meeting communities that can 
adopt planning decisions are more likely to be smaller in populations of less than 50,000. 
Furthermore, in the smaller town meeting communities, more than three quarters can make 
decisions on planning-related issues, while this number is only 20% in larger town meeting 
communities with populations of 50,000 or more. Initiative and referendum communities display 
similar patterns when assessing their applicability to planning issues. Larger communities, 
including larger initiative and referendum communities, tend to be more likely to allow these 
tools to address planning issues.  
In the direct democracy survey, a practice question has been included to ask how many 
planning measures have been placed on the ballot box and how many of them have been 
passed.50 Thirty-seven percent of jurisdictions that can adopt planning measures through 
initiatives have placed at least one such measure on the ballot box, and sixty-two percent of them 
have passed at least one measure. Thirty-five percent of jurisdictions that can place planning 
measures on the ballot box for a referendum, whether popular or legislative, have placed at least 
one such measure on the ballot box. Forty-four percent of them have passed at least one measure.  
                                                 
50
 These findings should be treated with caution given the small sample size. The number of responses received on 
practice questions is fairly small—only 59 initiative cases and 52 referendum cases. The low response rates may 
indicate that planning directors are not the best respondents for these questions. Clerks in local government may be 
more appropriate for answering them. Another potential error in the survey design is that I did not ask these 
questions in regard to town meeting because I believed that town meeting, as a form of government, should have the 
full authority to adopt all kinds of local policies. However, later readings prove that this is not the case—in some 
localities town meeting has only limited authority on policy making that is related to planning and zoning issues. 
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5.3 Growth Management Restrictiveness and Direct Democracy 
In this section, I first focus on the general access of planning direct democracy and observe its 
relationship with growth management restrictiveness from a nationwide perspective. I then focus 
on access to individual direct democracy tools and examine the relationships between growth 
management restrictiveness and such individual access. My focus on individual direct democracy 
tools, as proposed in Chapter 4, is due to the regionally exclusive distinction between town 
meeting and initiative/referendum. Here I separate the nationwide dataset into two groups of data 
based on regions in which town meeting and initiative/referendum exist popularly—the New 
England region and the non-New England region. An additive approach is also employed in 
testing these models.  
The findings indicate that, in general, direct democracy does exert influence over a locality’s 
overall growth management efforts. This influence is realized through both direct and indirect 
routes. However, this influence shows a connection with certain types of direct democracy and 
geographic areas. The evidence indicates that, from a nationwide view, access to direct 
democracy has a negative impact on the overall restrictiveness of growth management measures. 
However, results also show that direct democracy may help strengthen the influence of 
community socioeconomic status on policy restrictiveness. When examined separately, evidence 
suggests that while town meeting in the New England region has a positive effect on growth 
management restrictiveness, initiatives and referendums in the non-New England region go 
against this pattern—indeed, here communities with access to initiatives or referendums 
encompass fewer growth management measures. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that 
town meeting facilitates an independent negative impact of the white population on the 
propensity for a community to have restrictive measures, while the presence of initiative tends to 
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increase the extent to which higher community status increases the likelihood of having 
restrictive growth management efforts. However, when excluding California cases in the Non-
New England analyses, direct democracy’s influence, both direct and indirect, on policy 
restrictiveness disappears. Midwest region is the only area where direct democracy’s influence, a 
negative one, on growth management restrictiveness can be observed. Direct democracy also 
provides a mechanism translating racial status into policy restrictiveness in the Midwest.  
5.3.1 Growth Management Restrictiveness vs. General Access of Direct Democracy 
I will turn first to the findings on the relationship between general access of planning direct 
democracy and growth management restrictiveness. A comparison of means through 
independent-samples t-test indicates that the average growth management restrictiveness differs 
between communities with direct democracy and communities without direct democracy. On 
average, the restrictiveness of direct democracy communities is less than that of communities 
without direct democracy (2.00 vs. 2.15) and this relationship is statistically significant at 0.05 
level (see Section F.1 in Appendix F). However, this result cannot tell if the difference between 
these two types of communities can be attributed to direct democracy. Ordinal regression models 
are then employed to see the effects of direct democracy on growth management restrictiveness.  
Table 5-5 reports the coefficient and standard error for the independent variables in each of 
the models’ three steps. See Section F.2 in Appendix F for descriptive statistics.  
In Step 1, the model uses growth management restrictiveness as a dependent variable and 
includes resident status and growth variables in addition to other control variables. The model 
shows strong support for the status hypothesis. The coefficients for both status variables—white 
and income—are positively significant, indicating that a community with a larger white 
population and higher household income is more likely to have stringent growth management 
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policies.51  However, the model does not support the growth hypothesis—the growth rate 
(household population change from 1990 to 2000) is not significant in affecting local growth 
policy restrictiveness. Given the inconclusive findings related to both the status hypothesis and 
the growth hypothesis in the literature, these findings do not substantially add to the current 
evidence.  
Table 5-5. Ordinal Regression Results 1 -- National Models 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error 
Direct Democracy   -.319** .136 -1.437** .696 
Direct Democracy*White     .009 .008 
Direct Democracy*Household Income     .004* .002 
White .013*** .005 .012** .005 .016*** .006 
Household Income (thousand dollars) .002* .001 .002** .001 .004*** .001 
Population Growth Rate (90-00) -.019 .100 -.025 .101 -.022 .101 
Total Population (log) -.127** .062 -.155** .062 -.147** .062 
Senior -.056*** .014 -.058*** .014 -.059*** .014 
Moved-in between 95-00 -.019** .008 -.020** .008 -.020** .008 
Northeast1 .589** .239 .329 .256 .345 .257 
Midwest1 -.374* .206 -.498** .211 -.501** .214 
South1 -.241 .201 -.397* .215 -.418* .217 
Incorporated .300** .146 .243 .149 .249* .149 
Central City -.414* .242 -.366 .245 -.395 .246 
Threshold       
[restrict = 0] -4.085*** .944 -4.490*** .953 -3.870*** 1.007 
[restrict = 1] -2.031** .933 -2.434*** .942 -1.807* .999 
[restrict = 2] -.464 .931 -.866 .939 -.236 .997 
[restrict = 3] 1.192 .934 .805 .941 1.441 .999 
[restrict = 4] 4.433*** 1.053 3.989*** 1.059 4.633*** 1.111 
N 873 858 858 
Model Fitting Chi-Square: 100.218 99.076 103.681 
Pseudo R-Square (Nagelkerke): 0.114 0.115 0.120 
Link Function: Logit       
1
 Comparison Base: West       
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01       
Dependent Variable: Growth Management Restrictiveness 
 
                                                 
51
 The exact interpretation for the findings from an ordinal model, using “white” as an example, would be that, with 
everything else being equal, a community with a larger white population is more likely to fall into one of the more 
restrictive growth management categories.  
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In Step 2, access to direct democracy is added into the model. Results show that the 
coefficient of direct democracy is significant at the 0.05 level; surprisingly, its direction is 
negative. This result suggests that, with everything else being equal, a community with access to 
direct democracy is less likely to present restrictive growth management efforts compared to a 
community without access to direct democracy. The inclusion of the direct democracy variable 
does not affect other relationships since results related to the status and growth variables remain 
unchanged from the previous model. However, both the model fitting the Chi-Square52 and 
pseudo R-Square53 are almost unaffected, indicating that adding this new variable does little to 
improve the model’s explanatory power.  
In Step 3, two interaction terms between direct democracy and the two status variables are 
added to the model in order to test the indirect influence of direct democracy on growth 
management restrictiveness. The larger Chi-Square and R-Square statistics indicate that this 
model is better, in terms of model fitting and explanatory power, than those in Steps 1 and 2.  
The findings from this model reveal that there are both direct and indirect relationships 
between direct democracy and growth management restrictiveness. The coefficient for direct 
democracy is still negatively significant at the 0.05 level while the coefficient for the interaction 
term between direct democracy and household income is positively significant at the 0.1 level. 
The first result suggests that, contrary to my hypothesis, it is similar to the findings in Step 2, 
that a locality with access to direct democracy is less likely to have stringent growth 
management policies compared to a locality without access to direct democracy, when all other 
factors are equal. One explanation for this unexpected result could be that the study pools 
                                                 
52
 A larger chi-square statistic indicates that the model gives a better improvement over the baseline intercept-only 
model, or in other words, the model gives more adequate estimations.  
53
 The pseudo R-Square summarizes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable associated with the 
independent variables, with larger R-Square values indicating that more of the variation is explained by the model. 
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different types of direct democracy tools into only one variable and may have mixed the possible 
differences between the tools’ relationships with policy restrictiveness. Further examination of 
such detailed relationships may help clarify this unexpected result. Another explanation could be 
that direct democracy may be tied to certain types of growth management policies that are more 
restrictive when looking into their contents, and that a smaller number of those restrictive 
measures may still represent a stringent overall effort in limiting growth. This possibility 
indicates the need for further research efforts focusing on the content of growth management 
polices.  
The result found on the interaction term indicates the existence of an indirect relationship 
between direct democracy and growth management. That income level exerts further influence 
on the relationship between income and policy restrictiveness in direct democracy communities 
is realized. This result suggests that, given access to direct democracy, communities with higher 
income are more likely to cast a further positive influence over growth management efforts, in 
addition to the existing impact of income on policy stringency. Thus, income level in direct 
democracy communities presents a stronger positive effect on growth management 
restrictiveness compared with communities without access to direct democracy, all things being 
equal. This indirect relationship may help, at least partially, explain the inconclusive findings 
regarding how status affects policy adoption. The direct relationship between status and policy 
adoption may be disturbed by some undiscovered influences such as the one revealed here. Once 
the hidden influences are quarantined, the direct relationship between status and policy adoption 
might be observed.  
The coefficient for the interaction term between direct democracy and the white population is 
not significant, indicating that there is no indirect relationship between direct democracy and 
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growth management realized through racial composition. Or, from a different perspective, we 
may conclude that the presence of direct democracy does not alter the way in which race affects 
growth management.  
Over these three models, one noticeable result is that the status hypothesis is constantly 
upheld given that both race and income variables are always significantly positive. On the other 
hand, the growth hypothesis has never been supported—the population growth rate never 
appeared significant in these models. As regards other controls, three variables—total 
population, percentage of seniors, and percentage of newcomers who moved in within the last 5 
years—are significantly and negatively related to growth management restrictiveness, also a 
constant over these three models.  Regions and jurisdiction types also matter to a certain extent 
in affecting local growth management efforts.  
The results from the above models suggest that there are both direct and indirect relationships 
between direct democracy and growth management. However, there are different forms of direct 
democracy, and we do not know how each of them interacts with growth management. The 
following two sections will look at this interaction and observe the effects of town meeting, 
initiative, and referendum on growth management.  
5.3.2 Growth Management Restrictiveness vs. Town Meeting 
This section focuses on the New England region to see how town meeting affects growth 
management. A comparison of means through independent-samples t-test indicates that the 
average growth management restrictiveness differs between communities with town meeting and 
communities without town meeting. On average, the restrictiveness of town meeting 
communities is greater than that of communities with a council (3.28 vs. 2.05) and this 
relationship is statistically significant at 0.01 level (see Section F.3 in Appendix F). However, 
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this result cannot tell if the difference between these two types of communities can be attributed 
to the existence of town meeting. Ordinal regression models are then employed to see the effects 
of town meeting on growth management restrictiveness. 
Table 5-6 reports the coefficient and standard error for the independent variables in the New 
England models. Also see Section F.4 in Appendix F for descriptive statistics.  
Table 5-6. Ordinal Regression Results 2 -- New England Models 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error 
Town Meeting   2.481*** .621 11.232** 4.623 
Town Meeting*White     -.109** .053 
Town Meeting*Household Income     .003 .005 
White .050 .033 .019 .038 -.053 .057 
Household Income (thousand dollars) .000 .002 -.002 .002 -.001 .004 
Population Growth Rate (90-00) -.846 2.816 -1.818 3.085 -.983 3.185 
Total Population (log) .390 .369 .340 .388 .431 .395 
Senior -.238* .093 -.145 .095 -.148 .097 
Moved-in between 95-00 -.005 .065 .110 .078 .127 .079 
Central City -1.748* 1.044 -2.114* 1.178 -2.231* 1.194 
Threshold       
[restrict = 0] 2.853 4.792 2.359 5.095 -2.430 6.502 
[restrict = 1] 4.834 4.770 4.422 5.087 -.276 6.501 
[restrict = 2] 6.428 4.793 6.113 5.128 1.526 6.544 
[restrict = 3] 7.999* 4.825 8.348 5.172 3.824 6.538 
[restrict = 4] 11.399** 4.954 11.918** 5.275 7.494 6.534 
N 70 63 63 
Model Fitting Chi-Square: 15.294 33.335 37.925 
Pseudo R-Square (Nagelkerke): 0.207 0.432 0.476 
Link Function: Logit       
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01       
Dependent Variable: Growth Management Restrictiveness 
 
Once again, in Step 1 the model uses growth management restrictiveness as the dependent 
variable and includes resident status and growth variables in addition to other control variables.54 
                                                 
54
 Two variables—region and jurisdiction type—used in the national models are dropped from this set of models 
because they are not applicable to the dataset—all cases here are in the Northeast region and all are incorporated 
places.  
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None of the status and growth variables are statistically significant, indicating that in the New 
England region local growth management policies are not affected by either residential status or 
growth rate.  
In Step 2, the town meeting variable is added into the model. When this is done, both the 
model fitting Chi-Square and pseudo R-Square increase substantially, indicating that adding the 
town meeting variable into the model makes a substantial contribution to the model’s 
explanatory power.  
In this model, the coefficient for town meeting is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. 
This result indicates that in the New England region town meeting localities tend to have more 
restrictive growth management policies compared with localities with a council form of 
government, all other things being equal. This relationship is consistent with my hypothesis. 
Moreover, adding the town meeting variable into the model does not affect the outcome of other 
variables from the Step 1 model. Still, none of the status and growth variables are significant, 
indicating that status and growth may not affect growth policies.  
In Step 3, two interaction terms between town meeting and status variables are added into the 
model to test the indirect influence of town meeting on growth management restrictiveness. The 
larger Chi-Square and pseudo R-Square statistics indicate that this model is a further 
improvement over the Step 2 model by adding these new terms.  
The evidence from this model shows that town meeting has both a direct and indirect 
influence over growth management. The coefficient for town meeting is positively significant at 
the 0.05 level, indicating that town meeting localities, compared with localities having a council 
type of government, tend to present more stringent growth management efforts when other things 
are equal. The coefficient for the interaction term between town meeting and the white 
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population is also significant at the 0.05 level, but its sign is negative. This suggests an indirect 
relationship between town meeting and growth management—in town meeting localities a larger 
proportion of white population may decrease the likelihood of having stringent growth 
management policies, but this relationship may not exist in localities with a council form of 
government. The coefficient for the interaction term between town meeting and income is not 
significant, indicating that the relationship between income level and growth management 
policies is most likely the same in both town meeting and council communities.  
The negative sign of the coefficient for the interaction term between town meeting and the 
white population does not conform to my theoretical framework. Another interpretation is that in 
town meeting jurisdictions, the higher proportion of minority population tends to be associated 
with more restrictive growth management policies when other things remain the same. This 
finding is difficult to explain. A possible reason could be that town meeting communities may be 
associated with certain types of growth management polices and these policies vary in content. If 
a more white town meeting community presents more stringent contents over a less white town 
meeting community, this variation may compensate for the smaller number of growth measures 
in the more white community. Another possible explanation is that the minority population in the 
New England region might be different from the common perception, as it is poor and less 
educated. Further exploration in this direction may help clarify the issue here. Furthermore, there 
may be undiscovered factors influencing the relationship between race, town meeting, and 
growth management. Once their effects are isolated, a positive relationship between white and 
growth management in town meeting communities might be observed.    
Here the results on status and growth variables are unchanged from those in the previous 
models, indicating that race, income and growth rate are constantly not associated with growth 
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management policies in the New England region. The only control variable that seems important 
in these models is central city. Its coefficient is constantly significant over the three models and 
its negative sign indicates that, when compared to a suburban location, a central city tends to 
have less restrictive growth management efforts when other things are equal.  
Nevertheless, there is a concern regarding data limitation in these New England models. As 
seen, the case numbers for these models are fairly small—70 cases for the Step 1 model and 63 
cases for the Step 2 and 3 models. This limitation may impair the randomness of the sample. In 
other words, it may reduce the representativeness of the collected cases. The findings from these 
models should thus be treated with caution. In the next section it is interesting to see how 
initiative and referendum affect growth policy restrictiveness in areas other than the New 
England region.  
5.3.3 Growth Management Restrictiveness vs. Initiative and Referendum 
This section focuses on the non-New England region to see how initiative and referendum 
affect growth management. First, a comparison of means through independent-samples t-test 
indicates that the average growth management restrictiveness differs between communities with 
initiative/referendum and communities without initiative/referendum. On average, the 
restrictiveness of communities with initiative/referendum is less than that of communities 
without initiative/referendum (1.89 vs. 2.17) and this relationship is statistically significant at 
0.01 level (see Section F.5 in Appendix F). However, this result cannot tell if the difference 
between these two types of communities can be attributed to the existence of 
initiative/referendum. Ordinal regression models are then employed to see the effects of 
initiative/referendum on growth management restrictiveness. 
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A three-step additive approach is also applied here. Results are reported in Table 5-7. See 
Section F.6 in Appendix F for descriptive statistics. In Step 1, the model uses growth 
management restrictiveness as a dependent variable and includes resident status and growth 
variables in addition to other control variables.55 The results from this model are consistent with 
those from the national models. Both coefficients for the two status variables—white and 
income—are positively significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that higher status communities 
tend to have more restrictive growth management policies when everything else is controlled. 
The coefficient for the growth rate is insignificant, suggesting that growth does not have a 
systematic affect on growth policies.  
In Step 2, initiative and referendum are added into the model. Both the model fitting Chi-
Square and pseudo R-Square increase substantially, indicating that adding the two new variables 
considerably improves the model’s explanatory power. In other words, initiative and referendum 
help explain the variation in growth management restrictiveness.  
The findings from this model indicate that a jurisdiction with access to referendum is less 
likely to be associated with restrictive growth policies compared with a jurisdiction without 
access to referendum, when everything else is equal. The coefficient for referendum is negatively 
significant at the 0.01 level. As growth management restrictiveness is represented by the number 
of restrictive growth measures, the above result may be expressed in a different way—a 
referendum community tends to have fewer restrictive growth policies. Because referendum as a 
direct democracy tool places an additional electoral check, either approval or disapproval, on 
council-adopted policies rather than generating new policies, it is likely to reduce the total 
                                                 
55
 Municipal form variables such as form of government (mayor-council vs. council-manager), term limit for elected 
officials, and the election method (at large vs. by district) were also tested by including them into the models in this 
section. However, they make no meaningful difference in the results.  
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number of adopted growth policies. The next question would then be whether there is a 
systematic pattern between referendum and the types of growth measures it kills.  
Table 5-7. Ordinal Regression Results 3 -- Non-New England Models 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error 
Initiative   .197 .211 -2.210** .975 
Referendum   -.576*** .165 -.181 .860 
Initiative*White     .028** .011 
Referendum*White     -.003 .010 
Initiative*Household Income     .001 .004 
Referendum*Household Income     -.001 .004 
White .012** .005 .011** .005 .029*** .009 
Household Income (thousand dollars) .003** .001 .003** .001 .003 .002 
Population Growth Rate (90-00) -.012 .101 -.021 .102 -.018 .103 
Total Population (log) -.136** .063 -.186*** .064 -.202*** .065 
Senior -.051*** .014 -.051*** .015 -.051*** .015 
Moved-in between 95-00 -.019** .009 -.021** .009 -.022** .009 
Northeast1 .616** .268 .268 .310 .098 .323 
Midwest1 -.351* .207 -.474** .235 -.609** .242 
South1 -.233 .202 -.337 .252 -.506* .262 
Incorporated .289* .159 .114 .165 .104 .167 
Central City -.306 .252 -.251 .260 -.247 .261 
Threshold       
[restrict = 0] -4.179*** .976 -4.844*** .996 -3.695*** 1.115 
[restrict = 1] -2.123** .965 -2.790*** .984 -1.625 1.108 
[restrict = 2] -.551 .962 -1.209 .980 -.032 1.106 
[restrict = 3] 1.150 .966 .497 .982 1.679 1.108 
[restrict = 4] 4.405*** 1.118 3.748*** 1.131 4.933*** 1.243 
N 803 773 773 
Model Fitting Chi-Square: 72.487 80.005 88.136 
Pseudo R-Square (Nagelkerke): 0.091 0.104 0.114 
Link Function: Logit       
1
 Comparison Base: West       
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01       
Dependent Variable: Growth Management Restrictiveness 
 
The model does not provide evidence to support that initiative has an influence over growth 
management restrictiveness since the coefficient for initiative is insignificant. However, these 
relationships could have been disturbed by an indirect relationship between initiative/referendum 
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and growth policies, as occurred in the model for the New England region. We will next conduct 
a further examination in that direction.  
The inclusion of initiative and referendum in the model does not change the coefficients for 
the two status variables. Both of them are still positively significant at the 0.05 level, indicating 
support for the status hypothesis. Growth hypothesis is still not supported by the model because 
the coefficient for growth rate is insignificant. Changes to other control variables are also minor.  
In Step 3, four interaction terms between initiative/referendum and status variables are added 
into the model to test the indirect influence of initiative and referendum on growth management 
restrictiveness. The larger Chi-Square and R-Square statistics reflect that this model can better 
explain the dependent variable than the Step 1 and 2 models. The findings from this model are 
interesting.  
First, the results indicate that a community with access to initiative is less likely to have 
restrictive growth measures compared to a community without access to initiative, given the 
negatively significant coefficient for initiative. Thus, the results suggest that an initiative 
community tends to have fewer restrictive growth measures. This result contradicts my 
hypothesis in which I assume that initiative is associated with more restrictive growth 
management efforts. How can this result be explained? Local residents may adopt certain 
measures to manage growth through ballot box initiatives given the unresponsiveness or 
ineffectiveness of their representatives. In so doing, the voters may make the adopted measures 
so restrictive that there will be less need in the future to adopt other measures to limit growth. 
This would explain how a community with access to initiative may present fewer growth 
measures, yet the overall growth management efforts could still be restrictive. Further research 
examining the content of policies adopted through the ballot box may help to clarify this issue.  
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Second, the evidence indicates that there is also an indirect relationship between initiative and 
growth management, and that this relationship is realized by associating community 
socioeconomic status with growth policies in initiative communities. More specifically, the 
coefficient for the interaction term between initiative and white is positively significant at the 
0.05 level, suggesting that in initiative communities a larger proportion of the white population is 
more likely to be associated with restrictive growth management, particularly as this effect is in 
addition to the existing relationship between white and growth management. This conforms to 
my theoretical framework in which I assume that when given access to direct democracy, voters 
with a higher socioeconomic status have the incentives and resources to promote stringent 
growth measures. However, the coefficient for the interaction term between initiative and income 
is not significant. This implies that in initiative communities, growth management restrictiveness 
may hold a race-bias rather than an income-bias.  
Third, the coefficient of referendum has now become insignificant. Additionally, the 
interaction terms between referendum and status are also not significant. These results may 
suggest that there is no indirect relationship between referendum and growth management, and 
that the inclusion of these terms disturbs the existing direct relationship between referendum and 
growth management, thus causing it to disappear in the model. I did a test by removing the 
interaction terms between referendum and status but kept the interaction terms between initiative 
and status; the results confirmed my supposition—the coefficients for initiative and referendum, 
as well as for the interaction term between initiative and white are all significant, with the former 
two showing as positive and the latter one negative.  
The inclusion of the interaction terms in the model makes one change regarding the status 
hypothesis—the coefficient for income is no longer significant, even though its sign is still 
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positive. Still, we can reasonably conclude that the status hypothesis is partially supported.  The 
growth hypothesis is not supported because the coefficient for growth rate is insignificant. The 
results for other variables remain unchanged.  
5.3.4 Further Analyses 
Results from the above analyses show that the relationship between town meeting and growth 
management restrictiveness conforms my hypothesis, but the relationship between 
initiative/referendum and growth management restrictiveness contradicts my hypotheses. In the 
regression models’ outputs, the variable “region” shows a strong significant influence. This may 
indicate a collinearity problem between direct democracy and region. Similar analyses for each 
region may be worth an effort. In addition, like town meeting in New England region, direct 
democracy in California may differ from other states56. Following analyses (see Table 5-8) are 
conducted without cases from New England states and California.  
Without California and New England states, direct democracy in the national model becomes 
insignificant. So do the interaction terms between direct democracy and socioeconomic status 
variables. These results suggest that direct democracy has no impacts over growth management 
restrictiveness. The negative relationship between direct democracy and policy restrictiveness 
observed in previous models may be largely due to the impacts of town meeting in New England 
region and direct democracy in California.  
In three of the four regional models (without New England states in the Northeast model and 
without California in the West model), no significant relationship, direct or indirect, between 
direct democracy and growth management has been observed. The only exception is the Midwest 
model in which direct democracy is negatively associated with policy restrictiveness and the 
                                                 
56
 In fact, all California municipalities have access to direct democracy and they can adopt or modify land use 
regulations through direct democracy.  
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relationship is statistically significant at 0.05 level. This model also indicates an indirect 
relationship between direct democracy and policy restrictiveness through the interaction between 
direct democracy and race. The interaction term between direct democracy and white is 
positively significant, suggesting higher proportion of white may translate into restrictiveness 
through direct democracy.  
Table 5-8. Ordinal Regression Results 4 – Coefficients of Models without New England States and California 
 National Northeast Midwest South West 
Direct Democracy -.771 1.174 -3.180** -1.075 7.715 
DD*White .002 -.015 .034** -.011 -.121 
DD*Household Income .001 .000 -.004 .018 .012 
White .005** -.012 .028*** -.008 -.023 
Household Income (thousand dollars) .006 .005 .002 .021* .016** 
Population Growth Rate (90-00) .001 .725 -.061 -.091 -.223 
Total Population (log) -.176*** -.147 -.417*** -.076 .101 
Senior -.038** -.020 -.098*** -.027 .002 
Moved-in between 95-00 -.023*** -.091** -.039*** -.012 .020 
Incorporated .184 -.711* .819*** -.633* -.625 
Central City -.374 1.157 -.385 .589 -.187 
Threshold      
[restrict = 0] -4.505*** -9.302*** -6.253*** -2.786 -1.942 
[restrict = 1] -2.422** -6.550** -4.320*** -.308 .711 
[restrict = 2] -.854 -4.993* -2.681* 1.428 2.773 
[restrict = 3] .762 -3.363 -.830 2.858 4.669 
[restrict = 4] 4.010*** -.031  4.795*  
N 733 125 332 195 81 
Model Fitting Chi-Square: 56.982 12.567 64.623 12.535 15.219 
Pseudo R-Square (Nagelkerke): .079 .101 .187 .066 0.184 
Link Function: Logit      
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01      
Dependent Variable: Growth Management Restrictiveness 
 
5.3.5 Summary 
The findings from the ordinal regression models suggest that direct democracy plays a role in 
influencing local growth management restrictiveness. In addition to a direct relationship between 
them, direct democracy also helps the translation of community status into growth management 
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efforts. However, this influence is limited to certain types of direct democracy and certain 
geographic areas.  
From a nationwide perspective, local provision for direct democracy has a negative impact on 
the propensity to have restrictive growth measures. In addition to this direct impact, evidence 
shows that direct democracy has an indirect impact on growth management in that the presence 
of direct democracy may alter how community socioeconomic status influences growth 
management and make such influence even stronger. However, further analyses show that these 
results might be a false picture. Different forms of direct democracy at different geographic areas 
may have different types of association with growth management.  
In the New England states, town meeting shows a positive connection with growth 
management restrictiveness. However, by helping translate community status into growth 
management, town meeting gives income a negative impact on overall restrictiveness. In states 
outside New England, initiative and referendum prevail, but the evidence suggests that the two 
follow different routes in order to be associated with growth management. Similar to general 
access of direct democracy, initiative seems to have a negative association with the likelihood of 
having restrictive growth policies, and its existence may trigger a stronger positive impact by 
community status on growth polices. The results also indicate that referendum is likely to have 
only a direct link with local growth efforts and that it tends to be negatively associated with 
policy restrictiveness. However, when excluding California cases in the analyses, direct 
democracy shows no influence over policy restrictiveness in the Non-New England areas and the 
indirect relationship between direct democracy and policy restrictiveness also fades away. The 
negative relationship between direct democracy and growth management restrictiveness is only 
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observed in the Midwest region and there direct democracy also provides a mechanism through 
which higher proportion of white can be translated into restrictive growth measures.  
The results from the New England models and the non-New England models differ. This 
validates the separation of nationwide data into the above two sets which examine the different 
forms of direct democracy. One implication from the results for future direct democracy research 
is that according to the purposes of the research, by pooling together varying forms of direct 
democracy, we may mix their different, and even at times conflicting, impacts into a compliant 
universe, yet miss the important uniqueness of each tool’s impact.  
The findings from these models also suggest directions for future studies. The presence of 
direct democracy, as well as initiative and referendum, is associated with a smaller number of 
growth measures. One explanation could be that direct democracy may be tied with certain types 
of growth management policies that are actually more restrictive when looking closely at their 
contents, so that a smaller number of restrictive measures may still represent a stringent overall 
effort to limit growth. This recommends further research to look at the association between direct 
democracy and individual growth management measures. Efforts focusing on the content of 
growth management polices could further improve understanding on this matter.  
In New England, town meeting may help translate community status into growth 
management, but the relationship is negative. In addition to the possible explanation discussed 
above, another explanation could be that the minority population in the New England region 
might be different from the common perception, as this population is poor and less educated. 
Further exploration in this direction may help clarify the issue. Furthermore, there might be 
undiscovered factors influencing the relationship among status, town meeting, and growth 
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management. Once their affects are isolated, a straightforward relationship between status and 
growth management in town meeting communities might be observed.  
5.4 Growth Management Characteristics and Direct Democracy 
 
In this section, the aim is to explore whether direct democracy is associated with two 
characteristics of growth management—exclusionary potential and management-orientation. I 
focus on following six types of growth management tools—permit cap; vote requirement; low-
density-only zoning; mobile home and/or apartment prohibition; urban containment; and 
facilities regulation—and examine their relationships with direct democracy access. Among the 
six tools, low-density-only zoning and mobile home/apartment prohibition are identified as 
having exclusionary potential, while urban containment and facilities regulation are more 
management-oriented and do not have exclusionary potential, while permit cap and vote 
requirement are somewhere in between in this regard.  
Similarly to the previous section, I first focus on the general access of direct democracy and 
look at its relationship with growth management tools from a nationwide perspective. I then 
focus on the different forms of direct democracy, those being town meeting, initiative, and 
referendum, and examine the relationships between growth management measures and such 
individual direct democracy access. Again, because of the regionally-exclusive distinction 
between town meeting and initiative/referendum, I separate the nationwide dataset into two 
groups of data according to their geographic locations—the New England region and the non-
New England region.  
Findings indicate that direct democracy has a connection with the exclusionary potential of 
local growth management measures and a negative relationship with management-orientation; 
this connection is carried out through certain forms of direct democracy. The results suggest that 
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both town meeting communities in the New England region and initiative communities in the 
non-New England region are more likely to have measures that would exclude the poor and 
minorities. However, from a national perspective, no evidence indicates the existence of 
connections between general access to direct democracy and exclusionary measures—rather 
communities with some form of direct democracy tend less likely to have management-oriented 
measures. The findings from the models also show that both initiative communities and 
referendum communities are less likely to present management-oriented growth measures.  
However, findings from this section should be treated as the result of exploratory efforts. The 
found relationships are more or less statistical occurrences and lack sound theoretical support. 
The interpretation of the relationship between an individual growth measure and direct 
democracy is limited to a certain extent because growth measures do not usually exist 
individually. Many measures are complementary to each other and often consist of a coherent 
rather than a fragmented policy regime, thus they should be treated as a whole and interpreted 
altogether. Interaction terms between direct democracy and community status were also tested in 
these models, but the results are not reported as these terms make little improvement to the 
models.  
5.4.1 Individual Growth Management Measures vs. General Access of Direct Democracy 
Six logistic regression models corresponding to the six types of growth management tools are 
employed to examine the relationship between direct democracy and individual growth 
management tools. Each of the six growth management tools is used as a dependent variable, and 
access to direct democracy is included as the key independent variable of interest, while 
community status, growth rate, and other related factors are controlled. Table 5-9 reports the 
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coefficient (B) and exponentiated coefficient (eB) for the independent variables in each of the 
models. Descriptive statistics and classification tables are listed in Appendix F.   
Table 5-9. Logistic Regression Results 1—National Models 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Direct 
Democracy .668 1.951 .162 1.176 .086 1.090 .160 1.173 -.640*** .527 -.906*** .404 
White .048*** 1.049 .000 1.000 .015*** 1.015 -.017*** .983 .025*** 1.025 .008 1.008 
Household 
Income -.004 .996 .001 1.001 .002 1.002 .013*** 1.013 .001 1.001 -.003*** .997 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) -.011* .989 .000 1.000 -.002 .998 -.001 .999 .001 1.001 .001 1.001 
Total Pop. 
(log) .122 1.130 -.243*** .784 -.505*** .604 -.258*** .773 .265*** 1.304 .277*** 1.319 
Senior -.172*** .842 .015 1.015 -.064*** .938 -.011 .989 -.042** .959 -.016 .984 
Moved-in 
btwn 95-00 .031 1.032 -.006 .994 -.033*** .967 -.015* .985 -.009 .992 .035*** 1.036 
Midwest1 -1.539*** .215 -.457*** .633 -.474*** .622 -.473*** .623 1.081*** 2.946 -.623*** .537 
South1 .786 2.196 -.499** .607 -.361 .697 -1.015*** .362 1.738*** 5.686 -.532** .588 
West1 .661 1.936 -.316 .729 -1.347** .260 -2.491*** .083 2.901*** 18.192 -.012 .988 
Incorporated .471 1.601 .046 1.047 -.618*** .539 1.100*** 3.003 -.505*** .604 .464*** 1.591 
Central City .154 1.167 -.522** .593 -.850* .427 -.213 .808 .263 1.301 -.512** .600 
Constant -7.153*** .001 2.323*** 10.206 5.240*** 188.605 3.371*** 29.096 -6.020*** .002 -3.041*** .048 
N 773  1416  1328  1548  1328  1088  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.185  0.084  0.271  0.289  0.239  0.175  
1
 Comparison Base: Northeast 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
The results from these models indicate that direct democracy may not make a contribution to 
the possible exclusion of growth management. Direct democracy is not statistically significant in 
the low-density-only zoning model and the mobile home/apartment prohibition model, each of 
these having growth measures that have exclusionary impacts. In permit cap and vote 
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requirement models, direct democracy is also insignificant, indicating that direct democracy may 
not contribute to the measures with exclusionary potential.  
In the above four models, all the coefficients for direct democracy are positive. However, the 
lack of significance may indicate that the observation of the positive relationship could be by 
chance. We cannot reach any conclusion on the relationship between direct democracy and 
exclusionary growth measures or measures with exclusionary potential. This might, however, at 
least be a good sign to the establishment and employment of direct democracy. Furthermore, 
different forms of direct democracy may have different relationships with growth management 
measures, and thus blending them into a whole may have blunted each individual relationship. 
Looking at how different forms of direct democracy influence growth management may help 
disentangle their complex relationships. 
However, the evidence indicates that direct democracy may discourage the use of 
management-oriented growth measures. In both the urban containment and facilities regulation 
models, direct democracy is negatively significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that finding 
management-oriented measures such as urban containment and facilities regulation in direct 
democracy communities is less likely. As urban containment and facilities regulations aim to 
promote ordered and efficient development rather than stopping growth, the disconnection 
between direct democracy and management-oriented measures plus the finding that direct 
democracy is associated with fewer growth measures may suggest a lack of deliberative and 
mediate efforts to manage growth in direct democracy communities. In such communities, the 
orientation to growth is likely to be either promoting or simply limiting. Further examination of 
which forms of direct democracy contribute to this discouragement would be interesting.  
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Community status seems to play an important role in the association with growth management 
measures. The results indicate that the percent of white population is positively associated with 
permit cap, low-density zoning and urban containment, yet is negatively associated with mobile 
home/apartment prohibition. However, the evidence does not show that white has a significant 
connection with vote requirement. Compared with white, income’s connection with growth 
measures is limited.  The results show that household income is positively associated with 
mobile home/apartment prohibition, but negatively associated with facilities regulation.  
Surprisingly, the growth rate seems to play a role only rarely in contributing to the propensity 
for having a growth measure. The only exception is found in the permit cap model. Contrary to 
the common perception, growth seems to reduce the likelihood of having a permit cap.  
Among other control variables, larger population size or more newcomers who moved in 
during the last five years seem to have a connection with management-oriented measures as well 
as with smaller population size or less newcomers with measures having exclusionary potential. 
Communities with more senior residents have the tendency to decrease the likelihood of having 
permit cap, low-density-only zoning and urban containment. Incorporated jurisdictions tend to be 
more likely to have mobile home/apartment limitation and facilities regulation, but less likely to 
have low-density-only zoning and urban containment. Central cities are less likely to have vote 
requirement, low-density-only zoning and facilities regulation. Although a region’s influence is 
quite complex, two interesting patterns are seen—mobile home/apartment prohibition is most 
likely to be found in the Northeast and then, in descending order, in the Midwest, the South, and 
least likely in the West, while urban containment follows exactly the reverse order; it is most 
likely to be found in the West and least likely in the Northeast.  
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5.4.2 Individual Growth Management Measures vs. Town Meeting 
This section focuses on the relationship between town meeting and growth management 
measures. Utilizing data from the New England region, six logistic regression models 
corresponding to the six types of growth management tools are examined. Again, each of the six 
growth management tools is used as a dependent variable; town meeting is included as the key 
independent variable of interest, while community status, growth rate, and other related factors57 
are controlled. Table 5-10 reports the coefficient (B) and exponentiated coefficient (eB) for the 
independent variables in each of the models. See Appendix F for descriptive statistics and 
classification tables. 
Table 5-10. Logistic Regression Results 2 – New England Models 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement Low Density Zoning Mobile/Apt. Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Town Meeting .162 1.176 22.244 4.578E9 1.388* 4.005 .309 1.362 -18.435 .000 .604 1.829 
White .001 1.001 .054 1.055 .081 1.085 .020 1.020 -.055 .947 .054 1.055 
Household 
Income -.012 .988 .000 1.000 -.004 .996 .010 1.010 .004 1.004 -.002 .998 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) -.017 .983 -.032 .969 .094 1.098 .057 1.058 .079 1.082 -.069* .933 
Total Pop. 
(log) .294 1.342 .926 2.524 -1.735*** .176 .195 1.216 .012 1.012 .099 1.104 
Senior -.258 .773 -.088 .916 -.267** .766 -.159 .853 .272 1.313 -.008 .992 
Moved-in 
between 95-00 .164 1.178 .001 1.001 -.209* .812 -.108 .897 .080 1.084 .153* 1.166 
Central City -21.202 .000 -21.295 .000 -17.747 .000 -.886 .412 .567 1.762 2.185* 8.893 
Constant -5.286 .005 -13.377* .000 20.012** 4.908E8 2.033 7.639 -4.569 .010 -10.868* .000 
N 44  74  80  80  78  77  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.474  0.704  0.674  0.218  0.381  0.218  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
                                                 
57
 Two variables—region and jurisdiction type—are dropped due to lack of variation. All cases are in the Northeast 
region and all are incorporated jurisdictions.  
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The findings from these models suggest that in the New England region, town meeting has a 
connection with exclusionary growth management measures. The coefficient for town meeting is 
positively significant in the low-density-only zoning model, indicating that the presence of the 
town meeting form of government in a community increases the likelihood of having low-
density-only zoning measures. No evidence shows significant associations between town 
meeting and other growth management measures.  
The result that town meeting communities tend to have low-density-only zoning requires 
consideration. In the New England region, a majority of local jurisdictions have a zoning 
ordinance, but the contents of this ordinance vary across jurisdictions. The systematic application 
of low-density zoning in town meeting communities may reveal a deliberate manipulation of 
available land use tools to exclude certain types of housing development and potentially certain 
types of population. However, whether or not such manipulation is intentional is unknown. 
Detailed case studies looking into the preferences and motivation of town meeting participants 
may give further clarity in this matter.  
It is surprising to find that community status does not play a role in influencing the likelihood 
for a community in the New England region to have a particular growth measure. Compared to 
the findings in the previous section that the status variables are active in the national models, this 
result may indicate that the New England region is unique and the manner in which factors affect 
growth policy emergence is different here than in other areas. However, as in the previous 
section, growth seems to rarely play a role in contributing to the propensity for having a growth 
measure. The only exception is found in the facilities regulation model, where growth seems to 
reduce the likelihood of having such measure. This result is also contrary to the common 
perception.  
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Only a few control variables seem occasionally to be important in affecting the possibility of 
having a growth management measure in a New England jurisdiction. In the low-density zoning 
model, a community with smaller population size, fewer senior residents, or fewer newcomers 
who moved in during last five years tends to be less likely to have low-density-only zoning. In 
the facilities regulation model, central cities with more newcomers tend to be more likely to have 
a facilities regulation in the form of either impact fees or an APFO.  
It should be noted that the sample size for these models is relatively small, ranging from 44 
cases in the permit cap model to 80 cases in the low-density zoning model and mobile 
home/apartment prohibition model. This may limit the representativeness of the cases and 
caution should be used in making inferences from these findings.  
5.4.3 Individual Growth Management Measures vs. Initiative and Referendum 
The focus will now turn to the relationship between initiative/referendum and growth 
management measures. The data for the models in this section are from the non-New England 
region and again six logistic regression models corresponding to the six types of growth 
management tools are examined. Each of the six growth management tools is used as dependent 
variables; initiative and referendum are included as the key independent variables of interest, 
while community status, growth rate and other related factors are controlled. Table 5-11 reports 
the coefficient (B) and exponentiated coefficient (eB) for the independent variables in each of the 
models. See Appendix F for descriptive statistics and classification tables.  
The findings from these models indicate that initiative is closely tied with exclusionary 
growth management measures. In the mobile home/apartment prohibition model, initiative has a 
coefficient of 0.605, positively significant at the 0.01 level. This result implies that in the non-
New England region, the provision for initiative increases the probability of a community to 
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have a mobile home/apartment prohibition. However, no evidence shows connections between 
initiative and other exclusionary measures or measures with exclusionary potential.  
Table 5-11. Logistic Regression Results 3 – Non-New England Models 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Initiative -.805 .447 .227 1.254 -.111 .895 .605*** 1.832 -1.405*** .245 .267 1.306 
Referendum .890 2.436 -.073 .929 -.020 .980 .008 1.008 -.083 .920 -1.129*** .323 
White .045*** 1.046 -.002 .998 .012** 1.012 -.017*** .983 .025*** 1.025 .011* 1.011 
Household 
Income -.004 .996 .001 1.001 .002 1.002 .013*** 1.013 .001 1.001 -.002 .998 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) -.009 .991 .000 1.000 -.001 .999 -.001 .999 .001 1.001 .000 1.000 
Total Pop. 
(log) -.023 .977 -.268*** .765 -.511*** .600 -.272*** .762 .295*** 1.343 .363*** 1.437 
Senior -.105** .901 .017 1.017 -.033* .967 -.010 .990 -.045*** .956 -.059*** .943 
Moved-in 
btwn 95-00 .034 1.034 -.007 .993 -.029*** .972 -.014* .986 -.011 .989 .032*** 1.033 
Midwest1 .359 1.431 -.428** .652 -.126 .882 -.536*** .585 1.162*** 3.195 -1.877*** .153 
South1 2.219** 9.198 -.431* .650 -.056 .945 -.974*** .378 1.686*** 5.395 -1.685*** .185 
West1 3.012*** 20.321 -.351 .704 -.977* .376 -2.874*** .056 3.719*** 41.219 -1.579*** .206 
Incorporated -.547 .579 -.012 .988 -.949*** .387 1.067*** 2.907 -.401** .670 1.186*** 3.275 
Central City .475 1.608 -.387 .679 -.599 .549 -.162 .850 .163 1.177 -.787*** .455 
Constant -7.144*** .001 2.798*** 16.413 4.925*** 137.637 3.535*** 34.309 -6.317*** .002 -2.746*** .064 
N 728  1315  1230  1440  1223  983  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.202  0.081  0.259  0.277  0.259  0.265  
1
 Comparison Base: Northeast 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Initiative’s impact on policies may come from different directions—citizens may turn their 
preferences into policies directly by adopting policies through ballot box voting. Moreover, the 
past citizen practice of ballot box planning or the possibility for citizens to use the ballot box to 
adopt policies in their favor may shape the policies adopted by councils. For the exclusionary 
connection observed above from the model results, however, it is difficult to determine whether 
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this connection is established by citizens’ direct employment of ballot box planning or by 
applying pressure on councils or by a mix of both. Also, the findings do not determine if the 
exclusionary connection is a reflection of citizen preferences for exclusion or the result of other 
unobserved factors in initiative communities. 
No evidence is found that referendum has connections with exclusionary growth measures, 
whether low-density-only zoning or mobile home/apartment prohibition, as the coefficients for 
referendum in these two models are not significant. The models also failed to identify linkage 
between referendum and two measures having exclusionary potential—permit cap and vote 
requirement. The coefficients for referendum in these two models are insignificant. However, 
this may not necessarily suggest the non-existence of exclusionary preference among voters. 
Referendum works to stop council-adopted policies from becoming effective rather than to 
propose and adopt new policies. If the council does not pass policies with an exclusionary 
intention, there is no way for such policies to emerge through referendum, even in cases where 
voters would prefer to exclude them.  
The evidence also indicates that both initiative and referendum decrease the likelihood for a 
community to encounter management-oriented measures. In the urban containment model, 
initiative is negatively significant at the 0.01 level, showing a negative influence over the 
existence of urban containment measures. In the facilities regulation model, the coefficient for 
referendum is –1.129 and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the presence of referendum 
decreases the likelihood of having facilities regulations. As urban containment and facilities 
regulations aim at promoting ordered and efficient development rather than stopping growth, the 
disconnection between initiative/referendum and management-oriented measures suggests the 
lack of planned efforts to manage growth in either initiative or referendum communities.  
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Similar to the nationwide models, community status seems to play an important role in the 
association with growth management measures. The results indicate that the percent of white 
population is positively associated with permit cap, low-density zoning, urban containment and 
facilities regulation, but negatively associated with mobile home/apartment prohibition. The 
evidence does not, however, show that white has a significant connection with vote requirement. 
Compared with white, income’s connection with growth measures is limited. The results show 
that household income is only positively associated with mobile home/apartment prohibition. 
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that growth rate does not play a role in contributing to the 
propensity for having a growth measure.  
The role of other control variables also echo those found in the national models. Larger 
population size or more newcomers who moved in during last five years seem to have a 
connection with management-oriented measures, while smaller population size or fewer 
newcomers seem connected with measures having exclusionary potential. For communities with 
more senior residents, the likelihood of having permit cap, low-density-only zoning, urban 
containment and facilities regulation tends to decrease. Incorporated jurisdictions tend to be 
more likely to have mobile home/apartment limitation and facilities regulation, but less likely to 
have low-density-only zoning or urban containment. Central cities are less likely to have 
facilities regulation.  
A region’s influence still presents two interesting patterns—it is most likely to see mobile 
home/apartment prohibition in the Northeast and then following in descending order the Midwest 
and the South, while it is least likely to see this measure in the West; urban containment follows 
exactly the reverse order, most likely in the West and least likely in the Northeast. One change 
occurs to permit cap—in the national model, communities in the Northeast seem more likely to 
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have permit cap than in the Midwest; however, in the non-New England model, the Midwest is 
now no longer significant and permit cap is most likely to be seen in communities in the West 
and down to the South, and least likely in the Northeast.  
5.4.4 Further Analyses 
Here similar to the restrictiveness analyses, I tested models without cases from New England 
states and California. Results are presented in Table 5-12. Also see Appendix F for descriptive 
statistics, classification tables, and detailed outcomes (Section F.7).  
Table 5-12. Relationships between Direct Democracy and Growth Management Characteristics  
(from models without New England states and California) 
 
 Permit 
Cap 
Vote 
Requirement 
Low 
Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
Direct 
Democracy +**     -*** 
Initiative      +* 
US 
Referendum +**     -*** 
Direct 
Democracy    +***   
Initiative    -**   
Northeast 
Referendum    +***   
Direct 
Democracy +**   -** -** -*** 
Initiative    +*** -*** +** 
Midwest 
Referendum +**   -***  -*** 
Direct 
Democracy      -** 
Initiative       
South 
Referendum      -* 
Direct 
Democracy    +* -** -* 
Initiative    +*   
West 
Referendum       
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Here the results are similar to previous findings. The general trend is still that direct 
democracy shows a positive connection with exclusionary measures. One difference is that direct 
democracy shows a link to permit cap in the composite model, but this link can only be observed 
in one regional model—the Midwest model. The results also indicate that this positive 
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connection can be attributed to the availability of referendum while initiative makes little 
contribution to this relationship. A connection between direct democracy and mobile home and 
apartment prohibition measures exists in the Northeast and the West, but an exception from the 
general trend is that direct democracy is less likely to be connected to mobile home and 
apartment prohibition measures in the Midwest.  
The results indicate that direct democracy has a negative connection with management-
oriented measures such as urban containment measures and facilities regulations. In the 
composite model, direct democracy has a strong negative relationship with facilities regulations. 
With the exception of Northeast, the negative connection between direct democracy and 
management-oriented measures exists in all other regions. Referendum seems in large part 
responsible for this negative connection, while initiative has a positive relationship with facilities 
regulations but only in the whole model and the Midwest model.  
5.4.5 Summary 
The findings from these logistic regression models indicate that direct democracy has 
connections with exclusionary growth management measures and that this connection is realized 
through the various forms of direct democracy. In the New England region, town meeting 
communities are more likely to have low-density-only zoning. In the non-New England region, 
communities with access to initiative tend to be more likely to present mobile home and 
apartment prohibition measures. Similar relationship can also be found in the Northeast region 
without New England states and in the West without California. Midwest shows a little 
difference on this relationship—direct democracy is tied with permit cap but not mobile home 
and apartment prohibition measures. However, from a national perspective, when pooling 
different forms of direct democracy into a whole, no connection between direct democracy and 
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exclusionary measures is found. When excluding New England states and California, direct 
democracy shows a connection with permit cap.  
The evidence also shows that direct democracy communities are less likely to have 
management-oriented growth measures. In the national models, the findings indicate that 
communities with access to direct democracy are less likely to have urban containment and 
facilities regulations. In the non-New England region, initiative communities tend to be less 
likely to be associated with urban containment measures while referendum communities tend to 
be less likely to have facilities regulations. The models do not capture any relationship between 
direct democracy and management-oriented measures in the Northeast, with or without New 
England states.  
Support for the validation of model separation can also be found from the results of these 
models. Evidence of connections between the forms of direct democracy and exclusionary 
measures is revealed in the separate models, but not in the national models. Due to pooling 
together different forms of direct democracy, we may have mixed their varying impacts into a 
compliant universe and missed the important uniqueness of each tool’s impact.  
The negative relationship between direct democracy and management-oriented measures may 
help explain the unexpected findings from the previous section that direct democracy is 
associated with less restrictive growth management efforts. As growth management 
restrictiveness is represented by the number of restrictive growth measures, fewer restrictive 
growth efforts mean a smaller number of growth measures. The disconnection between direct 
democracy and management-oriented measures indicates that direct democracy communities are 
less likely to have management-oriented measures such as urban containment and facilities 
regulation. These measures are least restrictive in the six identified measures because they tend 
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to promote growth rather than limiting growth. Thus, a smaller number of growth measures may 
not necessarily represent less restrictive growth efforts. The construction of a more precise 
restrictiveness index may very well be worth consideration.  
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Chapter 6. Findings from Case Studies 
The overall objective of the case studies is to further examine the influence of direct 
democracy on growth management policies. My theoretical framework illustrates that due to the 
unbalanced participation of different status groups under direct democracy in local growth 
politics, growth management results under direct democracy may be restrictive and exclusionary 
over the results under representative democracy. The quantitative investigation provides some 
evidence to support my perception, namely that direct democracy has an association with 
restrictive, less deliberative and exclusionary growth management efforts. The evidence also 
indicates that direct democracy facilitates the relationship between community status and 
adopted growth policies.  
However, quantitative analyses cannot account for such detailed information as unique local 
conditions, informal growth management measures, motivation and actions of interest groups, 
and the manner in which measures were adopted. Qualitative case studies then become necessary 
to complement the models. The case study research will probe the growth management adoption 
process and scrutinize how direct democracy interacts with other factors such as community 
socioeconomic status and growth and results into growth management. Findings from 
quantitative analyses are also utilized to serve as the case selection criteria for case studies. 
The case studies focus on town meeting communities in the New England region. First, town 
meeting in the New England region is less focused. Second, town meeting is claimed to be the 
purest form of democracy and to interrupt the democratic decision making process the least. 
Town meeting is thus worth focusing on and may generate insights for the relationship between 
direct democracy and growth management in a straightforward way. It would make a better 
research to also focus on initiative and referendum use in one of the western states, presumably 
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California or Oregon, as both of these are heavy users of ballot box planning. However, ballot 
box planning in the western states, especially in California, has been the research topic in many 
studies. Thus I leave out these case studies in this research. The case study unit is local 
municipality.  
After examining the survey results, according to the selection criteria,58 I first selected the 
following two cases: the Town of Westford and the Town of Chelmsford, both in Massachusetts. 
See Figure 6-1 for their geographic locations. I then began to systematically collect background 
materials for these towns. The materials include broader context data, targeted land use policies, 
and government forms. These data are collected through the US Census; Massachusetts State 
general laws; local charters and bylaws; town meeting and council minutes; and local and 
regional newspaper archives. Additional information was collected through telephone interviews 
and email communications.  
 
 
Figure 6-1. Locations of Selected Case Study Communities 
                                                 
58
 See Chapter 4 for a detailed description on the case selection criteria and process, as well as the design for the 
case study research.  
Boston 
Chelmsford 
Westford 
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In total, four interviews were successfully conducted. The interviewees include a land-use 
management director and a selectman from the Town of Westford, and a community 
development director and a selectman from the Town of Chelmsford. Email communications 
with clerks, planners and some selectmen also helped in gaining information for the three cases.  
6.1 State Context 
Massachusetts is the heart of the New England region. It is the most populous of the six New 
England states, the third most densely-populated state in the US, and has the sixth highest GDP 
per capita in the US. Massachusetts features two separate metropolitan areas─the eastern Boston 
metropolitan area and the western Springfield metropolitan area. Approximately two-thirds of 
the state's population lives in Greater Boston. Culturally, historically, and commercially, 
Massachusetts has been significant throughout American history. Today the state’s economy has 
been transformed from one based on heavy industry into a service and high-tech based economy.  
The state’s population has continued to grow in the past few decades, but at a slower pace 
than the national average. The latest census estimates show that the Commonwealth's population 
was more than 6.5 million in 2010 and grew by 3.9% since 2000 (5.5% from 1990 to 2000), 
compared with nearly 10% nationwide. In the portion of the Greater Boston Metropolitan area 
that is included in my study, the growth trend apparently follows an outward direction from 
Boston (Figure 6-2).  
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Figure 6-2. Population Growth in Greater Lowell, 1950-2000 
Economic downturns may have contributed to the slow pace of growth. Since 1990, the state 
was hit by two severe recessions, one in the early 1990s and one in 2001. Each of these involved 
a crash in the state's vital technology sector (minicomputer and dot-com), compounding a real 
estate bust which was driven by speculative building.59 Domestic migration has also facilitated 
the slow growth, but there are a variety of reasons for people to leave the state. According to the 
Governor’s Jobs Creation Commission, most former residents cited high housing costs and a 
high cost of living in their decisions to leave Massachusetts.60 Another factor has been the 
transformation from a manufacturing economy into one based on high technology, leaving 
limited employment options for lower-skilled workers, males in particular.61 However, foreign 
immigration is more than making up for these losses, causing Massachusetts' population to 
continue to grow according to the 2010 Census.   
Massachusetts has a weak state planning framework. There are no statewide plans or planning 
goals and guidelines. As a strong home rule state, the power to plan and to regulate land use is 
                                                 
59
 http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/02/10/recession_looks_more_certain_but_it_may_be_short/ 
60
 http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/x1840140755/Experts-say-housing-costs-schools-key-to-job-creation-
in-Massachusetts 
61
 Levenson, Michael. Bay state's labor force diminishing. Boston Globe. December 10, 2006. Retrieved 2010-06-
05.  
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left in the hands of municipalities. Planning is basically a response to local needs, especially 
fiscal considerations, rather than a reflection of state or regional concerns. The state does not 
require that local master plans be consistent with zoning ordinances, thus the plan may not be 
translated into local implementation.  
However, some state provisions have influenced local planning efforts. Chapter 40A of the 
Massachusetts General Laws, also known as the Massachusetts Zoning Act, delegates to 
municipalities the power to zone land uses by permitting and prohibiting various land uses in 
mapped districts that cover all of the land of a municipality. Chapter 40A also states that city 
councils and town meetings can adopt or amend zoning laws only by a supermajority, i.e., a two-
thirds vote. Zoning regulations are designated as bylaws in towns and ordinances in cities. In 
Massachusetts, zoning commonly includes lists of activities that can be permitted in each zoning 
district: the densities at which structures can be built; height of structures; dimensional requirements 
for lots such as setbacks from property lines and percentages of landscaped or paved land; parking 
requirements; and procedures for approving permits. 
Under Chapter 40A, all municipalities in Massachusetts have zoning codes, but the contents of 
such codes vary substantially. The majority of zoning codes can be treated as low-density measures 
from a national perspective. Some researchers claim that these measures have resulted in low-density 
housing development and have harmed the state’s growth (Glaeser, 2011). According to a study by 
the MIT Center for Real Estate (The Housing Affordability Initiative, 2006), new single-family home 
development in the Greater Boston region consumes on average 1.3 acres of land per unit. Half of the 
metropolitan area’s new single-family homes were built on lots of 0.9 acres or larger.  
Chapter 40B of the Massachusetts General Laws (1969), the “Anti-Snob Zoning Act” has raised 
concerns that municipal zoning does not allow the market to meet the range of housing needs, 
particularly for low-income households. This law allows the state to overrule local land-use 
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regulations for projects in communities where less than 10 percent of the housing stock is 
affordable. If 20 to 25 percent of the units in a proposed development are subsidized to 
affordable levels, a developer can propose to build a housing project on land where zoning would 
preclude residential development. Developers can also propose projects with higher densities 
than would normally be allowed. In these instances, the state is allowed to override local 
regulations. Chapter 40B has caused heated controversies since the 1990s in many communities 
across the state. Some planners and officials feel that Chapter 40B has thwarted local efforts to 
plan for growth, while others admit the important role Chapter 40B has played in encouraging 
affordable housing construction in communities where it has traditionally been resisted.  
Proposition 2½, Chapter 59 of Massachusetts General Laws also has implications for the 
planning efforts of municipalities. This proposition was inspired by the California tax limitation 
law Proposition 13, passed by an initiative petition in 1980 and going into effect in 1982. The 
law sets a limit of 2.5% for annual property tax increases for all municipalities, but taxes from 
new development are exempted from this limit. A side-effect of Proposition 2½ is that 
municipality income will decline in real terms whenever inflation rises above 2.5%. Historically, 
inflation has been above 2.5% for a significant majority of the years since 1980, thus resulting in 
a real decline in local tax rates and local spending ability. The Law provides an exception that 
allows the citizens of each municipality to override the 2½ restriction to address the specific 
needs of the community, thus giving citizens direct control over their taxation.  
Before the middle of the 1990s, most municipalities were able to keep their budgets balanced 
by offsetting increased expenditures through new growth. Since the middle of the 1990s, 
however, with local expenses rising faster than the rate of inflation and cutting from state aid in 
record amounts due to recessions, Proposition 2½ is forcing a growing number of communities 
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to face limited and difficult options. One of these is to decide between requesting even more 
money from cash-strapped voters62 or cutting public services such as policing. The other option 
is to find other solutions to address the tax shortage63 and, in most situations, localities fight each 
other bitterly to attract new industrial and commercial development.  
Massachusetts also has a Community Preservation Act signed by its Governor into law in 
2000. The Act is a voluntary smart-growth tool that, once adopted, provides a funding source in 
the form of a surcharge of up to 3% on all property tax bills plus a state matching fund, to be 
used by Massachusetts communities for open space protection; historic preservation; the creation 
of affordable housing; and the development of outdoor recreational facilities. To date, 143 cities 
and towns have adopted the Community Preservation Act and are appropriating funds to 
thousands of community-based projects and needs.64 This law is in fact a type of growth 
management tool and limits the availability of developable land.  
Court rulings can also generate statewide influence over local decision-making on growth 
management. Two cases focusing on local growth control set good examples—Sturges v. Town 
of Chilmark (1980)65 and Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley (2004).66 In both cases, the towns’ 
growth control bylaws are similar to each other and aim at controlling the residential rate of 
development by restricting yearly construction. Surprisingly, however, the results are completely 
different. The court held Chilmark’s bylaw constitutional, contending that it is a temporary 
                                                 
62
 Since 1983, municipalities have requested, via referendum, 4,449 overrides of Proposition 2½, and 1,798 of them 
have passed. See MA Department of Revenue website at: 
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=dorterminal&L=4&L0=Home&L1=Local+Officials&L2=Municipal+Data+and+Fin
ancial+Management&L3=Data+Bank+Reports&sid=Ador&b=terminalcontent&f=dls_mdmstuf_prop2levy&csid=A
dor  
63
 In 2008, for example, a state legislation has given cities and towns the power to tax phone equipment such as 
telephone poles and wires.  
64
 This information was retrieved on May 28, 2011 from the Community Preservation Coalition’s website at: 
http://www.communitypreservation.org/ 
65
 402 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1980) 
66
 813 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 2004) 
 133
measure intended to slow growth during the implementation of a comprehensive plan. But in the 
second case, the court states that the town’s growth control bylaw was not adopted to assist in the 
execution of a comprehensive plan and is inherently in opposition to the public welfare, therefore 
holding it as unconstitutional. Since the Sturges decision in 1980, as many as fifty municipalities 
have enacted bylaws similar to that at issue in Sturges (Rothmel, 2006). However, after the 2004 
Zuckerman case, many of these growth control bylaws may now be considered unconstitutional, 
or at least challengeable. The policy decision of one case in this study has already reflected this 
impact.  
Massachusetts has a weak regional planning framework in which there are regional planning 
organizations such as the 13 Regional Planning Agencies (RPA) and the Metropolitan Area 
Planning Council in the Greater Boston Region, but these organizations assume entirely advisory 
roles in regional and local planning issues. In each community, ad hoc groups form quickly in 
the face of any serious threat to community character. The strength of local groups in influencing 
local land-use planning can make regional planning difficult, particularly when each community 
has to adopt unpopular policies such as upzoning in order to meet regional goals. In addition, 
officials in every locality struggle to maintain reasonable tax bases, particularly in the face of 
state funding cuts, in order to fulfill the escalating demands for high-quality public services. This 
reality also tends to make regional cooperation difficult.  
There are no county governments above the two selected cases, therefore there is no county 
influence over local growth management. Massachusetts, by law, and mainly due to 
indebtedness, began to allow county governments to dissolve beginning around 1997, mostly for 
the purpose of saving costs. The State has abolished eight of its fourteen county governments, 
leaving five counties with county-level local government and one with combined county/city 
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government. Vestigial judicial and law enforcement districts still follow the old county 
boundaries, and the abolished counties are still generally recognized as geographic entities if not 
political ones.  
Massachusetts has two types of local governments—towns and cities. Municipalities can 
decide whether to have a city or town form of government, but towns with less than 12,000 
inhabitants cannot adopt a city form of government. All cities have a council form of 
government, while towns have either town meeting or town council forms of government. There 
are two types of town meeting—open town meeting and representative town meeting. Towns 
with fewer than 6,000 inhabitants must have an open town meeting, while towns with more than 
6,000 inhabitants may adopt either form of town meeting at their discretion. In 2008, of the 298 
towns in Massachusetts with a town meeting form of government, 261 have open town meeting 
and 37 have representative town meeting. Towns are permitted to convert between these two 
types of town meeting. One of the cases in this study, the Town of Chelmsford, was the latest 
town to change from open town meeting to representative town meeting in 1989. Conversely 
three towns that had representative town meeting—Athol, Seekonk and Webster—have reverted 
to open town meeting.  
Cities and towns in Massachusetts can take steps to shape development through mechanisms 
such as zoning and subdivision control, but regulation is not the only tool available to influence a 
community’s future land-use pattern. Infrastructure and utilities, open space acquisitions, and 
organizational tools such as local development corporations or special districts also have a 
pervasive impact on private investment decisions. Furthermore, while it is tempting to focus all 
major growth management policies on the fate of vacant land, it would be a mistake to overlook 
the role that redevelopment plays in a community’s economy and visual character.  
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6.2 Town of Westford 
 
Figure 6-3. The Westford Town Center 
Westford is a suburban town in the Greater Lowell metropolitan area67 in Middlesex County, 
a member community of the Northern Middlesex Council of Governments.68 Westford is about 
30 miles northwest of Boston and is also part of the Greater Boston metropolitan area. The town 
is bordered by Chelmsford to the east, Tyngsboro to the north, Groton to the west, Littleton to 
the southwest, Acton to the south and Carlisle to the southeast. Interstate Highway 495 runs 
through the southern part of the town, and US Route 3 runs through the town’s northeast corner 
(see Figure 6-4). The population was 21,951 at the time of the 2010 Census and the total area 
within the town boundary is 31.33 square miles. The town was first settled in 1635 but not 
officially incorporated until 1729.  
 
Figure 6-4. Location of Westford 
                                                 
67
 Suburban sprawl and serious economic hardships have reduced the role Lowell plays in its suburbs over the 
decades. Today, Lowell is not the economic center it once was, but it is still a cultural and institutional center for the 
region.  
68
 The Northern Middlesex Council of Governments is one of the Regional Planning Agencies (RPA) in 
Massachusetts and includes 9 communities in the Greater Lowell metropolitan area.  
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In its early history, Westford was a rural town with rolling hills, lakes and apple orchards. 
During the nineteenth century, the textile industry boomed in this region and Westford was noted 
for its wool mills. However, after World War II, the textile industry in this region collapsed 
rapidly and Westford experienced a few decades of stagnation. The town began its technology 
development in the 1960s. With the advent of the 128 Technology Belt, increased development 
pressure from Greater Boston and the proliferation of automobile commuters pushed 
development outside of Route 128 to Interstate 495 and up Routes 3 and 93 into southern New 
Hampshire. By the 1970s, Westford began to act as a suburb for high-tech firms located in 
nearby areas, and later became a center of technology itself. By the 1990s, Westford was home 
to many high-ranking technology firms, most located along Route 110 and running parallel to I-
495. Today, Westford's agricultural past has given way to rapidly-expanding high technology 
industries, suburban retail, and upper-middle class residential areas.  
 
Figure 6-5. The Westford Town Hall 
6.2.1 Local Conditions and Growth 
Westford’s water resources and its direct access to major transportation routes have 
influenced its land-use pattern in noteworthy ways, both historically and since the town adopted 
its first zoning bylaw in 1955. The town was developed from six individual urbanized villages, 
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each with a distinct character and surrounded by low-density suburban residential development. 
Major commercial and industrial developments are concentrated along the Route 110 area and 
the adjacent Route 3 area. The remaining areas of the town are large open spaces, forestland and 
agricultural land. See Figure 6-6.  
 
Figure 6-6. Current Land Use in Westford 
Westford’s six villages evolved in association with different aspects of the town’s history: 
mill construction along a water sources; seasonal recreation on the lakes and ponds; 
transportation patterns; and agricultural development. Today, the villages are not as clearly 
defined as they once were because much of the surrounding land has been subdivided. However, 
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they still contribute significantly to Westford’s visual identity. Five of the six villages are listed 
on the National and State Registers of Historical Places.  
Westford’s residential development has a close connection with industrial and commercial 
development within the town and in nearby communities. From the 1960s to the middle of the 
1980s, industrial development such as high-tech firms and office parks found their place along I-
495 and Routes 3 and 93. As Westford began its development, it provided housing and 
commercial needs for those companies’ commuters, and condominium development was 
intensified during the first half of the 1980s. Beginning in the middle of the 1980s through the 
1990s, industrial and commercial development grew exponentially in the town, with large-scale 
office parks and single-family housing development prevailing, especially during the 1990s. 
Since the middle of the 1990s, Westford has made stringent planning efforts to limit rapid 
residential growth, resulting in slow growth during the last decade. The population growth rate 
from 1990 to 2000 was 26.3%, but from 2000 to 2010 this number dropped sharply to 5.8%. 
However, after some of the growth-limiting measures expired, and coupled with the Chapter 40B 
provisions, housing development has again been experiencing a growth spurt in recent years, 
especially for condominiums.  
Land use change can reflect the growth pattern described above. See Table 6-1 for land use 
change in Westford. The high percentage of change in both industrial and residential uses from 
1985 to 1999 reflects the rapid growth in industrial and housing development. The stagnation of 
both types of land use change in the subsequent 1999 to 2007 period shows the effects of 
restrictive growth management measures having been adopted. The continued commercial 
development in this period may be a reflection of Westford’s efforts to remedy the tax shortage 
caused by rapid residential growth in the previous period. In total, about 40% of the town’s land 
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had been developed by 2007. However, the data only represents broad classifications of land use 
and do not reveal fundamental transformations that occurred as Westford continued to grow. For 
example, considering all residential use types, more than 4,100 acres were converted to housing 
between 1971 and 2007, and over half of all residential land use changes occurred between 1985 
and 1999. However, the data does not show that this period included two cycles of intense 
housing growth: one prior to the recession in 1991 and the other after 1994.  
Table 6-1. Land Use Change in Westford, 1971-2007 
Acres in Use Percent Change 
Land Use 
1971 1985 1999 2007 1971-1991 1985-1999 1999-2007 
% Town 
2007 
Commercial 71.2 137.9 180.7 217.3 94% 31% 20.30% 1.10% 
Industrial 477.6 572.8 996.5 992 20% 74% -0.50% 4.90% 
Residential 2,504.6 3,642.9 6,215.5 6,562.7 45% 71% 5.60% 32.70% 
Other 17,013.7 15,713.5 12,674.4 12,295.1 -8% -19% -3.00% 61.30% 
Summary         
Developed 3,052.4 4,353.7 7,455.4 8,114.3 43% 71% 8.80% 40.40% 
Undeveloped 17,013.7 15,713.5 12,611.7 11,952.8 -8% -20% -5.20% 59.60% 
Total 20,067.1 20,067.1 20,067.1 20,067.1 NA NA NA NA 
Sources: For 1971, 1985 and 1999 data, UMass-Amherst, MacConnell Land Use Maps, MassGIS; for 2007, 
Westford GIS, aerial photogrammetry analysis. Data supplied courtesy of NMCOG.  
 
The large-scale development in the 1990s caused two major impacts on the community. First, 
large projects have often had a detrimental impact on the landscape of the town. As many have 
claimed, Westford has been losing its traditional scenic and country atmosphere. It “is now 
resembling any other town on the 495 strip that looks like a good place to stop briefly and then 
head out - the industrial parks seen from the road are also less than charming” (Westford: 2007 
Planning Survey). Second, the rapid growth placed heavy pressures on the town’s ability to 
provide public services and infrastructure such as schools and new roads. The tax-limiting 
Proposition 2½ and record cuts in state aid put the town’s budgeting situation in even a greater 
quandary. As a result, local property taxes increased sharply. During the rapid growth period 
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from the late 1990s to 2007, Westford’s average tax bill has increased by more than 85% in 
current dollars, and 24% in constant (2006) dollars.69  
The public school issue is among the most concerning in the town’s growth dilemma. 
Westford has a prestigious public school system, consisting of nine public schools and an 
integrated preschool facility. Since the middle of the 1990s, the town had been forced to build or 
renovate six of the schools to accommodate the children from all the new residential 
development. See Table 6-2 for the rapid increase in school enrollment from 1994 to 2004. This 
information also serves as testimony to the town’s significant growth during that period. Property 
tax levies, along with other local receipts, account for more than 90% of all school expenditures 
in Westford.70 Schools were the most important factor leading to the sharp fluctuation in 
property tax rates in Westford.  
The costs of new road construction and nearby transportation improvements for new projects 
are in many cases at least partially borne by development. Other public services such as small-
scale neighborhood parks have also been transferred onto the shoulders of developers. For 
example, as a negotiation result in the Greystone Estates project, the developer agreed to make 
improvements to the intersections surrounding the project as well as including within the project 
a 3-acre park with a baseball diamond, a tennis court, two basketball courts, and trails. Upon 
completion, the agreement included the transfer of the park to the town.   
Because the town is not engaged in providing sewer and water services, the conflicts between 
development projects and sewer and water service providers have often found a compromising 
stand in the town. The town provides public water for some areas but does not provide the 
sewage system. In Westford, approximately 75% of town residences and 90% of businesses are 
                                                 
69
 Massachusetts Department of Revenue, “Average Single-Family Tax Bill,” 1988-2007; Community Opportunities 
Group, Inc. 
70
 Various grants and federal aid sources provide support for the balance of total school spending.  
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serviced by the public water system. The pumping capacity of the eight municipal wells is 3,580 
gallons per minute. For the fiscal year 1999, 1.764 million gallons of water was used per day on 
average. As public sewerage is not available in Westford, all waste treatment must be handled on 
site.  
Table 6-2. Enrollment Growth, FY 1989-2009, Westford Public Schools 
Grade Levels Fiscal 
Year PK-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 Total 
Percent 
Change 
1988 879 585 679 652 2,795  
1989 957 588 647 638 2,830 1.30% 
1990 970 625 605 648 2,848 0.60% 
1991 1,017 661 607 644 2,929 2.80% 
1992 1,029 683 594 655 2,961 1.10% 
1993 1,070 704 649 607 3,030 2.30% 
1994 1,146 756 701 618 3,221 6.30% 
1995 1,153 806 746 609 3,314 2.90% 
1996 1,254 875 773 654 3,556 7.30% 
1997 1,398 892 783 679 3,752 5.50% 
1998 1,473 927 828 702 3,930 4.70% 
1999 1,486 973 898 728 4,085 3.90% 
2000 1,609 1,078 953 766 4,406 7.90% 
2001 1,609 1,107 999 830 4,545 3.20% 
2002 1,622 1,164 999 900 4,685 3.10% 
2003 1,677 1,197 1,103 948 4,925 5.10% 
2004 1,719 1,244 1,149 1,000 5,112 3.80% 
2005 1,645 1,271 1,206 1,011 5,133 0.40% 
2006 1,631 1,266 1,245 1,074 5,216 1.60% 
2007 1,608 1,262 1,241 1,123 5,234 0.30% 
2008 1,614 1,239 1,268 1,163 5,284 1.00% 
Sources: Massachusetts Department of Education, “Long-Term Trends in PK-12 
Enrollments, Westford Public Schools,” <http://finance1.doe.mass.edu/statistics/>. 
*Enrollment counts are based on conditions as of October 1 each year. For example, 
FY 2009 refers to enrollments reported by DOE for October 1, 2008. 
 
After years of growth, Westford today has become a high-end suburban bedroom community. 
A large portion of the town’s land is residential. In 2007, a total of 7,438 acres of land, or 42% of 
the town’s total land, was devoted to residential use (see Table 6-3). High-quality industrial and 
commercial land took up only 1,419 acres, less than 8% of the town’s total land. The majority 
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type of housing is single-family dwelling, with 6,635 acres of land devoted for this purpose, 
which is close to 90% of total residential land and 37% of the town’s total land. Condominiums 
occupied 633 acres, about 8.5% of residential land use. Two and more family dwellings only 
captured a minimal 160 acres, which is little more than 2% of residential land use.  
Table 6-3. Land Use in Westford, 2007 
Class of Use Acres % Total Class of Use Acres % Total 
Residential   Industrial   
   Single-family dwellings 6,635 37.33    Manufacturing, R&D 403 2.27 
   Two-family dwellings 115 0.65    Mining, Quarries 377 2.12 
   Three-family dwellings 18 0.10    Salvage 70 0.39 
   Multi-family dwellings 37 0.21    Public Utilities 90 0.51 
   Condominiums 633 3.56 Total 940 5.29 
Total 7,438 41.85    
Commercial   Mixed Uses   
   Hotels, Nursing Homes 36 0.20    Predominantly Residential 91 0.51 
   Commercial Storage 13 0.07    Predominantly Commercial 41 0.23 
   Retail, Restaurants 98 0.55 Total 132 0.74 
   Auto-Related Uses 28 0.16 
 
  
   Banks, Offices 117 0.66 Chapter 61, 61A, 61B 1,927 10.84 
   Services 21 0.12 
 
  
   Commercial Recreation 166 0.93 Privately Owned Vacant Land 2,482 13.97 
Total 479 2.70    
 
  Public, Non-Profit, Charitable 4,375 24.62 
Total 17,773 100.00    
Sources: Westford GIS Department, FY07 Assessor’s Database; Community Opportunities Group, Inc. 
 
Westford has very little economic or racial diversity, mainly due to its limited housing choices 
and high housing costs. Its housing inventory has become less diverse, and detached single-
family homes have clearly been Westford’s mainstay for a long time. From 1990 to 2000, the 
town’s total housing inventory increased by more than 1,400 units (Table 6-4), making Westford 
one of the state’s top thirty communities for rate of housing growth. Most of the increase 
reflected new single-family home development. Since 2000, market demand for multi-family and 
townhouse condominiums has intensified, though not to the degree that Westford experienced in 
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the early to mid-1980s. By 2007, the town had approximately 7,570 housing units, while 
detached single-family housing accounted for 87%.  
Table 6-4. Housing Units in Westford, 1990-2007 
Housing Type 1990 2000 Change 2007 Change 
Detached Single-Family 4,772 6,161 1,389 6,558 397 
Attached Single-Family or Multi-Family 489 574 85 802 228 
Two-Family 199 184 -15 184 0 
Other 74 22 -52 22 0 
Total 5,534 6,941 1,407 7,566 625 
Sources: Bureau of the Census, Claritas, Inc., and Community Opportunities Group, Inc. 
 
As Westford has grown, it has attracted affluent homebuyers who can afford the municipal 
and school services they expect from the town. In 2006, the median single-family home sale 
price and the median condominium sale price were $425,000 and $350,000 respectively, 
substantially higher than the state equivalences of $312,000 and $261,750 respectively.71 
Moreover, according to the 2000 census, 38.4% of owner occupied householders were 
newcomers (moved-in between 1995 and 2000). Based on a recent survey conducted by the 
town, two-thirds of local residents are commuters working outside of the town. A challenge for 
Westford is that the economic position of newer households often differs from that of long-term 
residents.  
Today, Westford is described as a traditional, affluent and prestigious community with a 
socioeconomic status far above the state average (see Table 6-5). In 2007, a majority of the 
population (90%) was white, subtantially higher than the state average (78.9%). More than a 
quarter of its age 25+ population held graduate degrees, almost double the statewide percentage 
(13.5%). Its per capita income was $48,788, one-and-a-half times the state level, and its median 
household income was $124,514, more than twice that figure statewide. The town’s family 
                                                 
71
 The Warren Group: 
http://www.thewarrengroup.com/portal/Solutions/PressReleases/tabid/190/newsid751/39/Default.aspx 
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tradition was reflected in that its family-related statistics were much higher than the state 
average. In 2007, among its total households, 85.3% were families, 76.4% were married couples, 
and 51.7% were families with children. Among occupied housing units, 92.0% were owner 
occupied according to the 2000 census. See Appendix G for more statistics of Westford.  
Table 6-5. Demographic Comparison: Westford and State, 2007 
 Westford State 
2000-2007 Growth Rate 
   Population Growth 3.90% 0.70% 
   Household Growth 5.10% 2.10% 
Population 
   Median age 37.8 38.2 
   % White, non-Hispanic 90.00% 78.90% 
   % Graduate degrees 25.40% 13.50% 
   Per capita income $48,788 $31,364 
   Labor force participation rate (civilian) 75.60% 66.30% 
Households 
   Average household size 3.00 2.48 
   Median household income $124,514 $60,331 
   Household income>$250,000 10.20% 3.10% 
Families 
   % Family households 85.30% 64.70% 
   % Married couples 76.40% 49.30% 
   % Families with children 51.70% 33.10% 
   Median family income $133,709 $74,948 
   % Families below poverty 1.80% 6.90% 
Sources: Claritas, inc., Community Opportunities Group, Inc. 
 
The dominance of single-family dwellings as well as rising housing costs has made negative 
impacts on certain Westford residents. While affluent newcomers may enjoy the high quality of 
living and public services, long-term residents, especially seniors and young graduates, may not 
be able to afford the living costs any longer and may be forced to relocate. Some respondents to 
the town’s 2007 survey even called Westford a “snob town.” This result is underscored by the 
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2010 census which shows that seniors (65+) account for only 9.9% of the population, which is 
lower than the state average of 13.6%.  
6.2.2 Growth Politics and Open Town Meeting 
There are two central themes found in Westford’s growth issues—fiscal impact and 
community character; these two themes shed different lights on fractions of the local residents. 
The fiscal impact considers the balance between revenues received from development, mainly 
through property tax collection and public service provision centered on public schools. 
Community character refers to the maintenance of a small town atmosphere with peaceful living 
conditions and large open spaces and agricultural land. The two most visible fractions72 of the 
town’s residents are newcomers and long-term residents, mostly seniors and young graduates, as 
suggested in the previous section.  
The fiscal impacts of growth on newcomers and long-term residents brought similar results 
but generated different reactions. Growth in Westford has driven up the local property tax rate. A 
community generally needs to provide a comprehensive range of services and infrastructures to 
support growth and include road, sewer, water, library, school, police, fire protection, and 
recreation facilities. In Westford, the controversial item has always been public schools due to 
the town’s limited capacity to accommodate new students. The rapid growth in the 1990s 
resulted in the construction of new schools and led to dramatic increases in tax bills. The 
newcomers tended to be wealthy and were able to absorb the higher taxation even though they 
were discontented. However, the tax increase became a heavy burden for the long-term residents, 
especially income-constrained retired seniors and the young graduates who were seeking 
                                                 
72
 I do not use the term “group” here because they did not form any organized groups—the later use of “group” is 
onlyt for my convenience of description and analyses.  
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employment. For them, the result of higher taxes could be that they are forced to move out of 
their hometown.  
The destructive nature of growth on community character also receives similar reflections 
from the two groups of residents but to varying extents. Newcomers came to Westford seeking 
its natural beauty and country atmosphere, and they were willing to pay a higher price as 
reflected in the high level of property tax in order to enjoy this character. The loss of this 
character may raise serious concerns among newcomers and could lead to their mobilization to 
protect this character or their possible decision to leave this community. Long-term residents also 
want to keep the familiar and joyful environment in which they grew up, but this preference 
would have a lower priority when compared to the threatening tax increase. Another reason for 
the low rank of community character by long-term residents could be that preserving open space 
is not free. It could also mean a rise in tax levies to cover the fund for open space purchase and 
protection.  
However, there have been few organized efforts concerning the town’s growth issues, either 
from inside or outside the town. Neighboring jurisdictions have little influence over Westford’s 
growth and politics. The political power of the town resides in the hands of individually-
registered voters. The voters pursue their interests through direct participation in town meeting 
and volunteering for Westford town boards and committees.  
The town’s form of government and power distribution are determined by its home rule 
charter. The present charter was adopted in 1989 and amended in 1992. It provides for an open 
town meeting, a five-member board of selectmen and a town manager who serves as the chief 
administrative and financial officer of the town. In addition to the board of selectmen, 
Westford’s charter provides for election of the town moderator, school committee, planning 
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board, housing authority, library trustees and board of health. Nearly all other boards, 
committees, and statutory town officers are appointed by the selectmen or town manager, 
although the moderator also has some appointment powers.  
Town meeting is the legislative branch of Westford’s government with two primary 
responsibilities: establishing an annual budget by voting to appropriate funds for all town 
departments, and voting to adopt or amend the town’s local statutes and bylaws. The following 
detailed town meeting procedures are defined by the town’s general bylaws. Westford’s annual 
town meeting is usually held on the first Saturday after the first Tuesday in May. If additional 
matters come up at a later time, a special town meeting can be called, either by the board of 
selectmen or by citizens’ petition. All registered town voters can attend, speak and vote at the 
open town meeting. However, no absentee voting is allowed and all voters must attend in person. 
Non-registered voters may attend the meeting as observers.  
There are some concerns about the town meeting in Westford. First, the voter attendance rate 
is fairly low. According to a selectman, about 200 registered voters generally participate in the 
town meeting. This number could not even satisfy the special town meeting quorum requirement. 
This complies with Bryan’s (2004) observation from his research on Vermont’s town meeting. A 
town meeting participant expressed his discontent after a meeting session as follows:  
Of course the whole town meeting is a joke. Only 200 people out of a town of 20,000 
show up. Most of the 200 just go along with whatever is proposed. The rest of the town 
is so apathetic with this process. They don't even get involved. 
 
Many factors contribute to the low attendance, including voter apathy or satisfaction; lack of 
communications between voters and the town government on town meeting issues; the meeting’s 
date and schedule conflicts with other events; or voters’ obligations to other things. It is simply 
not realistic for a busy father or mother to voluntarily sit in the Town Hall for 8 hours on 
Saturday facing a long list of complicated articles, according to one of the town’s planners.  
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Second, town meeting participants may not be representative of the entire town. The low 
attendance may result in representative bias, as the likelihood that a small sample is not random 
becomes much higher. Indeed, this is a potential problem in Westford—most of the participants 
in town meeting tend to be from the same flock, one that consists of senior and long-term 
residents. Of these participants, some arrive ill-prepared and during the proceedings become 
confused and alienated, convinced that town officials have a hidden agenda. Some comment on 
the attendees, asserting that they “do not fully understand town meeting warrant articles and in 
most cases they just cast their votes randomly.” Other voters arrive well-prepared and become 
frustrated with the pace and the process, convinced that town officials are incompetent planners.  
Third, the town’s voter blocs may be “stacking” meetings for specific warrant articles. When 
a controversial article on the warrant comes up for discussion, the town meeting floor is often 
suddenly flooded with voters who have been notified by cable TV or cell phones and who vote 
as a bloc for or against the controversial article, then just as suddenly disappear before the next 
article is taken up. This stacking of town meeting angers not only those voters who voluntarily 
endure the entire meeting, but also the voters who failed to organize their own bloc to back the 
opposing view. In fact, stacking may not be a problem since it is a democratic option available to 
all voters on all sides of a controversial warrant article.  
Last but not least, the meeting itself may change some participants’ voting behavior, 
especially those voters in the minority. These voters may be persuaded by majority decisions to 
both psychologically and emotionally re-think their decisions and the potential results associated 
with their votes. As a result, they may change their votes or even forgo their right to vote. This 
influence may discourage minority voters’ attendance in the future and leads to lower attendance 
rates and an even higher level of non-representativeness within the town meeting.  
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Westford has long recognized these problems and has even created a committee to evaluate a 
resolution to replace the open town meeting with a representative town meeting. After one year’s 
work, the committee presented a negative result, largely due to voters’ opposition. According to 
their report, voters “feel that exchanging OTM for RTM will only exchange one set of problems 
for another and would actually lead to a loss of representation—their representation. … Others 
suggested that the 200 elected [representative town meeting] representatives would likely turn 
out to be the same 200 voters who sit through to the end of TM now.” Surprisingly, the strongest 
support for a representative town meeting came from town managers who “liked dealing with a 
relatively static group of TM representatives whose response on an issue could be predicted and 
prepared for.”  
6.2.3 Growth Management 
Westford presents restrictive growth management efforts consisting of a well-developed 
system of planning and land use regulations. The management efforts can be divided into three 
layers: the comprehensive control; the pace control; and the spatial distribution control. The three 
layers complement each other and function as a system to prevent undesirable growth. In the 
town’s growth management measures, the density regulation and mitigation provision of the 
zoning bylaw, the building permit cap, and the Community Preservation Act (CPA) play 
important roles in limiting growth and causing Westford’s growth management to be restrictive.  
6.2.3.1 Comprehensive Control/Low-Density-Only Zoning and Fiscal Impact Review 
The first layer is comprehensive growth management, including a comprehensive plan (2009); 
zoning use and dimension control (zoning was originally adopted in 1955 and recently 
amended); a subdivision regulation (2004); and a site plan regulation (2007).73 The 
                                                 
73
 The Massachusetts Zoning Act does not specifically authorize site plan review, but the courts have upheld it as a 
valid exercise of zoning authority, and most communities have some type of site plan review procedure.  
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comprehensiveness of the effort in this layer is reflected in that all these measures apply town 
wide and to all types of development. As Massachusetts does not mandate that the 
comprehensive plan be consistent with zoning, many of the plan’s contents are not reflected in 
the implementation procedures. Thus, as regards this layer, I put my focus on the zoning bylaw.  
Westford's zoning bylaw features a low-density-only minimum lot requirement. There are two 
types of residential districts, RA and RB, in the zoning bylaw. In RA and RB districts only, 
single-family use is permitted by right, while other residential uses such as multifamily 
(including townhouse condominiums) and accessory or in-law apartments are allowed by special 
permit. Mobile home and apartment uses are prohibited. Uses other than residential are basically 
not allowed in RA and RB districts. A supermajority vote is required on all rezoning issues. The 
minimum lot requirement for RA is 40,000 square feet, equivalent to about one unit per acre, and 
for RB the minimum lot requirement is 20,000 square feet, barely two units per acre. Although 
the zoning codes in Massachusetts’ communities tend to impose low-density regulations, the two 
units per acre requirement in Westford’s zoning bylaw still falls into the lowest categories of 
density limitation.  
The zoning bylaw has a mitigation provision, added in 2005, under which the town requires 
fiscal impact review on all projects. The fiscal impact review is an independent evaluation of the 
proposed development’s fiscal impact on the town’s municipal services. Under this provision, 
and based on the fiscal impact evaluation, town review boards may impose reasonable conditions 
requiring developers to design and construct offsite improvements to municipal facilities,74 such 
as roads and intersections.  
While the zoning itself was the result of the state Zoning Act, its low-density requirement was 
a reflection of the rural character of the town as well as the lack of a sewer system when the 
                                                 
74
 Massachusetts General Laws do not allow local governments to collect impact fees from developers.  
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bylaw was adopted. Under growth pressures, many jurisdictions have increased the density 
ceilings which are limited in their zoning codes through an upzoning process.75 However, the 
low-density regulation functions by residents’ preferences76 in Westford, and no individual or 
group has ever made efforts to challenge it. Consequently, the town has kept the density 
regulation in its zoning bylaw as it was adopted five decades ago.  
Westford’s zoning bylaw indicates a tendency for exclusion of the low- and moderate-income 
residents and minorities. According to studies in this respect, the low-density-only requirement 
may restrain affordable housing production, increase housing sale price, and result in the 
exclusion of the poor and minorities. As the owners or renters of mobile homes and apartments 
tend to be low- and moderate-income people, prohibition of these units may also result in 
exclusion. Indeed, the trend of newcomers with higher income and the difficult situation of 
economically disadvantaged long-term residents during the town’s development reflect this 
tendency and the zoning bylaw may have made at least a partial contribution to it.  
6.2.3.2 Pace Control/Growth Rate Limit and Scheduling 
The second layer is growth pace control. Its most important component is the growth 
management provision contained in the town’s zoning bylaw, which provides a general growth 
rate limit and a development scheduling for certain projects. The purpose of the provision was to 
ensure that “growth occurs in an orderly and planned manner, at a rate that can be supported by 
town services, while avoiding large year-to-year variations in the development rate,” and further 
to “relate the timing of residential development to the town’s ability to provide adequate public 
safety, schools, roads, municipal infrastructure, and human services at the level of quality which 
                                                 
75
 http://www.masshousingregulations.com/dataandreports.asp 
76
 In the 2007 planning survey, only one-quarter of respondents replied that they agree the town’s zoning should 
allow less than one acre lots for new single-family development.  
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citizens expect, and within the town’s ability to pay under the financial limitations of Proposition 
2-1/2.”  
The provision contains two parts. The growth rate limit is set at 30 new dwelling units per 
calendar year77 and that the building inspector may issue up to six building permits to any 
individual development. The development scheduling regards projects with dwelling units for 
senior residents and reduced-density projects with a minimum of 25% reduction in permitted 
density; the planning board issues special permits for these projects at their discretion. 
Affordable housing, redevelopment projects, and accessory units were exempted from these 
provisions.  
The provision was first adopted in 1996 under a background of rapid growth. Since the 
middle of the 1990s, several large-scale residential projects have been under development. They 
presented a heavy burden on local public services, especially schools. In 1995, the town 
proposed a town-wide moratorium in order to temporarily stop the rapid growth and allow time 
for studying the impacts and solutions. However, the town meeting turned down this proposal. In 
1996, a local activist presented the growth management measure and successfully added it into 
the town meeting warrant. The measure was later approved by the town meeting.  
After several amendments to the provision’s expiration date, the last version stated that the 
provisions “shall expire on May 11, 2009; however, by vote of Town Meeting before said date, 
the provisions…may be extended for an additional five years.” In the 2009 annual town meeting, 
an effort was made to extend the provision for one more year but failed for lack of a majority. 
This result may indicate voters’ concerns regarding possible litigations on future projects due to 
                                                 
77
 When the provision was adopted in 1996, it set a growth rate limit on new dwellings to 30 units per calendar year. 
In 2000 the capped number was amended to 12 units per year, but in 2002 the number reverted to 30 units per year.  
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the threatening impact from the Massachusetts State Supreme Court’s decision on the Zuckerman 
v. Town of Hadley (2004) case.  
On the other hand, the decision might also be related to the enhanced capacity to support a 
moderate growth. Taking the most important school issue as an example, Westford’s school 
buildings have the capacity to absorb enrollment growth. Table 6-6 compares enrollments in 
October 2007 to the planned operating capacity of each school in Westford. It shows that most 
school buildings have room to accommodate enrollment growth.  
Table 6-6. Designed Capacity and Student Enrollment, Westford Public Schools (2007) 
Name of School Planned Operating Capacity Enrollment 10/1/07 
Blanchard Middle School 750 597 
Crisafulli School 528 416 
Westford Academy 1,750 1,580 
Integrated-Pre School 75 74 
Abbot School 484 386 
Stony Brook School 750 670 
Robinson 484 380 
Norman Day School 506 403 
Miller School 528 422 
Nabnasset School 462 369 
Source: Westford School Department, November 2007. 
 
The pace control provision may have been effective by reducing building permit issuance as a 
general trend. Figure 6-7 shows the number of single-family housing permits issued from 1996 
to 2010 in Westford. The largest number (193) issued occurred in 1998 and the smallest number 
(50) was observed in 2008. Even though there was fluctuation in the permit numbers for specific 
years, the general trend of permit numbers went downward. Although every year’s number was 
larger than the 30-unit growth rate limit, this can be attributed to the exemption for affordable 
housing and the planning board’s discretion in special permit issuance.  
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Source: http://www.city-data.com/city/Westford-Massachusetts.html 
Figure 6-7. Number of New Single-Family Permits per 10,000 Residents 
6.2.3.3 Spatial Distribution Control/Community Preservation Act 
The third layer is the control of geographic, or spatial, distribution of growth within the town. 
This effort is expressed as two approaches—the “pull” approach, directing certain types of 
growth into certain areas, and the “push” approach,  prohibiting development in certain areas. 
The pull approach includes two special districts defined in the zoning bylaw—the senior 
residential multifamily overlay district and the historical mill conversion overlay district. The 
aim of these two districts is to encourage the development of multifamily and affordable units as 
well as redevelopment or the conversion of old structures. The push approach is represented by 
the Community Preservation Act and a few overlay districts in the zoning bylaw with for the 
purpose of natural environment protection and the conservation of the town’s landscape. Of these 
measures, the CPA is the most active and effectively limits growth by setting aside large parcels 
of open space.  
The Community Preservation Act in Westford was adopted in 2001 immediately after the Act 
was signed into law by the state’s Governor in 2000. On March 2001, the board of selectmen 
voted for an action to include the act as an article in the town meeting warrant. In the May town 
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meeting, the act was passed by a 65% vs. 35% margin. The CPA created a local community 
preservation fund for open space protection, historical preservation, affordable housing 
provision, and outdoor recreation improvement. The fund collects a property tax surcharge of 
3%, the highest level allowed in the CPA, with exemptions for low income households and the 
first $100,000 of assessed value. The State provides a 100% matching fund to the CPA, partially 
as an incentive for local jurisdictions to adopt the CPA. The 100% distribution lasted until 2008 
and then this percentage began to decrease over time before reaching about the 30% level in 
2011, largely due to the impacts of recent recessions on the state budget.  
Under the act, Westford also created a Community Preservation Committee consisting of 8 
members in charge of the community preservation fund. The committee makes recommendations 
to the town board on the distribution of CPA funds among various projects. Their 
recommendations follow the state requirement that in every fiscal year the CPA fund should be 
spent or should set aside no less than 10% for open space, historical conservation, and affordable 
housing respectively. In fact, CPA funds have played an instrumental role in Westford’s 
acquisition of large open space parcels. For example, using the CPA fund, the town purchased 
the EBC property, a significant tract of open space that offers many passive and active recreation 
opportunities as well as protecting the property from large-scale development.  
CPA has been under challenge. Using a case study approach, Dillemuth (2007) asserts that 
CPA funds have primarily been designated to preserve existing affordable units, while very little 
CPA funding has gone to create new units. Also, she finds that the presumably equitable 
distribution of CPA resources in its first five years misrepresents affordable housing because of 
Cambridge’s disproportionately high allocations in that area. 
6.2.3.4 Growth Management under Open Town Meeting 
 156
In this section, I focus on two measures to learn how open town meeting affects the town’s 
growth management effort. The two measures are the community preservation act (CPA) and 
growth rate limit (CAP). The CPA was adopted through a referendum at 65% vs. 35% margin 
and the CAP was adopted at a close margin under open town meeting.  
The CPA referendum result indicated that the majority of town residents would support 
growth limitation. As mentioned above, the CPA was created for open space protection, 
historical preservation, affordable housing provision, and outdoor recreation improvement. There 
are two themes expressed in its purpose in the context of Westford—the first is to maintain the 
town’s environmental and historic character; the second is to aid in the creation of affordable 
housing. The preferences of the town’s residents, either newcomers or long-term, are similar in 
that both groups support the protection of community character and oppose affordable housing;  
the only difference is in the extent. When a resident voted for CPA, most likely he believed that 
the benefit he would gain from protecting community character surpasses the potential negative 
impact on his lifestyle by creating more affordable housing. He would be a growth-limitation 
supporter. When a resident voted against CPA, most likely he thought the opposite way, leaving 
his precise stand on growth orientation unclear. Alternately, he might think in a similar way as 
CPA supporters, but did not support the tax surcharge due to economic constraints. He would be 
a potential growth supporter. As the referendum was a town-wide vote, the 65% vs. 35% 
referendum result from the CPA voting thus indicates that the majority of town-wide voters 
thought they would be better off by supporting the CPA; that is, that the benefits associated with 
protecting community character exceeds the potential negative impact of more affordable 
housing. According to the above reasoning, I can make an inference that at least 65% of the 
voters would support growth limitation.  
 157
However, there were conflicting results in voting on growth limitation measures under town 
meeting. In 1995, a town-wide moratorium was turned down by a large margin in the town 
meeting. This fact indicates that a majority, if not all, of the town meeting participants were 
growth promoters or at least not supporters of no growth, at that time. Apparently the growth 
limitation supporters, who account for a majority of the town residents, did not show up 
proportionately. In addition to the loyal town meeting participants, namely senior long-term 
residents, the evidence indicates that there was a representation of the “growth machine”—voters 
in the development businesses or industries. A respondent to the town’s 2007 master plan survey 
states that the 1995 moratorium was turned down by local residents and developers. Also in that 
survey, several responses pointed out that there were development interests among the town 
officials. When the issues involve development, I have no doubt that voters related to the 
“growth machine” will most likely attend town meeting—development is their business, and thus 
their livelihoods depend on its success.  
In 1996, the adoption of CAP under the town’s open town meeting also indicates a likely 
misrepresentation of the town meeting. The measure was passed by a vote taken by a show of 
hands that was so close the vote had to be taken twice. This result raised a question on the 
participation rate of growth-control supporters, because it would be reasonable to see an easy 
win for the CAP measure if the growth-limitation supporters attended the meeting 
proportionately. Although I do not have information as to who attended the meeting at that time 
or if the growth promoters stacked this meeting article, the voting result indicates that growth-
limitation supporters were less represented. The evidence also suggests that there was 
manipulation involved in voting on this article. The article was placed at the very end of the town 
meeting warrant list, and as it was an annual town meeting the list was quite long. This may 
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suggest that there is a connection between the government’s interest and the benefits associated 
with growth, and public officials having such an interest made contributions, at least partially, to 
the close voting result.  
These results may suggest that Westford’s open town meeting is not a precise representation 
of the town. Among all registered voters, long-term residents and development interest-related 
voters tend to be overrepresented, while growth-limitation supporters such as newcomers seem 
underrepresented. The meeting operators with special interests may have also manipulated the 
meeting to promote their interests. The open town meeting in Westford may have altered to a 
certain extent the connection between voters’ preferences and resulted in a growth management 
framework; however, the resulting overall growth management effort still reflected the majority 
voters’ preference for restrictive growth management due to the preponderance in the proportion 
of growth-limitation supporters. It would be difficult to determine the result if the proportion of 
growth-limitation supporters was not overwhelming.  
Why do newcomers tend to be less likely to participate in town meeting? The answer, 
supplied by an interviewee, may help. This interviewee is a young professional who lives in a 
different town than where he works. He has never attended the town meeting in the town where 
he lives, but he says he would if he worked there. In Westford, commuting newcomers are not 
uncommon. According to the 2000 census, 38.4% owner-occupied householders were 
newcomers (moved-in between 1995 and 2000). Based on a recent survey conducted by the 
town, two-thirds of local residents are commuters working outside the town. If the majority of 
long-term residents work locally, then a conclusion can be reached that a majority of newcomers 
are commuters. If the interviewee is a common case, then it is understandable why newcomers 
do not participate in Westford’s town meeting.  
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6.2.4 Summary 
Westford has evolved from a rural community into an affluent suburb since the 1960s. Rapid 
development occurred from the middle of the 1980s through the 1990s and was slowed down in 
the last decade. Prestigious single-family homes are a dominant feature of the town’s 
development. As a result of the development pattern, the town has attracted many wealthy 
newcomers, most of whom are commuters. The newcomers and local long-term residents play 
important roles in local growth politics highlighted by two constant themes—public schools and 
open space character. The town’s growth policies feature restrictive growth management efforts, 
including such measures as low-density-only zoning, growth rate limit, and the community 
preservation act. The town is governed by an open town meeting.  
The restrictive growth management framework in Westford is the result of interaction 
between local residents and growth interests. Even though there is a division among local 
residents with differing motivations toward growth, they converge into a similar approach to 
limit growth under the threat of large-scale development. This convergent approach outweighed 
growth interests in the town meeting and resulted in restrictive growth limitation. In Westford, 
rapid growth during the 1990s placed severe burdens on the town’s public services, particularly 
public schoolsl and was damaging the town’s attractive country character. Large-scale 
development has caused tax increases and loss of open space. In fighting rapid growth, residents’ 
status determined their motivations and behaviors in local growth politics. While the wealthy 
newcomers put more weight on the protection of the open space character of the community, 
long-term residents, especially seniors, emphasize their tax burden as well as the affordability of 
their living place. Although they have different motivations, they converged to the same 
orientation toward growth. Together they successfully defeated the development interest-related 
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voters in the town meeting. As a result, the integrated preferences of local residents turned into a 
stringent growth management effort through its town meeting.  
The case study results also suggest that Westford’s open town meeting is not a precise 
representation of the town and can have a potential impact on the growth management measures 
adopted. In the open town meeting, among all registered voters, long-term residents and 
development interest-related voters tend to be overrepresented, while growth limitation 
supporters such as newcomers seem underrepresented. The meeting operators with special 
interests may have also manipulated the meeting to promote their interests. The open town 
meeting in Westford may have altered to a certain extent the connection between voters’ 
preferences and the resultant growth management framework; however, the resultant overall 
growth management effort still reflected the majority voters’ preference for restrictive growth 
management, due to the preponderance in the proportion of growth limitation supporters. It 
would be difficult to determine the result if the proportion of growth limitation supporters were 
not overwhelming.  
6.3 Town of Chelmsford 
 
Figure 6-8. Chelmsford  Town Center 
Like Westford, Chelmsford is a Greater Lowell suburban township in Middlesex County, and 
like Westford it is also a member of the Northern Middlesex Council of Government. It is 
situated about 30 miles northwest of Boston. Other than Lowell on its northeast, Chelmsford is 
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surrounded by five towns: Tyngsborough to the north, Tewksbury to the east, Billerica to the 
southeast, Carlisle to the south, and Westford to the west (see Figure 6-9). Chelmsford is 
bordered by two sizable rivers: the Merrimack River to the north, and the Concord River to the 
east. Both Interstate Highway 495 and US Route 3 cross through and intersect within the town. 
As of the 2010 Census, the town's population was 33,802 and the population density was about 
1,503.4 per square mile. Named after Chelmsford, England, the town was first settled in 1653 
and incorporated in 1655 by an act of the Massachusetts General Court. Chelmsford originally 
contained the neighboring towns of Carlisle and Westford, as well as parts of Lowell.  
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Figure 6-9. Location of Chelmsford 
In its early history, the Chelmsford area consisted of roadways following Native American 
trails that linked colonial farmsteads. The heart of the community provided goods and services 
for travelers and those residing in the predominantly agrarian community. Chelmsford Center 
today has retained much of its New England village-style character, with small shops located in 
older, detached buildings and historic homes. Originally, the town’s economy was fueled by 
lumber mills, limestone quarries and kilns. In the first part of the 19th century, both the 
Middlesex Canal and Middlesex Turnpike were built through Chelmsford and textile, iron works 
and cider manufacturing industries boomed. After World War II, Chelmsford experienced a large 
 162
growth spurt between 1950 and 1970, coinciding with the connection of US Route 3 in Lowell to 
Massachusetts Route 128 in the 1950s and the extension of US Route 3 from Chelmsford to New 
Hampshire in the 1960s. New economic opportunities featuring high-tech manufacturing and 
R&D came to the town and transformed it from a rural town to a thriving mature suburb. Since 
the 1980s, however, the town has entered a long period of slow growth with an emphasis on 
redevelopment.  
 
Figure 6-10. Chelmsford Old Town Hall 
6.3.1 Local Conditions and Growth 
Rapid development in Chelmsford started after World War II, which can largely be attributed 
to regional transportation improvements, the suburbanization of employment centers, and the 
relatively high housing costs in the Greater Boston area. The town’s development can be divided 
into three periods: rapid housing development from 1950 to1970; commercial and industrial 
development from 1970 to 1985; and slow growth from 1985 till today.  
After World War II, the Town of Chelmsford saw a significant increase in population. The 
development of the local highway network, particularly Interstate 495 and U.S. Route 3, brought 
new economic opportunities to the community, transforming Chelmsford from a rural town to a 
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mature suburb. As can be seen in Table 6-7 below, Chelmsford’s population grew from 9,408 to 
15,130 between 1950 and 1960, a growth rate of 60.8%. During the 1960s, the town population 
more than doubled from 15,130 to 31,432, making Chelmsford the fastest-growing community in 
the Commonwealth during that time period.  
Table 6-7. Population Trends in Chelmsford, 1950-2010 
Year Population Change % Change 
1950 9,408 -- -- 
1960 15,130 5722 60.8 
1970 31,432 16302 107.7 
1980 31,174 -258 -0.08 
1990 33,383 2209 3.9 
2000 33,858 475 4.6 
2010 33,802 -56 -0.2 
Source: 2010 US Census 
 
In the period 1971-1985, while residential development slowly continued, commercial and 
industrial development featured the most dramatic land use change. From 1971-1985, as outlined 
in Table 6-8, 342 acres of commercial and industrial lands were developed. Although population 
growth in the community began to level out after 1970, an additional 703 acres of land were 
converted to residential use between 1971 and 1985. This was primarily due to a decrease in 
household size and the formation of new households.  
Beginning in 1985 the town entered a slow growth period. From 1985 to 1999 the rate of new 
development in Chelmsford slowed considerably, as evidenced in the land use change data. 
Commercial and industrial land uses grew by 28% and 30% respectively. Residential land use 
increased by 13% during this same period. Since 1999, there has been almost no change in land 
use within the Town of Chelmsford. This can be attributed to a slowing economy and the nearly 
built-out nature of the community. By 2008, approximately 64% of the town’s land area had 
been developed.  
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Table 6-8. Land Use Change in Chelmsford, 1971-2008 (Acres) 
Acres in Use Percent Change Class of Land 
Use 1971 1985 1999 2005 2008 1971-85 1985-99 1999-05 2005-08 
Town 
% 2008 
Commercial 242 334 426 411 414 38% 28% -3.60% 1% 2.80% 
Industrial 204 454 592 561 560 150% 30% -5.30% -0.20% 3.80% 
Residential 5,758 6,461 7,306 7,163 7,371 12% 13% -2% 2.80% 50.00% 
Other 8,575 7,529 6,454 6,616 6,406 -12% -14% 2.50% -3.20% 43.40% 
Summary           
Developed 7,191 8,380 9,435 9,286 9,499 17% 13% -1.60% 2.20% 64.40% 
Undeveloped 7,587 6,398 5,343 5,464 5,254 -16% -16% 2.30% -3.80% 35.60% 
Total 14,778 14,778 14,778 14,750* 14,753* N/A N/A N/A N/A 100% 
Note: 2008 Land Use was updated from the 1999 McConnell Land Use files through orthophotography 
at a scale of 1 to 400. 
*Totals from 2005 and 2008 are due to State methodology changes initiated in 2004. 
 
The land-use pattern in Chelmsford reflects the substantial changes precipitated by post-
WWII development. The town has a traditional Town Center with a number of distinct 
neighborhoods (see Figure 6-11). The north neighborhood is a working- class community, which 
grew around the mill complexes during the nineteenth century and features a compact and mixed 
land-use pattern. The east neighborhood is largely occupied by Lowell commuters who are 
associated with the business activities within Lowell and who desire a less urban lifestyle. The 
south neighborhood was developed at a later time and features a rural character with high-style 
suburban houses.  
In general, the northerly portions of the town tend to be more urban, while the south is 
somewhat rural in character. The town is a composite of development traditions, many of which 
pre-date zoning. This phased-evolvement can be seen by the style and construction of its 
architecture as well as the design and layout of its transportation infrastructure. Local land use 
regulations have shaped recent development, but it has occurred in the face of protest by the 
older, established neighborhoods. There is strong community support in the town for preserving 
and respecting the historic fabric of these neighborhoods.  
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Figure 6-11. Chelmsford Land Use Pattern 
Currently, more than half of the land in Chelmsford is for residential use. An overwhelming 
majority of the homes are detached single-family residences built in tract subdivisions. As shown 
in Table 6-9, 68 % of the town’s land is used for residential purposes, of which 92% is utilized 
for single-family residences. An additional 6% of the community’s acreage is occupied by other 
residential uses, including condominiums, multi-family housing and rooming/boarding houses. 
Condominiums represent approximately 5% of the residential land uses and 3.47% of the overall 
land-use acreage. Two- and three-family homes make up a very small percentage (1.43%) of the 
land use in the town overall and only 2% of the residential land. Residential uses are distributed 
consistently throughout the town. Commercial and industrial uses occupy 8.8% of the town’s 
land.  
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Table 6-9. Land Use in Chelmsford, 2008 
Class of Use Acres % of Total Land 
% of Total 
Westford 
Residential    
Single-family dwellings 7,193 62.26  
Two-family dwellings 126 1.09  
Three-family dwellings 39 0.34  
Condominiums 401 3.47  
Mobile homes 39 0.34  
Four to eight unit apartment 10 0.08  
Apartments with more than eight units 54 0.47  
Rooming and boarding houses 2 0.02  
Total 7,864 68.07 41.85 
Commercial    
Hotels, Motels and Nursing Homes 28 0.35  
Storage Warehouses and Distribution Facilities 74 0.64  
Retail Trade 140 1.21  
Auto-Related Uses 30 0.26  
Banks, General and Medical Offices 161 1.39  
Indoor and Outdoor Recreational Facilities 32 0.28  
Misc. 8 0.07  
Total 473 4.09 2.70 
Industrial    
Manufacturing, R&D 489 4.23  
Public Utilities 57 0.49  
Total 546 4.72 5.29 
Exempt Land    
Municipal 1,870 16.19  
Colleges, Churches, and Charitable Org. 228 1.97  
State Land 307 0.27  
Total 2,405 20.82  
Chapter 61, 61A, 61B Land 265 2.3  
Grand Total 11,553 100%  
Source: Chelmsford Assessor’s Database for FY 2008 
 
Chelmsford is nearly built out, with only 680.58 acres of vacant developable land remaining, 
as a build out analysis conducted by NMCOG in 2008 indicates. A comparison of land use 
between Chelmsford and Westford also reflects the built-out nature of the town (for Westford’s 
figure, see right column in Table 6-9). While 64% of the land in Chelmsford had been developed 
by 2008, only 40% of the land in Westford was developed by 2007. According to 2008 figures, 
in Chelmsford the percentages for both residential use (68%) and commercial/industrial uses 
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(8.8%) are higher than those two percentages (42% and 7.8% respectively) in Westford (2007 
figures). However, while Chelmsford has a larger share of commercial land, it has a smaller 
share of industrial land when compared to Westford. These figures also indicate that Chelmsford 
is a more mature suburb than Westford.  
Chelmsford’s housing stock has been growing more slowly and has become more diverse (see 
Table 6-10) compared to that of Westford. From 1999 to 2009, the town’s total housing stock 
only expanded by 520 units, a 4% increase, bringing its total housing stock to 13,545 units. 
However, multi-family housing, especially larger units, increased faster than other types of units. 
From 1999 to 2009, dwellings with 3 or more units increased by 22%, while dwellings with 20 
or more units added 395 units, a 38% increase. Over this same period, single-family detached 
housing added only 69 units, a mere 2% increase. The share of single-family housing actually 
decreased by 1% in the period 1999 to 2009, while the share of dwellings with 3 or more units 
increased by 3% during the same period. Additionally, in 2009 there were 241 mobile home 
units in the town, making Chelmsford’s housing stock more diverse.  
Table 6-10. Housing Units in Chelmsford, 1989-2008 
Housing Type 1989 1999 2009 % Change 1989-2008 
Total housing units 11,812 13,025 13,545 14.7 
1-unit, detached 8,398 9,074 9,279 10.5 
1-unit, attached 926 1,144 939 1.4 
2 units 421 425 502 19.2 
3 or 4 units 241 285 341 41.5 
5 to 9 units 207 249 184 -11.1 
10 to 19 units 648 529 611 -5.7 
20 or more units 647 1,053 1,448 123.8 
Mobile home 239 266 241 0.8 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau SF-2 Reports, American Community 
Survey, 2006-2008 
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The median housing price in Chelmsford is consistently lower than in Westford, indicating 
that Chelmsford is a more economically-diverse community. According to the Warren Group, 
the median selling price for single-family housing and condominiums rose steadily between 1996 
and 2005 (see Figure 6-12). When the selling price for homes in Chelmsford peaked in 2005, 
single-family homes had a median selling price of $373,700 and the median selling price for 
condos was $272,000. Compared to the median selling prices in 1996, the cost of a single-family 
home in 2005 was 117% higher while condos were 124% more expensive. Between 2005 and 
2008, the median selling prices declined. However, during 2009 the median selling price for 
single-family homes increased by 1.2% from $325,000 to $329,000, while the median selling 
price for condos declined by 8.5%, from $218,500 to $200,000.  
 
Figure 6-12. Median Selling Prices in Chelmsford, 1996-2009 
Other sociodemographic statistics all indicate that Chelmsford is an economically better-
mixed community than Westford. According to the American Community Survey, the town’s 
median household income in 2008 was $88,293, much lower than the Westford 2007 median 
household income of $124,514, but still higher than the state average. Surprisingly, the racial 
composition of the two towns is quite similar—in 2008 the American Community Survey found 
that 91% of Chelmsford’s population was white, while this percentage was 90% in Westford in 
2007. The town’s family indicators are weaker compared to Westford, as indicated by 2010 
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census data—among its total households, 70% were families, 58.3% were married couples, and 
31.2% were families with children. Among occupied housing units, 82.7% were owner occupied 
according to the 2010 census. See Appendix G for more statistics of Chelmsford. 
Occupation status also indicates that Chelmsford is a more mixed community than Westford 
(see Table 6-11). In 2000, 52.7% of Chelmsford’s workforce was in management, professional, 
and related occupations, while 13.1% of the workforce was in material-related occupations such 
as farming, construction, or production. In that same year in Westford, however, 60.4% of its age 
16+ population was in management, professional, and related occupations, while 11.9% of 
workers were in occupations related to material handling. This comparison suggests that when 
compared to Westford, Chelmsford had a larger blue-collar workforce but a smaller white-collar 
workforce in 2000, and thus hold a more mixed-occupation status.  
Table 6-11. Occupation Status in Chelmsford and Westford, 2000 
Occupation Chelmsford Westford 
Management, professional, and related occupations 9,583 52.7% 6,573 60.4% 
Service occupations 1,872 10.3% 840 7.7% 
Sales and office occupations 4,330 23.8% 2,184 20.1% 
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations 19 0.1% 8 0.1% 
Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations 1,109 6.1% 561 5.2% 
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations 1,254 6.9% 719 6.6% 
Data Source: 2000 US Census     
 
The slow growth over a long period beginning in 1970 may have lessened Chelmsford’s 
burden-providing public services such as schools and public water. The town’s school system is 
made up of five K–4 elementary schools, two middle schools and one high school. Year 2000 
enrollments for all Chelmsford public schools were 4,069. These schools possess the appropriate 
capacity to accommodate students from new development. Chelmsford’s public water systems 
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consist of three water districts and service approximately 95% of the town. Since the town is 
fairly built out, no capacity constraints have been experienced by the districts.  
However, the public sewer service is an interesting issue in Chelmsford—its construction 
actually increased property tax levies. There was no public sewage available during the rapid 
growth in the 1960s. Indeed, between 1966 and 1980 the town was cited numerous times for 
violations of the Clean Water Act, culminating in a 1980 Consent Judgment, a 1986 plan, and 
then the completion of sewer projects in 1998. The sewer projects covered 68% of the town by 
that time. However, in 1995 changes in the state sanitary code (Title 5) required that 
homeowners have their septic systems inspected at the time of selling their house. In 1995, the 
Chelmsford septic system inspection failure rate was 35% and the average septic system repair 
cost was $20,000. The average cost of connection to the sewer system was in the $2,500-$4,000 
range. Subsequently, Chelmsford voters approved one more phase to serve the remaining 32% of 
the town. By the end of 2010, the entire town had been fronted by active sewer lines, thereby 
providing all properties with the ability to connect to the municipal system.  
Between 1986 and 2005, twenty-two bonds were issued to cover the cost of design and 
construction projects for sewer projects. The overall project costs were covered by Federal and 
State assistance, local tax levies, and a variety of fees. As a result, the taxes increased $2.10 per 
$1,000 valuation. The town also had to hold four overrides to exempt those costs from 
Proposition 2½. 
6.3.2 Growth Politics and Representative Town Meeting 
Chelmsford is a mature inner suburban community between Lowell and Westford 
socioeconomically. While Lowell, as a traditional industrial city, has a larger blue-collar 
population with a lower socioeconomic status, Westford as a prestigious community has a large 
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population with a higher status. Chelmsford, with a more mixed population, can be placed in 
between these other two communities. Compared to Westford, Chelmsford has a larger share of 
working-class residents. This is also reflected in its more diverse housing stock, lower median 
household income, lower median housing price, and a higher share of material-handling 
occupations.  
In terms of growth, Chelmsford shows a more balanced attitude, or a “composite vision,” as 
mentioned in its master plan. In opinions regarding the latest comprehensive plan, stakeholders 
have expressed an interest in promoting economic growth and development without utilizing 
further undeveloped land as well as seeking a balance between continued economic and housing 
growth. Moreover, they express a keen interest in preserving the quality of life for town 
residents.  
The balanced attitude in Chelmsford is the result of interaction between local residents and 
the built-out nature of the community. Large-scale development, with its overwhelming impact 
on public service and community character, is unlikely to be due to the built-out nature of the 
town. Most development projects have been 2- to 3-lot subdivisions, according to its community 
development director. Meanwhile, the town maintains a certain capacity to accommodate a 
moderate amount of development due to its early investment in infrastructure and services such 
as sewer, water, schools and public transit. Gains from small-scale development can help the 
town maintain its public services without changing its desired character. These results seem 
acceptable to most town residents.  
However, there is still an emphasis on concerns relating to the fiscal impact of development, 
particularly for Chapter 40B projects. Currently, challenges facing the town are related to issues 
on the affordability and availability of housing in both Chelmsford and the Greater Lowell 
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region. The increased number of Chapter 40B housing developments has made the town’s 
housing stock more diverse in terms of number of units and affordability. However, 40B projects 
may consume more public services such as public education but generate less tax, a service 
consumption level not comparable to the existing housing stock. As a result, current residents 
may have to bear the burden of part of these expenditures. There has been consistent resistance 
to Chapter 40B projects in the town.  
Chelmsford has some organized resistance efforts from local business, but not from local 
residents. The existence of the Chelmsford Business Association is an indicator. Established in 
1990 by a group of business people, the association’s major focus was to reduce the differential 
between business and residential tax classification, and eventually succeeded when the 
differential was eliminated by the town’s board of selectmen in 1998. According to a selectman, 
although appeals on certain projects presented by developers to town boards are common, 
organized efforts in growth politics are seldom seen in Chelmsford.  
The town uses a representative town meeting model adapted in 1989 from its previous open 
town meeting model. The representative town meeting form of government is defined by its 
home rule charter. All legislative powers of the town are exercised by the town meeting. The 
administration of all town affairs is vested in the executive branch, which is headed by the 5-
member board of selectmen and the town manager, who oversees public employees and serves as 
Chief Executive Officer. Other elected boards include, but are not limited to, the Planning Board; 
School Committee; Library Trustees; Board of Health; Sewer Commission; and the Zoning 
Board of Appeals. The town has three independent Water Districts.  
The representative town meeting has 162 town meeting members evenly elected from 9 
precincts. Members are elected for terms of three years each and vote on issues on behalf of their 
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precincts. Only town meeting members can vote in town meeting. Non-members can attend the 
meeting, but cannot vote. There are two scheduled annual town meeting dates. The spring 
meeting starts the last Monday in April and runs Monday and Thursday until it is completed. The 
fall town meeting commences on the 3rd Monday in October and runs Monday and Thursday 
until it is completed. A special town meeting may be called at any time. The representative town 
meeting has two primary responsibilities: determining an annual budget and voting on the town’s 
bylaws, including land-use regulations.  
At times it has been difficult to recruit town meeting candidates, and some precincts often fail 
to field a full slate of candidates. Vacant seats in a precinct are typically filled by voters selected 
by the other representatives of that precinct. In addition, even though the charter requires that 
“nomination of candidates for town meeting member shall be made by nomination papers signed 
by not less than twenty-five voters of the precinct in which the candidate resides and from which 
the candidate seeks election,” write-in candidates are common due to the lack of nominated 
candidates.  
Representative town meeting in Chelmsford has certain advantages over open town meeting 
in Westford. It has eliminated some problems associated with the open town meeting. First, the 
attendance rate is not a problem. Most of the town meeting members, at least 140 according to 
the town’s report, attend the meeting except on special occasions. Second, there is no stacking 
problem because only town meeting members are permitted to cast votes. In addition, according 
to the town’s planning officials, “representative town meeting is a better form of town meeting” 
from their perspective because it is much easier to convince the 162 members of good planning 
practices, such as a compact and mixed development pattern, than to convince the entire town, 
particularly when the attendees of open town meeting are an unknown factor.  
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However, representation could also conceivably present a problem. The difficulty in 
recruiting town meeting member candidates suggests that the participants might be the same 
group of residents no matter what form the town meeting takes. The filling of vacant seats by 
precinct caucuses provides an opportunity for stacking the representative town meeting. 
Interviews with public officials in Chelmsford indicate that many members are also retirees and 
that there is a “disconnection between the meeting members and local residents.” The accidental 
or even deliberate overrepresentation of retirees, unionized town employees, parents of school-
age children or other special interest groups can create temporary or permanent voting blocs in 
this type of town meeting. This form of meeting can also shape the decision-making and 
attendance behavior of members in a minority, as described in Westford’s open meeting section. 
In addition, town meeting members may become targets of concerted lobbying at election time. 
This could be one side of a double-edged sword, in direct opposition to what the planners 
proclaim to be the other side.  
6.3.3 Growth Management 
Under the balanced attitude, the Town of Chelmsford has a relaxed growth management 
framework with an emphasis on redevelopment. The efforts made are less restrictive and more 
inclusionary compared to those of Westford. The town has a comprehensive plan, zoning bylaw, 
subdivision control, site plan review, community preservation act, water capacity surcharge, and 
wetlands regulations. These measures can be grouped into two layers: comprehensive control 
and spatial distribution control. Because the town has never had pace control, there is no pace 
control layer. Of these measures, the density regulation and overlay districts in the zoning bylaw, 
community preservation act, water capacity surcharge, and the wetlands regulations make 
contributions to the town’s efforts in growth management.  
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6.3.3.1 Comprehensive Control 
The Town of Chelmsford has over forty years of experience with long-range master planning, 
with master plan documents having been completed in 1963, 1975, 1986, 1996 and 2010. The 
first three master plan documents were completed during periods of rapid growth and were 
primarily focused on responding to the impacts of that growth and planning for future 
development. However, later master plans began to focus on the quality as well as quantity of 
future growth. The 2010 Master Plan presented three potential build out scenarios: 
environmental; economic; and composite. The document ultimately recommended the composite 
scenario.  
The town’s zoning bylaw, with subdivision control and site plan review combined, shapes the 
development pattern and design in the town. In the zoning bylaw, there are four residential 
districts, three of which are single-family districts and one being a residential multi-family 
district (RM). RM is a high-density residence district, which requires a minimum lot size of 
5,000 square feet per dwelling unit, or about 8 units per acre. This density is substantially high 
within the Massachusetts context. A supermajority vote is required on all rezoning issues.  
The zoning bylaw is inclusionary. Its RM district provides a density bonus for affordable 
housing development as is stated following: “...the Planning Board may grant a density bonus of 
10% to an applicant willing to set aside 10% of the units for low and moderate income persons 
and families, for a period of at least ten years.” The zoning bylaw permits the development of 
apartment buildings in its RM district. It also contains a residential mobile home district, 
although mobile home development in the town already has a history.  
The town collects water and sewer capacity surcharges from new development. As a premise 
for applying for building permits, developers need to first obtain permits from the water district 
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and sewer commission. They also need to pay a capacity surcharge to cover the expense of 
buying regional allotments of sewer treatment and water supply. This surcharge is different from 
the usage fees applied after building completion, which is a standard charge based on the amount 
of usage.  
6.3.3.2 Spatial Distribution Control 
There are two types of efforts in spatial distribution control. While the residential district in 
the zoning bylaw includes special types of development such as multi-family units, other 
measures tend to exclude development from the bylaw. Two zoning overlay districts—the 
aquifer protection and floodplain districts, together with wetlands regulations, prohibit any 
construction within their boundaries in order to protect drinking water, damages from flooding, 
and wetland resource areas. The Community Preservation Act is also an important measure for 
the protection of open space and to limit development.  
In Chelmsford the CPA is similar to that in Westford. It was adopted in 2001 through the 
town’s representative town meeting with a 61% vs. 39% margin. The act created a local 
community preservation fund and a 9-member Community Preservation Committee. However, 
the initial act placed a property tax surcharge of only 0.5% with an exemption on the first 
$100,000 of assessed value. Unlike Westford, Chelmsford’s surcharge levy did not exempt low-
income households. Six years later, however, the town passed a surcharge increase to 1.5% for 
the CPA fund with a close 54% vs. 46% margin, and this time the low-income households were 
exempted. Similar to the Westford situation, the state provides a 100% matching fund to the 
CPA. The 100% distribution lasted through 2008 before beginning to decrease until reaching a 
level of about 27% in 2011.  
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6.3.3.3 Growth Management under Representative Town Meeting 
Chelmsford’s representative town meeting also shows a bias in voter representation, which 
may have shifted the direction of the growth management effort. I first look at a series of voting 
results on decisions regarding the funding of town-wide sewer projects. I then compare the 
voting results on the adoption of CPA and the sewer/water surcharge.  
The voting results on decisions authorizing funding for the town’s sewer project show that a 
proportion of the residents, possibly with a growth-limiting preference, were systematically 
underrepresented in the representative town meeting as well as previously in the open town 
meeting before 1989. In the 1980s and the middle of the 1990s, Chelmsford passed four town 
meeting articles that authorized funding for various portions of the town-wide sewer project. 
Three of the articles in the 1980s were passed unanimously in the town meeting, while the 1996 
article was passed by a vote of 147 to 2. In the same time period as these articles, the town also 
utilized referendum to override Proposition 2½ for the approved funding. On these occasions, the 
voters consistently supported the sewer project by approximately 2 to 1 margins in the 1980s and 
by more than a 3 to 1 margin in 1996.  
A comparison of town meeting results and referendum results suggests that the preference of 
one-third of the town’s voters was missing in the town meeting in the 1980s, while the 
preference of one-quarter of the town’s voters was missing in the 1996 town meeting. The 
possible reason for this could be that a group of voters who cast their votes on the referendum 
did not attend the open town meeting before 1989 and were not represented by meeting members 
in the post-1989 representative town meeting. These voters would most likely have consisted of 
two groups of residents. One group may have had septic tanks in good condition around that time 
and the other group may have had a growth-limiting preference and did not support the sewer 
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development because an established sewer system can trigger more growth and even higher-
density growth. However, I had no information as to why they chose not to attend town meeting.  
The comparison between CPA adoption and the sewer/water surcharge decision also indicated 
a representation bias within the town’s representative town meeting; this bias may have 
influenced the relationship between voter preference and growth polices. As stated above, in 
2001, Chelmsford adopted the CPA act through referendum with a 69% vs. 31% margin. The act 
ordered a tax surcharge of 0.5%. In 2007, the town passed a surcharge increase to 1.5% for the 
CPA fund with a 54% vs. 46% margin. Using similar analyses as in the Westford case, I find that 
this voting result indicated the presence of majority voters town-wide, with a strong orientation 
for community character protection. However, when the sewer/water surcharge was voted on in 
the representative town meeting in 1994, the measure was passed unanimously. By a planned or 
guided development approach, the surcharge measure still indicates a growth orientation, one 
allowing development to devour the town’s few remaining open space parcels. This contradicts 
the preference of growth-limitation supporters. At that time, there were no measures such as the 
CPA to protect the open-space community character from encroaching growth. Yet no voters had 
ever devised alternative measures or offered different voices. Growth-limitation supporters 
seemed inactive in the representative town meeting, and their growth-limiting tendency was 
never injected into Chelmsford’s growth-management efforts.  
These comparative results may indicate that Chelmsford’s representative town meeting shows 
a bias in the representation of the town. Voters with a growth-limiting preference might be 
under-represented, while other voters such as retirees may be over-represented. The consistent 
unanimous passage in Chelmsford’s town meeting may indicate public officials’ manipulation of 
the meeting, but there is no substantive evidence to support this. The balanced or “composite” 
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effort toward growth in Chelmsford may be a result tilted by the town’s representative town 
meeting and has appeared as a reflection of the over-represented development interest combined 
with the preference of retirees. However, the reason for growth-limitation supporters being less 
likely to appear as meeting members is unknown. 
6.3.4 Summary 
Chelmsford is a mature inner-suburban community. It  experienced rapid development during 
the 1950s and 1960s, but after that time entered a long slow growth period. Today the town has 
almost reached its built-out stage. The town has a mix of residents having various socioeconomic 
status including wealthy newcomers, Lowell business commuters, long-term residents, and blue-
collar workers. Due to its built-out nature, the town has a balanced and inclusionary growth-
management framework which emphasizes redevelopment and affordable housing provision. 
The town has adopted a community preservation act and collects sewer and water surcharges for 
new development. In 1989, Chelmsford switched from an open town meeting to a representative 
town meeting.  
The balanced growth management effort in Chelmsford is also the interactive result of local 
residents and growth-related interests, with possible filtration through the representative town 
meeting. Due to the town’s built-out nature, large-scale development at this point is unlikely. 
Occasional scattered growth or redevelopment can help maintain the town’s public services and 
keep a healthy local economy. In this context the balanced growth management is in fact a pro-
moderate-growth stand. Most retirees may take this stand because they are more concerned with 
fiscal burdens due to their constrained incomes. By dominating the representative town meeting, 
retirees and growth-related interests have adopted this balanced approach to development—a 
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moderate amount of growth to maintain the town’s public services, but without seriously 
damaging its community character.  
However, Chelmsford’s representative town meeting shows a bias in the representation of the 
town. Voters with a growth-limiting preference, including newcomers and Lowell business 
commuters, might be under-represented. These individuals put more weight on open space 
protection because they came to the town for just such amenities, and thus the scarcity of open 
space is even more concerning to them. Still, there is no indication of such preferences in the 
resultant growth policies. The consistent unanimous passage for growth in Chelmsford’s town 
meeting may also indicate public officials’ manipulation of the meeting, but there is no further 
evidence to establish this. The balanced or “composite” effort toward growth in Chelmsford thus 
may be a result that has been tilted by the town’s representative town meeting and has appeared 
as a reflection of the over-represented development interests and retirees’ preference. However, 
the reason for growth-limitation supporters being less likely to appear as meeting members is 
unknown.  
Another problem with both the representative town meeting in Chelmsford as well as the open 
town meeting in Westford is the likely manipulation of the meeting by public officials and 
employees. I have not articulated this issue in  the case development due to limited facts and its 
complex nature. Local governments may have an inherent pro-growth orientation. Local 
governments run mainly on property taxes, and in most situations they are fiscally constrained. 
Therefore, public employees have the incentive to boost tax levies from growth and this may 
result in their manipulation of town meeting to promote their hidden pro-growth agenda. There is 
some evidence supporting this perception: First, the assertion that many growth measures were 
passed unanimously is questionable. In these two towns, and especially in Chelmsford with its 
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diverse population, it is unlikely to have repeated unanimous results without manipulating the 
meetings. Second, growth-management measures were often placed at the end of warrant 
articles, which may increase the likelihood of their not being passed due to many voters leaving 
before the end of the meeting. Third, in Westford’s planning survey, many respondents feel there 
is a development interest in the town government. They prefer to replace the open meeting with a 
representative meeting or even a council. Ironically, the Westford representative town meeting 
research committee submitted a report recommending keeping its current open town meeting. If 
the manipulation does exist, it may further exacerbate the representation problem of town 
meeting.  
6.4 Comparison and Conclusion 
In this section, I first make a side-by-side comparison between Westford and Chelmsford in 
the areas of growth, local residents, town meeting, and growth management. I also make a 
comparison between town meeting and other forms of direct democracy, mainly initiative. Then 
I draw some conclusions from these two cases on growth-management adoption and the effects 
of town meeting on growth management. 
6.4.1 Comparison 
Westford is an affluent outer suburb in the Greater Lowell area and features prestigious 
single-family houses and an attractive natural environment, while Chelmsford, which neighbors 
Westford, is a mature inner suburb with a diverse housing stock but limited open spaces. Rapid 
growth first came to Chelmsford in the 1950s and 1960s followed by a moderate commercial 
development in the 1970s and 1980s; an eventual growth slowdown commenced after the early 
1990s. Now Chelmsford has almost reached its built-out stage. For Westford, growth came at a 
later time, around the middle of the 1980s, then it increased in the 1990s before slowing down in 
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the 2000s, yet it was still at a higher rate when compared to Chelmsford. Today, in both 
communities, Chapter 40B affordable housing development is an important issue.  
Growth has placed heavy pressures on public services and infrastructure in the two towns. In 
Westford, large-scale development in the 1990s severely burdened the town’s public schools. Six 
of its nine schools were constructed or renovated from 1995 through the early 2000s. In 
Chelmsford, public sewage and water have been hot issues. The town has improved its water 
districts and installed a town-wide sewer system since the late 1980s.  
The residents of Westford are highly homogeneous in socioeconomic status, while in 
Chelmsford residents tend to be more diverse, a combination of high status residents and a 
working class. In Westford, both median household income and housing price are substantially 
higher than in Chelmsford. Racial composition is similar in these two towns—whites dominate 
both communities, with only a handful of Asian residents. Both towns have a large group of out-
of-town commuters and both have a substantial group of senior or retired long-term residents. 
Both Westford and Chelmsford have adopted town meeting as their form of government, but 
Westford uses an open town meeting while in 1989 Chelmsford switched from open to 
representative town meeting. The representative town meeting in Chelmsford has certain 
advantages over the open town meeting in Westford, including an improvement in the attendance 
rate and the elimination of voter stacking. Still, both communities share the same representation 
problem. Evidence indicates that retired long-term residents tend to be the central participants of 
the meetings, while newcomers and commuters are less likely to get involved. There is also a 
likely manipulation of the meeting by public officials and employees due to their inherent 
incentives to promote growth.  
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The two towns have taken different growth-management paths. Westford has a stringent 
growth-management system. It has adopted low-density-only zoning, a growth rate limit, a 
community preservation act, and a mitigation provision. Westford also prohibits apartment and 
mobile home development and requires a supermajority vote on rezoning issues. In contrast, 
Chelmsford takes a balanced approach to growth management, allowing higher-density 
development as well as apartments and mobile homes. Meanwhile, the town has adopted a 
community preservation act. It collects a sewer and water capacity surcharge from new 
development and also requires a supermajority vote on rezoning issues. 
6.4.2 Town Meeting and Initiative 
After having conducted these two case studies, I have an improved understanding on town 
meeting. As a form of direct democracy, town meeting shows several important differences from 
other forms of direct democracy. Here I compare town meeting with initiative.  
While initiative is a direct democracy tool used in most cases occasionally or only when 
necessary, town meeting is a general form of government dealing with a complete spectrum of 
public issues. Initiative may be launched at any time and requires an initiator, but town meeting 
has a fixed schedule in general, usually twice a year, and does not requires someone to start it.  
Town meeting is under the control of public staff such as moderator and town clerk. As a 
result, town meeting can be influenced by the interest of meeting staff who may promote growth 
in order to maintain a balanced budget for the town. Meanwhile, initiative completely bypasses 
the public sector and gives the decision-making power to its participants. In most cases, initiative 
participants are against the public sector’s growth interest and use initiative as a channel to 
express their preferences. Initiative tends to be prone to the influence of outside interests.  
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Compared to the lack of discussion in initiative process, town meeting provides deliberative 
opportunities such as public hearings. During the meeting process, there are many opportunities 
for citizens to participate, to ask questions, and to involve into discussions. Unless the “winner 
takes all” nature of initiative measures, town meeting allows negotiation and mediation processes 
before, during, and even after the decision-making process.  
Contrary to my perception that town meeting is a form of direct democracy with better 
representation of citizens, there is an under-representation problem associated with town 
meeting. In both towns, the meeting participants are only a small proportion of the general public 
and they tend to be over-represent particular groups of the eligible voters. This characteristic 
does not distinguish town meeting from initiative for which representation is also a problem.  
6.4.3 Conclusion 
In both towns, growth management efforts can be seen as the result of interactions among 
growth, local residents, and town meeting within the state framework. Residents have their 
preferences toward growth based on their status. However, their preferences are layered and may 
change due to varying growth conditions. Town meeting provides a stage for residents with 
different preferences to interact, but the meeting induces unbalanced representation and possible 
manipulation. Overall, the growth-management effort in a community is the integrated result of 
residents’ preferences toward growth through the filtration of town meeting, all occurring under 
the umbrella of the state framework.  
In these two towns, newcomers and commuters, with higher socioeconomic status, have the 
preference to protect the character of their community’s open space as well as to reduce the fiscal 
burden on local public services, although the fiscal burden tends to have a lower priority in their 
preference. They generally tend to support a restrictive approach to control growth. In 
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Chelmsford, retired long-term residents and working-class residents prefer to keep the 
environmental amenities, but they pay more attention to their tax bills and housing affordability. 
These residents tend to support a moderate growth; neither rapid growth nor no growth are 
attractive to them because the former can place a heavy burden on local services and result in tax 
increases, while the latter may reduce housing supply, thus leading to housing price inflation. 
Residents who work in development-related industries as well as public employees may benefit 
from growth; both of these groups tend to support a pro-growth agenda.  
The decisive force in both towns’ growth politics is in fact the retired long-term residents. In 
Westford, rapid growth during the 1990s severely burdened the town’s public services, 
particularly public school, and was damaging the town’s attractive country character. Large-scale 
development has led to tax increases and the loss of open space. In this context, both newcomers 
and the retired teamed together to combat rapid growth. They defeated the pro-growth interests 
in the town, resulting in the adoption of growth-limiting measures. In Chelmsford, however, 
large-scale development is unlikely at this point due to the town’s built-out nature. Occasional 
scattered growth or redevelopment can help maintain the town’s public services and bolster a 
healthy local economy. The retired teamed with pro-growth interests to adopt a balanced 
approach to development, thus allowing a moderate amount of growth to maintain the town’s 
public services without seriously damaging community character.  
Nevertheless, for these two towns the use of town meeting is not a precise representation of 
the town. Indeed, to a certain extent town meeting has shifted the growth-management efforts 
adopted. In both types of town meeting, among all registered voters, long-term residents and 
development interest-related voters tend to be over-represented, while growth-limitation 
supporters such as newcomers seem under-represented. The open town meeting in Westford has 
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filtered off, to a certain level, the newcomers’ preference for limited growth. However, the 
resultant overall growth-management effort still reflects the majority voters’ preference for 
restrictive growth management. This result is mainly due to the retirees’ support for limiting 
growth and the preponderance in the proportion of growth-limitation supporters. It would be 
difficult to determine the outcome if the proportion of growth-limitation supporters was not 
overwhelming, as indicated by the close voting results in the adoption of the growth rate limit. In 
Chelmsford, the representative town meeting has also filtered off the newcomers’ growth-control 
preference, but due to retirees’ support of moderate growth in this case, the town has finally 
adopted a balanced approach to development.  
The reason for growth-limitation supporters being less likely to appear in the meetings is 
unknown, although in both of these towns such supporters are similarly newcomers and out-of-
town commuters. My perception is that both newcomers and commuters may feel less attached 
to their communities due to their unfamiliarity with local growth issues and politics. They may 
be further discouraged from attending town meeting if the meetings are mostly attended by a 
group of strangers who may give them a feeling of alienation or even hostility. On the other 
hand, long-term residents, especially seniors, are well-attached to their hometown and feel 
comfortable in the meetings amongst friends and neighbors. These residents may also have the 
tendency to more willingly follow the casual hints of the meeting moderators.  
Contrasting with the meeting’s filtration effect on newcomers and commuters, manipulation 
of a meeting by public officials and employees can magnify their influence on growth policy 
adoption. As meeting organizers, they can deliberately arrange the meeting schedule, including 
its meeting time, location, and warrant articles. They can also strategically filter the meeting 
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participants by “teaming up” with the welcomed while creating an unfriendly atmosphere around 
the unwelcomed. Such corrosive behavior has caused voter distrust and discontent in both towns.  
Town meeting presents difficulties when faced with the acceptance of professional inputs. 
This trend is particularly obvious in Westford’s open town meeting. Even though the voter 
participation rate is low, there are still a large number of voters in a town meeting compared to 
the small number of elected officials in a council. The participating voters may not always be 
exactly the same group of people, and thus planners equipped with state-of-the-art planning 
principles always find it difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the right targets. A planner 
interviewee complained that when she wants to promote the compact and mixed land-use pattern, 
she has no idea with whom she should talk. Moreover, most town meeting participants are 
ordinary residents, so they may not have a good understanding of the impacts and implications 
behind the issues. These conditions make educating the decision-makers problematic for 
planners.  
Growth is a double-edged sword in influencing growth-management emergence. When there 
is rapid growth, it may tax the community’s ability to provide public services while driving up 
the tax bill. As a result, economically-constrained residents, such as Westford’s long-term 
seniors, may be pushed out. However, if growth is strictly limited, especially when facing a 
moderate or heated housing demand, the housing market could be inflated. Again, the low- and 
moderate-income residents may not be able to afford the increasing rent and leave the 
community. To protect this vulnerable group of residents, the best practice would be to keep a 
moderate and stable pace of growth, balancing the tax bill and housing prices.  
The impact of growth on land-use policies can be compromised by a community’s capacity to 
accommodate growth. Such capacity, rather than growth itself, seems to be an important factor, 
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one that affects voters’ decision on growth management. This relationship was reflected in 
Westford’s inactivity after the expiration of its growth rate limit.  
Outside factors such as state provisions and court rulings are important in the formation of 
local growth-management efforts. The state plays a crucial role in the adoption of some growth 
management measures in both towns. Even though Massachusetts is a home rule state and both 
towns have their home rule charters, the power of the towns is still strictly constrained by the 
state. The towns must follow state provisions precisely in order to adjust their growth 
management. Even though both Westford and Chelmsford are reluctant to increase their 
affordable housing share under the Chapter 40B provision, they continue to work cooperatively 
with the state. State incentives also have a strong influence over local regulations. For example, 
the community preservation act was adopted directly under state initiation and incentives. Court 
decisions also have an overwhelming influence on local policy decisions, as exemplified by 
Westford’s abandonment of its growth rate limit. After the State Supreme Court’s decision on 
the Zuckerman case, Westford did not renew its growth cap measure; this non-renewal was at 
least partially due to concerns over the threatening possibility of litigation in the future. Another 
example of the Court’s influence over local policy adoption was its ruling on the early Sturges 
case, which led to the popular adoption of permit cap. Studies on local land-use regulations and 
growth management must take into account the impacts of state-level factors.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion and Discussion 
Studies on growth-management adoption often focus on growth and local residents’ status. 
Some studies have also paid attention to ballot box planning and have examined the effect of 
direct democracy practice on resulting planning policies. This study further extends the scope of 
this research and focuses on the institutional effect of direct democracy on growth management.  
The study presents a complex connection between direct democracy and growth management. 
It shows that direct democracy not only affects policy restrictiveness, but also has a connection 
to two characteristics of growth management—exclusionary potential and management-
orientation. The town meeting case studies further indicate that growth-management emergence 
is a dynamic result of interaction between growth and resident groups under the filtration of town 
meeting.  
There are some limitations associated with this study: First, with regard to growth-
management measures, no information on the adoption method is available. We do not know if 
such measures were adopted by direct democracy or by the council government. Second and also 
related to growth-management measures, no adoption year is available. This may generate 
confusion between the impacts of growth and adopted polices. Third, the sample sizes for 
growth-management characteristics analyses are relatively small for the nationwide models. The 
results generated should be treated with caution.  
7.1 Direct Democracy and Growth Management Restrictiveness 
According to the findings, direct democracy does influence growth management 
restrictiveness, but in a complicated manner. It affects growth-management policies not only by 
itself, but also by its interaction with a locality’s socioeconomic status. According to the results, 
a locality with access to direct democracy tends to be less restrictive in growth management 
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compared to a locality without access to direct democracy. Moreover, direct democracy tends to 
magnify the effect of community status on growth management. For example, income in direct 
democracy localities has a stronger impact on growth management than in localities without 
access to direct democracy.   
It is important to observe that socioeconomic status works in conjunction with direct 
democracy in the determination of growth management policies. As analyzed in Chapter Two, it 
is logical to conclude that higher socioeconomic status communities have both the incentives and 
the resources to adopt more stringent growth-management policies to control or manage growth. 
However, the findings from previous studies on this topic have mixed results, and the reasons for 
the results are unknown. The findings from this study may offer an explanation in this regard. 
Direct democracy provides a channel for local electorates, one through which their political will 
can be expressed into policies, while in localities without access to direct democracy the 
representatives may have taken into consideration other factors than the pure will of their 
electorates into the policy adoption process. In addition, conducting status-bias research by 
mixing direct democracy and representative democracy localities may have reduced the 
opportunity to observe the relationship between status and resulting policies. Nonetheless, there 
is no conclusion made that in representative institutions the “representatives” do not represent 
their electorates.  
However, the relationship between direct democracy and growth-management restrictiveness 
contradicts my hypothesis. Potentially, there may be two reasons that explain this contradiction: 
First, the growth-management restrictiveness variable takes into account only the total number of 
restrictive measures, but without looking into the content of such measures. If jurisdictions tend 
to adopt very stringent growth-management measures through direct democracy, then it is likely 
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that they do not need a large number of policies. Case studies focusing on policy contents may 
point in a promising direction for this type of research.  
Second, direct democracy has different tools, such as town meeting and initiative/referendum, 
and different tools have different working mechanisms. Pooling all the tools together may tend to 
randomize the relationship between direct democracy and policy restrictiveness. The findings in 
this study have shown evidence in this direction—direct democracy tools do have unique 
working mechanisms and show different effects on growth management. The suggestion here is 
that instead of looking at direct democracy as a single entity, new research should be conducted 
that treats town meeting and initiative/referendum as two distinct categories.  
Town meeting is a unique political instrument in the New England region. According to the 
findings, town meeting localities tend to have more restrictive growth-management measures 
compared to localities with council governments. This result confirms my hypothesis, and is 
more straightforward when compared to those from initiative and referendum localities. In 
initiative/referendum localities, policies may be carried out by both representative councils as 
well as electorates, while in town meeting localities all policies are adopted by the electorates. 
Thus, the findings from “pure democracy” jurisdictions can show the straightforward 
relationship between direct democracy and policies within the scope of this study. Additionally, 
town meeting localities, when compared to council governments, are more likely to have low-
density zoning according to the individual measure models.  
However, town meeting tends to weaken the relationship between community status and 
policy restrictiveness. The study finds that the effect of white population on growth policies in 
town meeting communities is weaker than in council communities. One explanation for this 
result could be that the white population is either under-represented by town meeting or over-
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represented by representative council. However, the two cases I chose did not generate evidence 
on the under-representation of white population.  
Initiative and referendum are popular in the non-New England region, especially in the West. 
Surprisingly, the study indicates that jurisdictions with access to initiative are less likely to 
encounter stringent growth-management efforts compared to jurisdictions without access to 
initiative. Analyses of individual measures further show that initiative communities are less 
likely to have urban containment measures, yet are more likely to have mobile home and 
apartment prohibitions. Together, these findings suggest that initiative communities have a less 
restrictive growth-management framework due to their lack of management-oriented measures. 
Initiatives may not affect communities’ growth control or limitation efforts.  
Furthermore, initiatives help exaggerate the impact of community status on growth 
management. The study finds that while white population has a positive effect on growth-
management restrictiveness, this effect is much stronger in initiative communities. This finding 
supports my hypothesis and indicates that initiative, used in an institutional setting, helps 
translate higher-status groups’ preference into growth management. This may be realized 
through the direct practice of initiative or ballot box planning by the higher-status groups, or by 
intimidating the representative decision-makers with the possibility of even more restrictive 
growth management.  
Similar to initiative, referendum also shows a negative connection to growth management 
restrictiveness—localities with access to referendum tend to be less likely to have restrictive 
growth management. Further evidence shows that referendum communities are less likely to 
have facilities’ regulations. Together, these results suggest that referendum communities tend to 
veto management-oriented measures, resulting in a less restrictive growth-management 
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framework. In my hypotheses, however, I assume that high-status groups are more likely to 
participate in referendum and less likely to stop growth-management measures due to their 
incentives to control growth. This finding would thus be a modification of my hypotheses.  
7.2 Direct Democracy and Growth Management Characteristics 
This study looks at two characteristics of growth management—the exclusionary potential 
and the management orientation. Findings indicate that direct democracy has a tie with the 
exclusionary potential of growth management, yet has a negative relationship with management-
oriented measures. These relationships are better articulated through direct democracy tools.  
The tie between direct democracy and the exclusionary potential of growth management is 
realized thorough direct democracy tools. The evidence shows that both town meeting and 
initiative communities have an exclusionary tendency in managing growth. Town meeting 
communities tend to be more likely to utilize low-density-only zoning as a growth-management 
tool. In many situations, this rules out small-lot housing, increases housing prices, and excludes 
the poor and minorities. Initiative communities are more likely to prohibit mobile homes and 
apartments, which oftentimes accommodate economically-constrained tenants. However, the 
exclusionary effect is not observed between general access to direct democracy and growth 
management, possibly due to the mix of different direct democracy tools. Furthermore, 
referendum also does not exhibit this exclusionary orientation.  
This finding confirms my hypotheses. Higher-status residents tend to utilize direct democracy 
to manage growth. In doing so, two motivations may lead to their exclusion of the poor and 
minorities: First, there is a fiscal impact motivation. The poor consume a similar, and sometimes 
even higher, level of public services such as schools and policing when compared to the well-off, 
yet they pay less property tax due to their lower property values. Indeed, well-off residents are 
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subsidizing the poor in local public financing. Exclusion of the poor can thus benefit the rich. 
The second motivation is linked to community character. These two groups exhibit different 
lifestyles, which may result in a different community character, one unacceptable to the well-off, 
and thus provides another motivation for them to exclude the poor and minorities.  
When pooling all direct democracy tools together into a general access, the study observed a 
strong pattern between direct democracy and management-orientation. Direct democracy 
communities systematically lack management-oriented measures such as urban containment and 
facilities’ regulations. This pattern is further strengthened by the relationship between 
initiative/referendum and management-oriented measures. Initiative communities are less likely 
to have urban containment measures, while referendum communities are less likely to have 
facilities’ regulations. However, no such pattern was observed in town meeting communities.  
This pattern indicates an inflexible approach to growth management among direct democracy 
communities. Such communities either do not make efforts to manage growth, or they take rigid 
growth-limiting measures toward growth. By contrast, representative councils, without the 
influence of direct democracy, tend to be more likely to adopt management-oriented measures 
while taking a flexible approach to growth management. In general, these communities tend to 
channel growth into desirable locations, control the timing of development, and reasonably 
distribute the burden to provide, at least partially, public services to responsible developers.  
7.3 Town Meeting Case Studies 
The case studies indicate that growth-management emergence is a dynamic result of 
interaction between growth and resident groups under the filtration of town meeting. It is also 
observed that town meeting exhibits an unbalanced representation of the community. This 
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finding provides implications for other direct democracy tools and helps explain the results of the 
quantitative models.  
Utilizing the model results, two town meeting cases—the Town of Westford and the Town of 
Chelmsford—are selected in Massachusetts. The cases are relatively less complex in terms of 
local conditions and political context. Both communities are within the same state and 
constrained by the same state provisions. They are both middle-sized and with a similar level of 
majority white populations. No organized interests have been observed in local growth politics.  
In both towns, the growth-management efforts can be seen as the result of interactions 
between growth, local residents, and town meeting under a state framework. Residents have their 
preferences toward growth which are based on their status. However, their preferences are 
layered and may change due to varying growth conditions. Town meeting provides a stage for 
residents with different preferences to interact, but the meeting induces unbalanced 
representation and possible manipulation. Thus, the growth-management effort in a community 
is the integrated result of residents’ preferences toward growth through the filtration of town 
meeting, which is of course under the state framework.  
Westford presents a restrictive growth-management effort. In Westford, rapid growth during 
the 1990s severely burdened the town’s public services, particularly public schools, and was 
damaging to the town’s attractive country character. Large-scale development has caused tax 
increases and loss of open space. In this context, both newcomers and retirees teamed together 
against rapid growth. They defeated the pro-growth interest in the town, resulting in the adoption 
of growth-limiting measures. Interestingly, even though town meeting under-represented the 
newcomers, the filtration effect does not change the resulting policy effort due to the dominance 
of growth-limitation supporters’ preference.  
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The Town of Chelmsford has a less restrictive and more balanced growth-management 
framework. In Chelmsford, large-scale development is unlikely due to the town’s built-out 
nature. Occasional scattered growth or redevelopment can help maintain the town’s public 
services and maintain a healthy local economy. Here the retired teamed with pro-growth interests 
and adopted a balanced approach to development—a moderate amount of growth to preserve the 
town’s public services without seriously damaging its community character. However, 
newcomers with a growth-limitation preference are largely excluded from Chelmsford’s 
representative town meeting. In this case, such under-representation has contributed to the 
balanced growth-management effort.  
The results from the case studies indicate a need to modify my conceptual framework. In my 
framework, I assume that residents with higher socioeconomic status tend to participate in direct 
democracy and make growth decisions. I further assume that higher-status residents do so for 
fiscal considerations, particularly in the continuation of their lifestyles, which they enjoy. 
However, based on the results from these two case studies, participants of direct democracy are 
not necessarily higher-status residents. Economically-constrained retirees dominate the town 
meetings in these two cases. Even though the participants are not as expected, yet their 
motivations share similarities to my proposed framework. The retirees tend to focus on their 
fiscal constraints and the country atmosphere of their communities, though they put more weight 
on the former.  
If participation in town meeting does not depend on socioeconomic status, then does another 
participation pattern exist? The case studies also reveal that in addition to long-term residents’ 
participation in town meeting, newcomers and commuters are less likely to become involved in 
town meeting decisions. This may be caused by the difference between the two groups of 
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residents as regards their familiarity with local conditions, history, and more importantly, other 
participants. Together, these findings lead to a new perception that town meeting as an 
institutional mechanism may benefit the natives and thus encourage their participation.  
The evidence also indicates the existence of development interest in public officials who 
organize and implement the town meeting decisions. Their preferences tend to be amplified 
through town meeting due to possible manipulation of the meeting. As meeting organizers, they 
seem to have many opportunities to adjust the arrangements or to create an unfriendly 
atmosphere for the not-welcomed, thus shaping the meeting results and tilting them toward their 
preferences. This situation is different from initiative or referendum voting. In these cases, the 
votes can completely bypass the representative government, thus leaving few opportunities for 
manipulation. 
7.4 Putting Things Together 
Putting findings from quantitative models and case studies together, I draw following 
conclusions. Contrary to the common perception that direct democracy leads to stringent land 
use regulations, the results show that direct democracy has limited influence over growth 
management restrictiveness and this influence is related to specific forms of direct democracy 
and geographic areas. While in New England region, town meeting is associated with more 
restrictive growth measures, at the national level excluding California, the research does not 
show a connection between direct democracy and growth management restrictiveness. However, 
in Midwest, where there is a large mix of local governments with direct democracy, the research 
finds a significant negative relationship between direct democracy and restrictiveness.  
In addition to this direct relationship, the analyses also show that there is a limited indirect 
relationship between direct democracy and growth policies and this indirect relationship is also 
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tied to specific direct democracy tools and geographic areas. This indirect relationship is 
reflected in the New England region where town meeting tends to curb the translation of race to 
restrictiveness. In the Midwest, there is a positive relationship between growth management 
restrictiveness and the interaction term, indicating that direct democracy provides a mechanism 
through which race translates to restrictiveness. However, no indirect relationship is found at the 
national level.  
 The most important findings are on the relationship between direct democracy and types of 
growth management measures. First, direct democracy shows a positive connection with 
measures that have exclusionary potential. At the national level, direct democracy has a positive 
connection with building permit cap and a similar relationship can also be found in the Midwest.  
Findings also indicate that in New England region, town meeting encourages the use of low-
density-only zoning. Second, direct democracy has a negative influence over management-
orientation of growth management. This relationship can be observed at national level as well as 
most regions except the Northeast.  
The limited influence of direct democracy over growth management might be better 
understood under the California context. California is often thought more restrictive on growth 
management approach than other states and it features universal use of direct democracy, i.e., 
initiative and referendum. This correlation leads many observers to infer that initiatives in 
particular lead to policy restrictiveness. However, there are many other features of the California 
planning regime that also might contribute to the restrictiveness of growth management. These 
include, for example, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); the tax limitation of 
Proposition 13; a strong liberal or interventionist ideology in many cities and counties; state case 
law and statutes that have been very friendly to local experimentation in land-use regulation (i.e., 
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exceptional strength of home rule well beyond initiative and referendum); fast growth; high 
property values; comparatively sparse infrastructure in newly developing areas (new growth 
requires bigger investments in roads, sewers, water, and schools); strong racial and ethnic 
diversity; and so on. Any of these features alone might be enough to heighten restrictiveness, but 
all of them together certainly do. Initiatives and referendum, perhaps, just add to the complex 
mix of features, and they may even be weaker than many of the others. Reducing initiative and 
referendum, consequently, or limiting their use, will probably not be enough to limit 
restrictiveness. The state has both too much growth pressure to reduce local desires to control 
and manage growth, and too many other options beyond initiative to adopt measures to do so.  
The findings on the relationship between direct democracy and types of growth management 
measures also suggest that exclusionary measures and management measures are substitutes for 
one another rather than complements in most situations. Practical evidence has also pointed to 
this propensity. Pendal, Puentes, and Martin (2006) have shown that jurisdictions in California, 
as well as those in growth management families more broadly, do not use low-density-only 
zoning or apartment exclusion measures. So the real reason why direct democracy generally (at 
the national scale) does not associate with higher restrictiveness is because the only jurisdictions 
that use both exclusionary measures and management measures at the same time are those 
outside the growth management families. The assumption that communities with different 
approaches to growth management are similar in the “medium” levels of restrictiveness might be 
inappropriate. In reality, they are quite different, they have different motivations, and different 
political institutions result in different approaches. Separating these measures may help improve 
the quality of this research.  
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7.5 Policy Implications 
These findings may give decision-makers mixed feelings. First, direct democracy as well as 
initiative and referendum in non-New England regions tend to have limited impacts on growth-
management framework. Moreover, none of the evidence indicates that either initiative or 
referendum is connected with more restrictive growth-control measures such as low-density-only 
zoning. This finding contradicts the common perception that ballot box planning will result in 
more stringent growth controls, possibly leading to a series of negative outcomes such as 
housing shortages, housing stock imbalances, market inflation, and further affordability issues 
and exclusions. Taken from this perspective, this result can help reduce the anxiety of ballot box 
planning opponents.  
However, direct democracy in the New England region, or the town meeting, shows a linkage 
to restrictive growth-management efforts. The effects of town meeting on growth policies are 
actually understudied in the current literature; this result may therefore warn academics and 
higher-level policy-makers to pay attention to the potential negative impact of growth policies 
adopted under town meeting. While town meeting is the product of state provisions, local public 
officials can basically do nothing to alter the meeting’s institutional setting. Whether local 
officials have any incentive to make alterations is questionable, especially due to their possibly 
inherent development interest. State-level actions will be needed in order to curb the potential 
negative impacts from town meeting measures.  
The evidence also indicates that direct democracy can result in potentially exclusionary 
policies, such as low-density-only zoning adopted through town meeting, or mobile home and 
apartment prohibitions as observed in initiative communities. Such measures are contrary to one 
of the crucial goals of planning. However, as these adoption processes are the direct actions of 
 201
local voters and bypass the local government, efforts to control these results must be initiated 
from state-level governments. Such efforts can focus on improvement of voter participation to 
make the process more representative. Moreover, these efforts could shape state provisions and 
generate a policy template to limit the type and contents of policies adopted through direct 
democracy.  
Many have made the challenge that direct democracy tends to generate rigid and decisive 
measures, leaving out the deliberative process. The findings indicate that direct democracy has a 
less likely tendency to be associated with management-oriented measures such as urban 
containment and facilities’ regulations. This shows that direct democracy lacks a flexible and 
planned approach to growth management. One explanation for this lacking could be that ordinary 
voters are not professional plan-makers and do not have the ability to devise deliberated and 
well-planned measures. Planning enlightenment and education can definitely help improve 
policy quality. To a certain extent, state-level incentives on the flexible adoption of measures 
attained by means of direct democracy can also help.  
The next two points are related to town meeting in particular. Town meeting shows an 
unbalanced representation of local voters, and this may imply that town meeting possesses the 
same characteristics associated with other direct democracy tools. Many residents cannot attend 
town meeting due to schedule conflicts or other obligations such as childcare. Technology 
enhancement through TV broadcasting or Internet/mobile device connection with the meeting 
could substantially improve both participation and representation. Relaxed regulations on 
absentee voting could also increase the representativeness of town meeting.  
Town meeting presents difficulties with regard to the acceptance of professional planning 
inputs. Even though the voter participation rate is low, there are still a large number of random 
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voters in a town meeting when compared to the small number of elected officials in a council. 
Planners equipped with state-of-the-art planning principles always find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to pinpoint the right targets. Additionally, most town meeting participants are 
ordinary residents who may not have a good understanding of the impacts and implications 
behind the issues. These conditions give planners difficulties in educating the decision-makers. 
Local governments should improve the communications between the public side and local voters 
in order to articulate policy contents and implications. The government should also offer voters 
more learning opportunities such as seminars or training programs to enhance their knowledge in 
order to make quality decisions.   
7.6 Future Research 
The limited effects of direct democracy on growth management restrictiveness might be the 
results of the existence of other strong factors that influence growth polices. In addition to 
growth and community socioeconomic status, these factors may also include state and local legal 
framework, community political orientations, local and regional real estate market, and so on. A 
comprehensive evaluation of such factors and a comparison of their effects against direct 
democracy’s effects on growth policies may help improve our understanding on the relationship 
between direct democracy and growth management as well as a general understanding on policy 
adoption.  
Methodological improvement can also make a future direction. As mentioned in previous 
section, exclusionary measures and management measures are not equal in terms of 
restrictiveness. They might also be different in motivations and backup institutions. An additive 
restrictiveness index by adding up all types of growth management measures may have mixed 
the uniqueness of these two types of policies. An improved approach of restrictiveness indicator 
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construction needs to take into account their difference and can possibly generate new insights 
on the relationship between direct democracy and growth management. 
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Appendix A. Local Provision for Direct Democracy Survey 
Dear Sir or Madam:  
 
In 2003, you responded to a survey by Cornell University Professor Rolf Pendall and his 
colleague Jonathan Martin about your jurisdiction's land-use regulations—thank you for your 
help at that time! I am now conducting a follow-up survey on local provision for direct 
democracy—ballot initiative, referendum, and town meeting—that pertain to planning and land-
use regulations. This survey will help us learn more about the role of "direct democracy" in land-
use regulations in the 50 largest U.S. metropolitan areas.  
 
Even if you no longer work for the jurisdiction for which you responded in 2003, please answer 
the survey as it relates to that jurisdiction. All the questions concern direct democracy tools in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. If you feel uncomfortable answering the survey as it pertains to your 
former jurisdiction, please let me know and, if possible, provide contact information for a better 
potential respondent.  
 
If you have any questions regarding this survey, please email me at dw86@cornell.edu or contact 
Professor Pendall at (607) 255-5561.  
 
Thank you very much for your help.  
 
 
 
 
Dehui Wei 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Dehui Wei, Ph.D. Candidate  
317 West Sibley Hall  
Department of City and Regional Planning  
Cornell University  
Ithaca, New York 14853  
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Your Information:  
• Name of respondent: _______________ 
• Title: _______________ 
• Jurisdiction name: _______________ 
• State: _______________ 
• Jurisdiction type:  
__City/borough/village  
__Town/township/charter township  
__County  
__Other (please specify_______________) 
• Does your jurisdiction have a charter?  
__Yes 
__No 
__Don’t know 
__Other (please specify_______________) 
• Zip code: _______________ 
• Telephone number (with area code): _______________ 
• Email: _______________ 
• Date of response: _______________ 
 
Instruction to Fill Out the Survey:  
From the next page, you'll be asked about local provisions for each of the following types of 
direct democracy:  
 
1. Town meeting: town meeting is a form of local government practiced in the New England 
region, but rare elsewhere. The general form is for local residents to gather periodically and act 
as a legislative body to enact local regulations, elect local officials, set local tax rates, and make 
appropriations for local purposes through voting.  
 
2. Ballot initiative: a ballot initiative allows citizens to enact new charter provisions or 
ordinances by collecting signatures on a petition for eventual consideration as a ballot measure. 
The voter response may be binding or non-binding on local government.  
 
3. Legislative referendum: legislative referendum requires the local governing body to place 
charter/home rule changes and bond issues on the ballot for voter approval or rejection. The 
results may be binding or non-binding on local government. 
 
4. Popular referendum: popular referendum allows citizens to collect signatures on a petition 
to place on the ballot any charter, ordinance, or home rule change that has been adopted by the 
local government before the change can take effect. The results may be binding or non-binding 
on local government.  
 
Please fill out the survey even if your jurisdiction does not have any of the provisions. 
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1. Town Meeting 
• Is town meeting* used in your jurisdiction?  
   __Yes-open town meeting**  
   __Yes-representative town meeting**  
   __No      
   __Don't know     
   __Other (please specify_______________)   
 
*Town meeting is a form of local government practiced in the New England region, but rare elsewhere. The general 
form is for local residents to gather periodically and act as a legislative body to enact local regulations, elect local 
officials, set local tax rates, and make appropriations for local purposes through voting.  
**There are two forms of town meeting: open town meeting and representative town meeting. In open town meeting 
all registered voters can participate and vote, while in representative town meeting the citizens elect town meeting 
members by precinct to represent them and vote on the issues for them. 
 
• How many times is a town meeting held in your jurisdiction ANNUALLY?  
_______________ 
 
• Can decisions on local COMPREHENSIVE PLANS, PLANNING REGULATIONS, and/or 
ZONING RULES (ordinances, by-laws, resolutions, etc.) be made in town meeting?  
   __Yes        
   __No        
   __Don't know       
   __Other (please specify_______________)     
 
2. Initiative  
• Are citizen ballot initiatives* allowed in your jurisdiction for at least some local actions?  
  __Yes  
  __No     
  __Don't know     
  __Other (please specify_______________) 
 
*A ballot initiative allows citizens to enact new charter provisions or ordinances by collecting signatures on a 
petition for eventual consideration as a ballot measure. The voter response may be binding or non-binding on local 
government. 
 
• Are citizens of your jurisdiction allowed to use an initiative to adopt or change 
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS, PLANNING REGULATIONS, and/or ZONING RULES 
(ordinances, by-laws, resolutions, etc.), rather than charters and home rules?  
   __Yes  
   __No      
   __Don't know     
   __Other (please specify_______________) 
 
• How many times between 1990 and 2002 (inclusive) did citizens place initiatives on the 
ballot that would change your jurisdiction's PLANNING REGULATIONS or ZONING 
RULES?  
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   __0     
   __1-5  
   __6-10  
   __>10  
   __Don't know 
 
• How many of the initiatives included in your previous question were passed by the voters?  
   __0  
   __1-5  
   __6-10  
   __>10  
   __Don't know 
 
3. Legislative Referendum 
• Is legislative referendum* required in your jurisdiction for at least some local government 
decisions?  
   __Yes  
   __No     
   __Don't know    
   __Other (please specify_______________) 
 
*There are two types of referendum--legislative referendum and popular referendum. Legislative referendum 
requires the local governing body to place charter/home rule changes and bond issues on the ballot for voter 
approval or rejection. Popular referendum allows citizens to collect signatures on a petition to place on the ballot any 
charter, ordinance, or home rule change that has been adopted by the local government before the change can take 
effect. The results may be binding or non-binding on local government. This question asks specifically about the 
former.  
 
• Is your local governing body required to use legislative referendum to adopt or change local 
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS, PLANNING REGULATIONS, and/or ZONING RULES 
(ordinances, by-laws, resolutions, etc.)?  
   __Yes  
   __No     
   __Don't know    
   __Other (please specify_______________) 
 
• How many times between 1990 and 2002 (inclusive) did your government, not the voters, 
place PLANNING REGULATIONS or ZONING RULES on the ballot box for voter 
approval as required for legislative referendum?   
   __0    
   __1-5  
   __6-10  
   __>10   
   __Don't know 
 
• Among the number of times you answered to the previous question, how many times have 
citizens rejected city council's decisions in legislative referendums?  
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   __0  
   __1-5  
   __6-10  
   __>10  
   __Don't know 
 
4. Popular Referendum 
• Is popular referendum* allowed in your jurisdiction for at least some local government's 
decisions?  
   __Yes  
   __No     
   __Don't know    
   __Other (please specify_______________) 
 
*Popular referendum allows citizens to collect signatures on a petition to place on the ballot any charter, ordinance, 
or home rule change that has been adopted by the local government before the change can take effect. The results 
may be binding or non-binding on local government. 
 
• Are citizens of your jurisdiction allowed to use popular referendum to vote on local 
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS, PLANNING REGULATIONS, and/or ZONING RULES 
(ordinances, by-laws, resolutions, etc.) enacted by your government?  
   __Yes  
   __No     
   __Don't know    
   __Other (please specify_______________) 
 
• How many times between 1990 and 2002 (inclusive) have your citizens challenged city 
council-enacted PLANNING REGULATIONS or ZONING RULES through popular 
referendum on the ballot box?   
   __0    
   __1-5  
   __6-10  
   __>10  
   __Don't know 
 
• Among the number of times you answered to the previous question, how many times have 
citizens overturned local government's decisions through popular referendums?  
   __0    
   __1-5  
   __6-10  
   __>10  
   __Don't know 
 
5. Comments 
If you have any comments, please write them below:  
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Thank you very much. I really appreciate your help.  
 
Dehui Wei 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Dehui Wei, Ph.D. Candidate  
317 West Sibley Hall  
Department of City and Regional Planning  
Cornell University  
Ithaca, New York 14853  
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Appendix B. APA Chapter Vice-President Email Survey Instrument 
Dear Sir or Madam:  
 
My name is Dehui Wei, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of City and Regional Planning at 
Cornell University. I am writing to ask you questions regarding the nature of local provision for 
initiative—direct or indirect but not including referendum—in the state where your chapter or 
section is located.  
 
My study looks at the relationship between growth management policy restrictiveness and access 
to direct democracy in US municipalities and counties. The initiative, a tool of direct democracy, 
is one of the most important focus points in my study. I have some general information on 
whether local residents are allowed to use initiatives, but this information does not distinguish 
whether they can use initiatives to pass a zoning ordinance amendment, growth management 
ordinance, or other ordinance on land-use planning. I have good information about referendum, 
in which local residents can approve or reject a decision made by the elected officials, and I do 
not need more information about that. Thus I am asking for your help to answer these two 
questions:  
 
First, are local residents allowed to use initiative to change or adopt planning regulations and/or 
zoning ordinances other than bond issues, charter amendments, or home rule changes, if there is 
provision for initiative in municipalities in your state?  
 
Second, would you say that in your state initiatives on planning, growth management, and 
zoning issues have been proposed in more than half of jurisdictions, between a quarter and a half, 
less than a quarter, or none at all?  
 
Thank you very much. I appreciate any of your help.  
 
 
 
Dehui Wei 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Dehui Wei, Ph.D. Candidate 
317 West Sibley Hall 
Department of City and Regional Planning 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, New York 14853 
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Appendix C. The 2001 ICMA Municipal Form Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
Municipal Form of Government, 2001 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Municipal Form of Government, 2001  
Trends in Structure, Responsibility, and Composition  
 
 August 2001  
 
Dear Municipal Clerk:  
 
The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) has conducted a Form of 
Government Survey for more than thirty years. This survey gathers the most comprehensive 
information available on form of government, election systems, provisions for referendum/recall, 
and term limits. In addition, information on characteristics of the local governing body is 
collected in this survey. A summary of the results will be available on ICMA’s web site 
(http://icma.org) after the data have been tabulated.  
 
Please contribute to this significant body of knowledge by completing the survey and returning it 
in the enclosed postage-paid envelope within three weeks. Your participation is greatly 
appreciated.  
 
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
  
William H. Hansell, Jr.  
Executive Director, ICMA  
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Definitions:  
The term municipality refers to cities, towns, townships, villages, and boroughs.  
The term council refers to an elected body whose members may be called council members, 
aldermen, selectmen, freeholders, trustees, commissioners, or a similar title.  
The chief appointed official of the local government is often referred to as city manager, chief 
executive officer, city administrator, chief administrative officer, town administrator, village 
manager, or a similar title.  
The chief elected official of the local government may have the title of mayor, president, board 
chair, etc.  
1. Indicate your current form of government as defined by your charter, ordinance, or state law. 
(Check only one.)  
a. Mayor-Council Elected council or board serves as the legislative body. The chief elected 
official is the head of government, with significant administrative authority, generally elected 
separately from the council.  
b. Council-Manager Elected council or board and chief elected official (e.g., mayor) are 
responsible for making policy. A professional administrator appointed by the board or 
council has full responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the government.  
c. Commission Members of a board of elected commissioners serve as heads of specific 
departments and collectively sit as the legislative body of the government.  
d. Town Meeting Qualified voters convene to make basic policy and to choose a board of 
selectmen. The selectmen and elected officers carry out the policies established by the 
government  
e. Representative Town Meeting Voters select citizens to represent them at the town 
meeting. All citizens may attend and participate in debate, but only representatives may vote.  
2. How is your municipality’s structure or form of government established? (Check only one.)  
a. Charter  
b. State law  
c. Local ordinance  
d. Council resolution  
e. Other (Please specify. )________________________  
3. Does your municipality have the position of chief appointed official? (The chief appointed 
official of the local government is referred to as city manager, chief executive officer, city 
administrator, chief administrative officer, town administrator, village manager, or a similar 
title.) a. Yes b. No  
A. If your municipality does have the position of chief appointed official, what action 
established the position? (This question refers only to the establishment of the position, 
not to the person or group that does the hiring.)  
a. Charter  
b. State law  
c. Local ordinance  
d. Council resolution  
e. Chief elected official created position  
f. Other (Please specify.) ____________________________  
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B. If your municipality does have the position of chief appointed official, who appoints the 
chief appointed official?  
a. Chief elected official c. Combination of chief elected official and council  
b. Council d. Other (Please specify.) ________________________  
4. Who has the independent authority to develop and make recommendations for the budget 
submitted to the council? (The term “develop” means that the person has responsibility for 
content of the budget.)  
a. Chief elected official d. Chief financial officer  
b. Chief appointed official e. Other (Please specify.) ________________  
c. Combination of chief elected official and chief appointed official  
5. Are your department heads (Check only one.)  
a. All elected b. All appointed c. Combination, some are elected and some appointed  
A. If any of your department heads are appointed, who appoints them?  
a. Chief elected official d. Council/board of selectmen  
b. Chief appointed official e. Other (Please specify.) ______________  
c. Combination of chief elected official and chief appointed official 
6. Does your municipality have a provision for  
A. Initiative? 1. Yes 2. No  
Initiative allows citizens to place charter, ordinance, or home rule changes on the 
ballot by collecting a required number of signatures on a petition.  
1. If yes, which of the following initiative processes does your municipality provide? 
(Check all applicable.)  
a. Indirect: Requires that before any charter, ordinance, or home rule change 
proposed by citizens through a petition process is placed on the ballot for vote, the 
council must consider it. Vote results are binding on the local government.  
b. Direct: Requires that any charter, ordinance, or home rule change proposed by the 
citizens through a petition process must be placed directly on the ballot for a vote. 
Vote results are binding on the local government.  
c. Non-binding initiative: Allows citizens to place on the ballot a question for voter 
approval or rejection. The voter response is non-binding on the local government.  
B. Legislative referendum? 1. Yes 2. No  
Legislative referendum allows the council to place any question on the ballot for 
voter approval or rejection. The results may be binding or non-binding.  
If yes, which of the following items must be placed on the ballot for voter approval 
(Check all applicable.)  
a. Local bond measures  
b. Proposed charter amendments  
c. Proposed ordinances  
d. Proposed home rule changes  
e. Other ______________  
C. Popular referendum 1. Yes 2. No  
Allows citizens to collect signatures on a petition to place on the ballot any charter, 
ordinance, or home rule change that has been adopted by the local government before the 
change can take effect.  
D. Recall 1. Yes 2. No  
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Allows citizens to collect signatures on a petition to place on the ballot a question of 
whether an elected official should be removed from office before the expiration of 
his/her term.  
7. Since January 1, 1996, have there been any attempts to change your municipality’s structure or 
form of government (e.g., change from at-large to ward or district elections or add or 
eliminate the position of chief appointed official, etc.)? a. Yes b. No  
A. If yes, approximately how many attempts have been made to change your municipality’s 
structure or form of government since January 1, 1996? ______________  
B. Check each item that describes the proposed change(s) and indicate whether the change(s) 
was approved.  
Attempted change 
Change 
was 
proposed 
Not 
approved Approved 
Year 
approved 
1. Change from at-large to ward or district elections   
2. Change to a mixed system with some at-large and 
some ward or district elections  
 
3. Change the mix between the number of council 
members elected at large and the number elected by 
ward or district  
 
4. Increase the number of council or board members   
5. Decrease the number of council or board 
members  
 
6. Change the method of election of the chief 
elected official  
 
7. Increase in powers/authorities of the chief elected 
official  
 
8. Decrease in powers/authorities of the chief 
elected official  
 
     9. Add the position of chief appointed official (the 
appointed professional administrator)  
 
     10. Eliminate the position of chief appointed 
official (the appointed professional administrator)  
 
     11. Change who appoints the chief appointed 
official from (enter the previous appointment 
authority) ____________ to ___________(enter 
proposed)  
 
     12. Change the form of government  
a. If a change in form of government was proposed, what was the proposed change? (Place a check in the 
box in the “From” column that indicates the original form and a check in the box in the “To” column that 
indicates the proposed form.) 
From  To  
1. Mayor-council  6. Mayor-council  
2. Council-manager  7. Council-manager  
3. Commission  8. Commission  
4. Town meeting  9. Town meeting  
5. Representative town meeting  10. Representative town meeting  
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CHIEF ELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL/MAYOR/BOARD CHAIR  
 
The chief elected official of the local government may have the title of mayor, president, board 
chair, etc.  
8. Is the position of chief elected official in your local government officially full-time or part-
time? a. Full-time b. Part-time  
9. How is your chief elected official selected? (Check only one.)  
a. Voters elect directly  
b. Council selects from among its members  
c. The council member receiving the most votes in the general election becomes the chief 
elected official  
d. Council members rotate into the position of chief elected official  
e. Other (Please specify.) _________________________  
10. How long is the chief elected official’s term of office? (Important: If the chief elected official 
is a member of the council, specify the term for the position of chief elected official, not of 
council member.) (Check only one.)  
a. 1 year b. 2 years c. 3 years d. 4 years e. Other (Please specify.) __________________  
11. Is there a legal limit on the number of terms allowed for the position of chief elected official?  
1. Yes 2. No (go to question 12)  
A. If yes, what is the maximum number of terms allowed by law?  
a. 1 term b. 2 terms c. 3 terms d. 4 terms e. Other (Please specify.) ___________  
B. If yes, when was the term limitation for the position of chief elected official enacted? 
_________ (year)  
C. If yes, what authority limits the number of terms for the position of chief elected official? 
(Check only one.)  
a. Ordinance  
b. Charter  
c. State law  
d. Other (Please specify.) ___________  
12. Is the chief elected official a member of council, that is, does the chief elected official serve 
on the council? 1. Yes 2. No  
A. If yes, does the chief elected official receive supplemental compensation for these 
additional duties? 1. Yes   2. No  
13. Under what circumstances does the chief elected official have the authority to vote in council 
meetings?  
a. On all issues b. Only to break a tie c. Never d. Other (Please specify.) 
__________________  
14. Does the chief elected official have the authority to veto council-passed measures?  1. 
Yes  2. No   
A. If yes, is a “super majority” vote of the council required to overturn the mayoral veto?  
1. Yes 2. No  
15. Does the chief elected official have the authority to (Check all applicable.)  
a. Assign council members to chair or serve on committees and make assignments to those 
committees  
b. Appoint citizens to serve on advisory or quasi-judicial authorities, boards, or commissions  
 216
c. Receive the annual budget developed by the chief appointed official and present the budget 
with comments and suggestions to the council for consideration  
d. Make an annual report to the council and citizens on the state of the community  
e. Initiate the hiring and/or involuntary termination of the chief appointed official  
16. Since 1996 have any recall initiatives been filed against the chief elected official? 1. Yes   2. 
No  
A. If yes, were any successful? 1. Yes  2. No   
17. How many staff work directly for the chief elected official?  
a. Full-time staff ________ b. Part-time staff _________ 
 
COUNCIL/BOARD OF SELECTMEN/TRUSTEES  
 
The term council refers to the elected governing body of the local government. The elected body 
may be called the board of selectmen, trustees, aldermen, etc.  
18. Does the political party affiliation of council candidates appear on the ballot in a local 
general election? 1. Yes 2. No  
19. What is the current filing fee for running for a seat on the council? (If there is no fee, enter 
zero.) $_________  
20. How many council positions are there on your council? ___________ (Include the chief 
elected official if that position serves on the council. If the chief elected official is a member 
of the council, your answer to question 12 should be “yes.”)  
21. Are all of these council positions filled? 1. Yes 2. No A. If no, how many council positions 
are filled? ________  
22. How many current council members are (Total number of council members should equal the 
total in question 20 if all are filled. If all are not filled, this number should equal the total in 
21A.) a. Male ___________ b. Female ___________  
23. How many current council members fall into the following age groups? (Total number of 
council members should equal the total in question 20 if all are filled. If all are not filled, this 
number should equal the total in 21A.)  
a. Under 22 _________  
b. 22-29 _________  
c. 30-39 _________  
d. 40-49 _________  
e. 50-59 _________  
f. 60 and over _________  
24. How many current council members are (Total number of council members should equal the 
total in question 20 if all are filled. If all are not filled, this number should equal the total in 
21A.)  
a. Native American __________  
b. Hispanic __________  
c. Asian or Pacific Islander __________  
d. White, not of Hispanic origin __________  
e. Black, not of Hispanic origin __________  
25. How many current council members are in each of these occupational categories? (Count 
members only once. If any member has more than one occupation, include that person in the 
category where he or she spends the greatest amount of time. Total number of council 
 217
members should equal the total in question 20 if all are filled. If all are not filled, this number 
should equal the total in 21A.)  
___________ a. Lawyers     ___________ g. Homemakers  
___________ b. Other professionals  
(medicine, engineering, etc.)    ___________ h. Teachers and other  
educational personnel  
___________ c. Business executives/managers  ___________ i. Clergy  
___________ d. Business/industry employees  ___________ j. Retired persons  
___________ e. Service industry employees  ___________ k. Other (Please 
specify.)___________  
___________ f. Farmers or ranchers  
26. How many council members are selected by the following methods. (If none are elected by 
one of the methods, indicate zero.)(Number should equal the total in question 20.) a. Elected 
at large______ b. Elected by ward or district______  
27. Indicate the length of term for council members. (Even if the chief elected official is a 
member of council, specify the length of term for other council members, not for the chief 
elected official.)  
A. Council members elected at large  
a. 2 years b. 3 years c. 4 years d. 6 years e. Other ________  
B. Council members elected by ward or district  
a. 2 years b. 3 years c. 4 years d. 6 years e. Other ________  
28. Terms of office are (Check only one.)   a. Staggered b. Concurrent  
29. Is there a legal limit on the number of terms a council member may serve? a. Yes b. No  
A. If yes, what is the maximum number of terms allowed by law? ___________  
B. When was the term limitation enacted? ___________ (year)  
C. By what authority is the number of terms limited? (Check only one.)  
1. Ordinance 2. Charter 3. State law 4. Other (Please specify.) _____________________  
30. How many incumbents ran for reelection to council in the last general election? __________  
a. How many of those incumbents were reelected? (If none, enter zero.) ___________  
31. How is a council member’s seat filled if it is vacated before the term has expired? (Check 
only one.)  
a. Method depends on length of term remaining  
b. Special election  
c. Appointed by council  
d. Appointed by chief elected official  
e. Position left vacant until next regular election  
f. Other (Please specify.) __________________ 
32. Since 1996, have any recall initiatives been filed against council members? 1. Yes 2. No  
A. If yes, were any successful? a. Yes b. No  
33. Are any council members (excluding the chief elected official) paid an annual salary or 
stipend for any of their services?    
1. Yes 2. No  
A. If yes, please indicate the approximate annual dollar amount that your council members 
receive.  
1. Full-time council member $___________ 2. Part-time council member $___________  
34. How often does the council meet in formal session? (Check only one.)  
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a. More than once a week e. Once a month  
b. Once a week f. Less than once a month  
c. Three times a month g. Other (Please specify.) _____________________  
d. Twice a month  
35. Does the council have standing committees (permanent bodies with set memberships and 
regularly scheduled meeting times) that consider specific policy matters?  1. Yes 2. No   
A. If yes, approximately how many standing committees did the council have as of January 
2001?  
a. 1-2 standing committees d. 11-15 standing committees  
b. 3-5 standing committees e. More than 15 standing committees  
c. 6-10 standing committees  
36. Does the council use citizen authorities, boards, or commissions? 1. Yes 2. No  
A. If yes, are members 1. Elected 2. Appointed (Check all applicable.)  
B. If yes, in what capacity do they serve? (Check all applicable.)  
1. Advisory 2. Decision/policy making 3. Quasi-judicial  
C. If yes, in which areas are they used? (Check all applicable in the list below.) 
a. Growth  i. Civil service  q. Architectural review  
b. Transportation  j. Libraries  r. Code enforcement  
c. Zoning  k. Housing  s. Parks and recreation  
d. Finance  l. Community-police 
relations  
t. Ethics  
e. Airports  m. Economic development  u. Charter review commissions  
f. Art  n. Planning  v. Other (Please specify.)  
g. Beautification  o. Environmental issues  ____________________________  
h. Cable TV  p. Historic preservation   
37. How many staff are employed by the council to work exclusively on council business?  
a. Full-time staff ___________ b. Part-time staff ___________  
38. When does your next fiscal year begin (i.e., 07/2001)?  
Month ___________ Year _____________  
Name: ____________ Title: ____________  
Telephone number: __________ Email :_____________ 
 
Thank you for completing the survey. Please return to:  
Evelina Moulder, Director of Survey Research, ICMA  
777 North Capitol Street, NE, Suite 500, Washington DC 20002-4201. 
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Appendix D. Restrictiveness of Growth Management Measures 
Growth management policies can be evaluated at different levels from different perspectives. 
At one level we can evaluate individual measures while at the other level we can evaluate all the 
measures as a whole in a local jurisdiction. We can focus our attention to policy restrictiveness 
or stringency—the attempted level of limitation on growth or development. We can also focus on 
policy effectiveness—whether or not the policy or policies have reached their designated goals.  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to compare individual measures’ restrictiveness, either 
different measures within the same jurisdiction or the same measure across different localities, 
taking into account the nature of policies and local contexts in which policies are adopted and 
implemented. It is extremely hard to determine which one is stricter between an 8 units-per-acre 
zoning and a concurrency requirement of adequate public facilities or between an urban growth 
boundary including 20 years of developable land and an annual permit cap with 300-unit 
limitation. It is also hard to make judgment on which measure is more stringent between a 10 
unit-per-acre zoning in Boston metropolitan area and a 20 unit-per-acre zoning in Seattle 
metropolitan area because of the regional difference in density preference and acceptance as well 
as other contexts.  
However, it is promising to compare restrictiveness of all the growth management measures 
as a whole across municipalities. Different measures aim at controlling or managing different 
aspects of growth. Some measures will not necessarily attempt to restrict the amount of growth, 
but may change the intensity of development, shift its geographical focus, or motivate the 
provision of adequate facilities. Therefore, in general, the larger the number of growth 
management measures is, the more aspects these measures will focus. Furthermore, growth 
measures are cyclical in nature. For instance, if the enacted measures fail to contain the negative 
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effects of growth, the jurisdiction may attempt alternative strategies. Hence, the jurisdiction may 
add new measures to the existing policy pool as new kinds of growth problems become cogent or 
as prior measures fail to be effective and cause new problems (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992). As a 
result, a greater number of growth management measures could mean both a limit on more 
aspects of growth and a higher level of effort to control growth problems, the equivalent concept 
of restrictiveness.  
However, some measures may not be counted due to their minimum contribution to growth 
limitation. I use “average restrictive potential” to filter them out. Only those measures with 
higher average potential in restricting growth will be taken into consideration and others with 
lower average restrictive potential will be ignored. The reason is simple—the others may not be 
able to restrict growth and thus make little contribution to overall growth management 
restrictiveness. In order to understand the concept of “average restrictive potential”, we need to 
focus on policy effectiveness.  
Policy effectiveness is different from restrictiveness. Effectiveness is usually evaluated based 
on empirical evidence while restrictiveness based on theoretical perception. In some cases, 
policies are viewed as effective if they have accomplished their goals—usually controlling the 
amount of growth or directing the location and timing of growth, while in other cases, policies 
are ineffective when they have not reached their expectations. Meanwhile, the latter cases can be 
further divided into two groups:  policies that have certain side effects such as housing price 
increase, and policies that have no impacts at all. Effective policies and ineffective policies with 
side effects are thought as having higher average restrictive potential and thus making a 
difference in limiting growth in local growth arena.  
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However, we need be careful with above statements—in all the above cases the policies are 
integrated with local contexts in which the policies are drafted, enacted, and implemented. Only 
a strong policy is equipped with strict implementation measures, can it make a difference in 
restricting growth. Separated from its context, we are unable to assure whether or not a particular 
policy is effective. So the effectiveness and restrictive potential statements are really discussed in 
general trends or the average outcomes across municipalities.  
In this part, I try to evaluate growth policies’ overall restrictiveness in local jurisdictions and 
make possible the comparison of such policies across localities. I define local growth 
management policy restrictiveness as the total amount of growth management efforts used by a 
local government to control or restrict the amount, location, and timing of growth. A growth 
management policy restrictiveness index can then be set up by summing up the number of 
growth management measures with higher average restrictive potential in a local jurisdiction. 
Measures with lower average restrictive potential will be ignored from this study. I use the 
following approach to set up the restrictiveness index:  
1. Growth management measures are first grouped into different categories.  
2. Measures within each category are assessed based on their average restrictive potential 
in local growth. For simplicity, the average restrictive potential is divided arbitrarily 
into two types—high and low. A measure is assessed as having high average 
restrictive potential if the evidence is found from literature that, on average, the 
measure is effective, or ineffective but with substantial side effects related to growth, 
across municipalities. Otherwise, a measure is assessed as having low average 
restrictive potential.  
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3. The total number of measures with high average restrictive potential are summed up 
for each local jurisdiction and utilized as the restrictiveness index.  
D.1 Grouping of Growth Management Measures 
Along with the development of modern planning, growth management techniques are 
evolving and a variety of innovative measures have emerged. In a late 1980s California local 
jurisdiction survey, 907 different growth management and growth control measures were 
reported “on the books” in 443 local jurisdictions through the first quarter of 1989 (Glickfeld and 
Levine 1992). A vast number of growth management techniques are being used throughout the 
nation.  
Attempt is made to organize various growth management techniques. Some measures may 
perform integrated functions and pursue together similar objects or goals, while some other 
measures may perform different functions and pursue different goals. Certain measures thus can 
be seen as occupying only one category of a jurisdiction’s growth management effort. In 
Glickfeld and Levine’s (1992) study of local growth measures in California, they distinct types 
of growth measures by performing a factor analysis of growth measures that local government 
tended to enact together. Interestingly, associations among types of measures is weak or 
nonexistent, with none of the pairs of measures achieving an intercorrelation higher than 0.26. 
This result provides empirical support for growth management measures’ grouping or 
categorization.  
However, I must admit that precise categorization is difficult because of two reasons. First, 
the functions and objectives of some measures are vague and they may not belong to any 
category or they could be assigned to multiple categories. Second, some techniques have 
multiple functions and it is hard to determine which one is the dominant one.  
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Based on their factor analysis, Glickfeld and Levine (1992) arrived at six categories (each is a 
factor) of growth measures that local governments tended to enact together (see Table D-1). 
However, urban limit line or greenbelt has a much smaller loading (0.419 compared with 0.854 
and 0.846 for population growth caps and housing permit limitations respectively), or put in 
another way, a weaker association with the first factor—the population control category. 
Glickfeld and Levine (1992) point out that the weaker loading on the urban limit line or 
greenbelt can be partially explained by geographic regional differences. The three measures, 
population caps, housing caps, and urban limit lines do tend to be enacted together in coastal 
county jurisdictions. However, the majority of Central Valley jurisdictions enacting urban limit 
lines do not also enact population or housing caps. They further attribute the pattern difference to 
the different goals sought in these two geographic regions with the Central Valley jurisdictions 
focused on preserving agricultural lands through the urban limit line, while coastal jurisdictions 
use urban limit lines as much for growth rate control as for agricultural preservation. Therefore, 
in my study, I separate urban limit lines and greenbelts from population control category since 
both of them only function together with population and housing caps in limited jurisdictions and 
pursue different goals than those caps.  
Table D-1. Glickfeld and Levine’s (1992) Growth Management Categories 
Categories Measures 
Population control Housing permit limitations 
 Population growth caps 
 Urban limit line or greenbelt 
Floor space control Industrial square footage limitations 
 Commercial square footage limitations 
Infrastructure control Residential infrastructure requirements 
 Commercial/industrial infrastructure requirements 
Zoning control Rezone residential land to a less intense use 
 Restricts permitted commercial/office building heights 
 Residential downzoning 
 Rezone commercial/industrial land to a less intense use 
Political control Required voter approval for upzoning 
 Required council supermajority for upzoning 
General control Growth management elements of the General Plan 
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This separation in grouping effort can be further justified by Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 
(2002). In their article, they posit greenbelt and urban limit line (also termed urban growth 
boundary (UGB), blue line, or green line), together with urban service boundary (USB), under 
the concept of urban containment which is “simply an attempt to deliberately use their public 
land acquisitions, land-use regulations, and infrastructure investments to contain, influence, or 
direct growth to specific geographic locations.” Urban containment policy seeks goals apparently 
different from those of population control measures.  
Landis, Deng, and Reilly (2002) further strengthen the grouping of growth management 
measures. They divided growth management programs into five groups based on policy 
objectives. Zoning and environmental impact assessment target at multiple aspects of the 
development process, most of which are narrower in both scope and use. Urban growth 
boundaries, annexation limits, and sphere of influence adjustment procedures are all directed 
toward regulating the supply of land available for development. The objectives of housing and 
commercial space caps are primarily to limit the supply of buildings and thereby limit the 
impacts of related activities. The purpose of development impact fees and adequate public 
facilities ordinances (APFOs) is to minimize development’s fiscal and public service impacts, 
while the purpose of linkage fees, inclusionary zoning, farmland protection ordinances and many 
types of environmental regulations is to minimize development’s fiscal, social, and 
environmental side effects.  
Since my study focuses on residential growth management, commercial and industrial 
measures are eliminated. With some further adjustments in terms, the grouping of growth 
management measures is resulted in the following six categories: Zoning ordinances and 
subdivision regulations, urban containment, public facilities regulations, pace of growth, 
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Institutional control, and other measures. For a detailed categorization of growth management 
measures, see Table D-2.  
Table D-2. Categorization of Growth Management Measures 
Categories Measures 
Zoning ordinances and 
subdivision regulations 
Low-density zoning/high-density zoning, upzoning/downzoning, 
inclusionary zoning/exclusionary zoning, height limits, floor area 
ratio (FAR) regulations.  
Urban containment Urban growth boundaries (UGBs)/urban limit lines (ULLs)/green 
lines/blue lines, greenbelts, urban service areas (USAs)/urban 
service boundaries (USBs), annexation limits.   
Public facilities regulations Adequate public facilities ordinances (APFOs), mandatory 
dedications, negotiated exactions, impact fees, improvement taxes, 
real estate transfer taxes, special districts, tax increment financing.  
Pace of growth Building permit caps, population growth caps, moratoria on 
issuance of building permits/subdivision.  
Institutional control Voter approval requirements, super-majority vote requirement in 
city council, review streamlining, one-stop permitting.  
Other measures Growth management elements of the General Plan, affordable 
housing programs (such as housing linkage fees, affordable housing 
density bonuses), farmland protection ordinances (Right-to-farm, 
differential tax assessments, state income tax credits, capital gains 
taxes, voluntary districts, agricultural/forest buffers, rural land 
reassembly).  
 
D.2 Growth Management Measures’ Average Restrictive Potential 
It is important to bear in mind that it is difficult for a growth management measure to be 
assessed in terms of restrictiveness unless we integrate the policy’s contents with its contexts. 
Only a strong policy is equipped with strict implementation measures, can it make a difference in 
restricting growth. So the term “restrictive potential” are discussed in general trends the average 
effects and side effects of a particular growth management measure has on limiting growth 
across municipalities.  
Both critics and advocates of local growth management policies frequently assume that such 
policies are effective in holding down growth rates. Critics of such policies further maintain that 
efforts to restrict housing supply lead to increased housing prices (Advisory Commission on 
Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, 1991). However, results from empirical studies do 
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not support such definitive perceptions. The relevant literature indicate that many growth 
management measures have mixed effects on growth and housing prices, while others are not 
effective at all (Baldassare and Protash 1982, Donovan and Neiman 1995, Glickfeld and Levine 
1992, Landis 1992, Levine 1999, Logan and Zhou 1989, Mercer and Morgan 1982, Staley 2001, 
Warner and Molotch 2000). Nevertheless, several studies do provide evidence as a foundation 
for the assessment of growth management measures’ average restrictive potential. In the 
following sections, I summarize the assessment of measures in each policy group.  
D.2.1 Zoning Ordinances and Subdivision Regulations 
This category of measures includes low-density zoning/high-density zoning, 
upzoning/downzoning, inclusionary zoning/exclusionary zoning, height limits, and floor area 
ratio (FAR) regulations. These measures are the most traditional approach to land use regulation 
and are directed at multiple aspects of the development process. Not in all situations do measures 
here qualify as growth management policies. Only those that can fulfill certain purposes of 
growth management efforts, such as limiting growth or redirecting growth to desirable areas, will 
be included into growth management family.  
D.2.1.1 Zoning Ordinances 
Zoning ordinance, the oldest tool regulating land use type and intensity, is probably the most 
common approach to manage growth. Between 1993 and 2004, over 95 percent of jurisdictions 
nationwide used either a plan or zoning or both (Pendall et al. 2004). Moreover, Midwestern 
jurisdictions that did not plan or adopt zoning were townships that had the option to regulate but 
relied instead on their counties, whose plans and zoning either stand behind or supersede local 
regulations in Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The Northeast and Midwest have the 
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highest incidence of zoning ordinances that impose low density ceiling, while the West is the 
most accommodating area for high-density zoning (Pendall et al. 2004).  
Pendall et al. (2004) point out that, at the national level, the share of surveyed jurisdictions 
(700+) with very low-density zoning—prohibiting housing at 8 or more dwellings per acre—was 
16 percent in 1993 and 17 percent in 2004, and the share of respondents saying they had reduced 
the maximum permitted density by over 10 percent in the previous five years was 8 percent in 
both years. At the other end of the density scale, 28 percent of the repeat respondents 
accommodated densities over 30 dwellings per acre in 1994, compared with 26 percent in 2003; 
the share that claimed an increase of over 10 percent in their permitted maximum density 
climbed modestly from 7 to 9 percent between the two survey years.  
Low-density zoning, especially extreme low-density, if properly implemented, is the most 
stringent approach in this group in limiting residential development. Low-density zoning and 
downzoning, often existing in affluent suburbs, require that higher-density  (and therefore less 
expensive) housing construction is not permitted to begin with. Some communities have never 
experienced serious growth control movements in recent decades, because their zoning traditions 
make it prohibitive or impossible to develop large quantities of housing (Lewis and Neiman 
2002). In this way, local growth seems more incremental, and local streets and services are less 
likely to be negatively affected by growth. Therefore, growth controversy is less likely to occur.  
Low-density zoning may well have had a greater effect on residential building rates than the 
growth management policies sometimes passed in desperation after a community has begun 
experiencing growth-related conflicts. “it is still by placing undeveloped land into large-lot zones 
that communities most commonly control population growth and land conversion. This practice 
ensures that land either cannot be developed economically, or can be used only for the most 
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expensive type of structures” (Dowall 1984). Pendall (2000) finds that municipalities with low-
density zoning patterns experience lower levels of rental housing development, and with fewer 
entry-level housing options add fewer minorities to their populations than otherwise similar cities 
without such zoning. In another analysis, still using the same data set, Pendall (1999) suggests 
that low-density zoning contributed to sprawl by displacing growth outward. Neiman (1980) and 
Farley (1964) present evidence indicating that, over time, communities tend to retain their initial 
status difference vis-à-vis other localities, which may well be a function of initial zoning.  
It is worth mentioning that not only large-lot, low-density zoning might reduce the supply of 
land for residential development. If localities over-zone for other purposes, including 
commercial and retail uses, there is also a potential zoning effect that adversely affects housing 
supply (Lewis and Neiman 2002). Levine (1999) in a study of 490 California cities and counties 
found that local growth management policies “significantly displaced new construction,” and the 
following four measures had the strongest effects: rezoning of land from residential to 
agricultural or open space, rezoning of land from commercial or industrial to less intense use, 
residential downzoning, and reduction in permitted heights of commercial or office buildings.  
In contrary, high-density zoning, upzoning, and inclusionary zoning may have shallow effects 
on limiting growth, and sometime even embrace residential development. They are in the other 
end of the restrictive continuum in this group.  
D.2.1.2 Subdivision Regulations 
Subdivision regulations, such as height and area floor ratio (AFR) limits, materials used in 
housing construction, can also put upward pressure on the cost of new housing and reduce 
housing construction. These regulations typically have very worthy goals relating to the public’s 
health, comfort, and safety, on the margin such standards do reduce the amount of usage space 
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and the ability of builders to produce low-cost housing units (Lewis and Neiman 2002). Thus, 
these regulations have restrictive potential, but to a less extent compared to low-density zoning 
and downzoning.  
D.2.2 Urban Containment  
Broadly speaking, urban containment covers a wide variety of tools shaping the geographical 
pattern of urban growth, including not just regulation but also public ownership of land and 
policies regarding the timing and sequencing of public infrastructure construction. In this study, I 
adopt its narrow scope defined as a set of land use regulations that prohibit urban development 
outside a certain boundary. This group includes urban growth boundaries (UGBs)/urban limit 
lines (ULL)/green lines/blue lines, greenbelts, urban service areas (USAs)/urban service 
boundaries (USBs), annexation limits. These measures aim at two primary purposes—allocating 
compact and contiguous growth into areas with cost-effective public facility provision and 
meanwhile protecting resource lands and environmental resources outside those areas. These 
measures intervene spatial patterns of development and seek a wide range of goals including 
preservation of natural land, farmland, and resource land, and efficient utilization of urban land 
and infrastructure (Pendall et al. 2002).  
D.2.2.1 Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs)/Urban Limit Lines (ULLs)/Green     
Lines/Blue Lines 
Nationally the adoption of urban growth boundaries appears to have been slow. Along with 
building permit caps and adequate public facilities ordinances, urban growth boundaries have 
been embraced most enthusiastically in the West, suggesting that Western jurisdictions, which 
accommodate substantial density in their zoning ordinances, must also regulate the impacts of 
the density the permit (Pendall et al. 2004).  
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Urban growth boundaries constrain the geographical expansion of urban areas largely through 
the use of regulatory techniques, such as zoning. Property inside the boundary which is 
designated for urbanization will be zoned for urban use; property outside the boundary will be 
zoned for rural uses (Pendall et al. 2004). UGBs have been increasingly promoted by land-use 
planning advocates as a useful and effective tool in constraining urban growth. The growing 
support for UGBs also reflects the high profile of the UGB system in Oregon and especially in 
the Portland metropolitan area, which many planning advocates have pointed to as a model of 
"good planning".  
The Oregon Land Conservation and Development Act (LCDA) of 1973 is probably the 
strongest state growth management law in the nation. It connected state and local planning 
programs by requiring that local comprehensive plans be consistent with statewide goals and also 
created the state Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC). It also requires the 
drawing of urban growth boundaries around all the state’s cities and a metropolitan growth 
boundary around the Portland region. Oregon’s UGBs do restrict the outward geographical 
expansion of the state’s urbanized areas, but they are also required to maintain a rotating supply 
of buildable land. In a side by side comparison of the Atlanta and Portland metropolitan areas, 
however, Nelson (2000) attributes recent increase in the price of housing in the Portland region 
to improved amenities and development quality rather than to the well-known urban growth 
boundary, while he attributes Portland’s ability to maintain (and in some cases improve) its 
quality of life characteristics to the regional urban growth boundary.  
California does not have a state law mandating growth management or urban growth 
boundaries. Survey research suggests that boundaries are more prevalent among counties than 
among cities, partly because most undeveloped land lies within county unincorporated areas 
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(Fulton et al. 1996). City boundaries are less common but probably receive more publicity 
because they are often passed by voter initiative and they tend to regulate outward geographical 
expansion more strictly. The experience of Ventura County and Contra Costa County reveal the 
implementation issues associated with a locally driven urban containment system.  
In 1998 voters in Ventura County and several of its cities created a countywide system of 
urban containment by placing growth boundaries around the cities and subjecting future rezoning 
of agricultural and open space land to a vote. As a result, according to estimates prepared by the 
University of Southern California and Solimar Research Group, most developable lands are 
directed outside growth boundaries. At the same time, the state’s lack of an Oregon-style growth 
management law means neither the county nor its cities must estimate or manage the land supply 
inside the boundary in order to account for future demand—and they have not done so. Fulton et 
al. (2001) warn that current plans will likely hold construction in the vicinity of 33,000 units, 
compared with the target of approximately 60,000 units of future housing construction as 
required by state housing law.  
In 1990, Contra Costa County voters rejected a stringent, citizen-sponsored UGB initiative 
and instead approved a county-sponsored alternative. The alternative permitted some growth in 
unincorporated areas, but instructed the Board of Supervisors to create an "urban limit line" 
(ULL) and set aside 65 percent of the county’s territory as open space. In 2000, the county 
shrank the boundary, and the revised ULL conflicts with the spheres of influence for some cities 
as determined by the county LAFCO, meaning some pro-growth cities may not be able to expand 
their developed area as far or as rapidly as they had previously expected. This situation has led to 
a major dispute between these cities and the county (Fulton 2000).  
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Overall, UGBs limit the spatial growth of the cities that adopt them, but not necessarily the 
numerical amount of growth. In a California peer-comparison study, Landis et al. (2002) 
compare case study cities with certain growth management measures to peer cities without such 
measures and find that, collectively, 1990-2000 population and housing unit growth rates in the 
four case study cities with UGBs (or ULLs) exceeded their peers by 20 percent and 38 percent 
respectively. Compared individually, the differences were even greater. UGBs also have no 
effects on rental housing construction and racial composition (Pendall 2000). Levine (1999) 
finds that UGBs do not appear to significantly shift development between communities. 
However, this result contradicts Landis et al.’s finding in California. As implemented in 
California so far, UGBs do seem to be successfully redirecting growth from the urban fringe 
back into interior areas (Landis et al. 2002).  
D.2.2.2 Greenbelts  
Only a few communities in the United States have conscious greenbelt policies—the most 
prominent being Boulder, Colorado. However, many other metropolitan areas have growth 
patterns that are the result of a de-facto greenbelt created by publicly owned open space of one 
kind or another. Many metro areas in the West, for example, have been shaped by the amount 
and location of federal land holdings, which have begun to serve as de facto greenbelts as 
Western metro areas have expanded geographically (Hollis and Fulton 2002). In some cases, 
topographical features may be so large and imposing that they create de facto greenbelts whether 
or not the land is publicly owned or strictly regulated. This is true, for example, of many Western 
metro areas surrounded by mountains and metro areas on the Atlantic Coast of Florida, which 
have begun to butt up against the Everglades.  
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The longest experiment in "greenbelt" planning in the United States has occurred in Boulder, 
Colorado, which has used both regulation and public acquisition to establish and maintain a 
"blue line" around the city for more than forty years. There is little question that the Boulder 
approach has had both beneficial and harmful effects. One the one hand, it has encouraged a 
systemic approach to protecting open space that has matched land acquisition and land regulation 
in classic "greenbelt" fashion. On the other hand, the fragmented system of land-use planning in 
the Boulder area has permitted one city to pursue an aggressive policy without requiring regional 
collaboration or coordination. Boulder’s strategy has created satellite communities. But those 
communities are not self-contained; rather, they are mostly bedroom suburbs for Boulder, 
creating a jobs-housing imbalance that has meant workers must commute across the greenbelt to 
work.  
D.2.2.3 Urban Service Areas (USAs)/Urban Service Boundaries (USBs) 
Urban service areas are tools designed to link infrastructure and growth, most notably APFOs 
or "tiering" mechanisms. Urban service areas resemble urban growth boundaries in the sense that 
they create geographical limits on urban growth (at least urban growth that requires the extension 
of public water and sewer systems). But they also tend to be more flexible and easier to move 
because they tend to be concerned with the geographical sequencing of growth rather than its 
constraint. However, in many cases APFOs or tiering mechanisms are adopted independently, 
absent an overall urban service area strategy. Much of the motivation for adopting these policy 
tools was financial, not geographic—they sought to reduce the cost of infrastructure to the 
communities hosting the growth. As a result, they do not always shape growth geographically in 
an overt fashion.  
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I leave the APFOs for next section and focus mainly on the tier system here. Midway between 
the adequate public facilities approach, which does not necessarily envision any ultimate 
boundary for growth, and the permanent greenbelt approach, tier systems use infrastructure 
capacity, current levels of development, and assessments of rural resource viability to identify 
areas that are currently developed, areas where development should be avoided, and areas for 
new growth over a given time period. Among the best-known tier systems are those in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, San Diego, and Palm Beach County. Maryland’s Smart Growth program 
may be the newest and most closely watched statewide tier program. Maine and Wisconsin 
recently overhauled their state planning legislation to encourage an urban service area approach 
(on Maine, see American Planning Association 2002; on Wisconsin, see Wisconsin Office of 
Land Information Services 2001).  
Lets take Minneapolis-St. Paul Urban Service Area and San Diego’s Tier System as example. 
Despite unusually strong powers, considerable evidence indicates that the designated Urban 
Service Area in Minneapolis-St. Paul has not curbed sprawl in the region (Fulton, Pendall et al. 
2001). In some ways, as compared with the Minneapolis-St. Paul System, the San Diego system 
succeeded. It boosted in-town density to, and perhaps beyond, the maximum levels possible 
within the established infrastructure system; only then did the City Council decide to relax 
controls on outlying areas. But the San Diego system also confirmed the difficulty of 
maintaining the political equilibrium of a system that seeks to simultaneously direct growth to 
certain areas and maintain a pace of infrastructure construction that can truly accommodate new 
growth.  
Research on greenbelts in London (Hall et al. 1973, Munton 1983, Simmie 1993, and 
Pennington 2000) and in Seoul (Bae 1998, Cho 1997, Choi 1993, and Kim and Kim 2000), 
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UGBs in Portland (Downs 2002, Dunphy 1998, ECO Northwest 1990, Ehrenhalt 1997, Knaap 
1985, Metro 1997, Metro 2000a, Metro 2000b, Phillips and Goodstein 2000), and tier system in 
San Diego (Calavita 1997, Fulton 1997, Mandelker 1999) all suggests that a containment 
boundary that is tightly drawn and hard to change encourages more dramatic and rapid density 
increases, especially if policies are flexible enough to accommodate new development inside the 
boundary. Conversely, very remote boundaries, such as those maintained by many Tennessee 
counties today, will not necessarily reduce housing space, dramatically raise housing costs, or 
encourage leapfrog development. However, research from around the world suggests that tight 
urban containment policies, especially greenbelts, will inevitably drive some urban growth 
completely beyond the land preservation area surrounding the metropolis and so stimulate what 
critics call "leapfrog" development.  
D.2.2.4 Annexation Limits 
The last one, annexation limits limit growth. Most new development in California occurs at 
the urban fringe. Accordingly, we would expect regulations that limit municipal annexation also 
limit population growth and housing construction. This is indeed the case—Landis et al. (2002) 
found that, compared collectively, population and housing growth rates in three case study cities 
with annexation limits during the 1990s were about 60 percent of the level of their peers. It 
seems that annexation limits is the most stringent measure in this group.  
D.2.3 Public Facilities Regulations 
This set of measures function through adequate public facilities ordinances (APFOs) and a set 
of exactions such as mandatory dedications, negotiated exactions, impact fees, improvement 
taxes, real estate transfer taxes, special districts, tax increment financing. Among all the exaction 
measures, impact fees are not immediately employed but are more common among localities. 
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These measures tend to focus on spatial pattern and timing of development. Their primary 
purposes are to encourage efficient urban development pattern rather than to control growth.  
D.2.3.1 Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances  
APFO programs were pioneered most famously in Ramapo, New York; since then many other 
local governments have experimented with them. The concept of adequate public facilities for 
new growth became the centerpiece of Florida’s statewide growth management system in 1985, 
and Washington’s 1990 growth management statute adopted the APFO concept for developing 
areas within urban growth areas. 
Pendall et al. (2004) observe that APFOs anticipate and avoid the shortages that often prompt 
local governments to respond with permit caps and moratoria. But partial evidence suggests that 
APFOs became less popular in the 1990s. This trend counters the common expectations, given 
state concurrency mandates in Florida and Washington, increased acceptance of “pay as you 
grow” attitudes in local governance, and increased concern about suburban sprawl more 
generally. Only 25 percent of the 363 repeat respondents to our APFO questions had these 
ordinances in 2003, compared with 30 percent in 1994; declines were observed in all four 
regions. The South and West continue to lead the Northeast and Midwest in adoption of APFOs, 
with Florida and Texas metros as well as Phoenix and Seattle ranking high in their adoption. But 
again, the use of APFOs declined or stabilized in the California metro areas. The decline of 
APFOs in the Midwest is largely attributable to declining use in Chicago. It is possible that local 
governments are turning increasingly to impact fees instead of adequate public facilities 
ordinances because APFOs require more administrative discretion and monitoring than impact 
fees. Impact fees will be discussed later.  
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APFO is not to limit growth, at least not explicitly. Rather, it is to help cities cope with the 
fiscal and infrastructure impacts of growth. APFOs require that infrastructure be in place before 
development is permitted. APFO programs are implemented at the municipal or county level, 
sometimes based on guidance or mandates from state law, and the facilities and services are 
usually provided by local governments. They do not necessarily impose an ultimate outer limit 
on growth, but they do change the geographical calculus of growth—some evidence suggests 
they do increase densities more than urban growth boundaries (Pendall et al. 2002).  
In the peer-comparison study, Landis et al. (2002) find that cities with residential APFOs 
actually grew faster during the 1990s than their collective and individual peers. They further 
conclude that, given the even larger case-peer differences in housing construction rates, one 
might go so far as to conclude that the principal effect of residential APFOs is to make the cities 
that adopt them “safe” for additional development (Deakin 1989). However, In a national study 
comparing local land use regulations, housing production, and community economic and 
demographic characteristics, Pendall (2000) found no strong connection between adequate public 
facilities ordinances and rental housing construction or racial composition. Using the same data, 
Pendall (1999), as well as Levine (1999), suggests that APFOs did not displace growth and in 
some cases encouraged more compact growth forms. Levinson’s evaluation (1997) of 
Montgomery County, Maryland’s very stringent adequate public facilities ordinance and travel 
demand management programs suggest that they have not been very effective either in matching 
the provision of transportation infrastructure to private development, or in changing traveler 
behavior to reduce trip lengths and congestion. Levinson blames this failure on the tendency to 
proscribe particular regulatory solutions rather than using pricing strategies such as impact and 
congestion fees.  
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D.2.3.2 Impact Fees 
Exaction measures shift financial burden from local government to alternative sources 
(developer exaction, impact fees, special financing districts, and development taxes)—a shift of 
the cost of new infrastructure from the general public to the new developments that create the 
need. The method of financing involves a policy choice between two competing principles: 
ability-to-pay or benefit received (Nelson and Duncan 1995). 
Pendall et al.’s (2004) 1994 survey did not ask about impact fees, but among the repeat 
respondents exactly half of the 356 respondents reported that they had impact fees, a rate double 
that of APFO adoption. Only two metro areas, Detroit and Cincinnati, had fewer respondents 
with fees than with APFOs.  
Studies find that direct cost measures such impact fees may have little effect on limiting 
growth. On a national level, an analysis by Mayer and Somerville (2000) of housing construction 
in 44 U.S. metropolitan areas between 1985 and 1996 found that housing starts were 45 percent 
lower in metropolitan areas dominated by jurisdictions with more stringent land use controls. 
However, supply levels were not affected by direct cost measures, but by measures that 
lengthened the approval process or made it more complex. Pendall (1999), through a national 
study, suggests that impact fees did not displace growth and in some cases encouraged more 
compact growth forms.  
D.2.4 Pace of Growth 
This set of measures includes building permit caps, population growth caps, and moratoriums 
on issuance of building permits/subdivision. They allow communities to buy time for the 
development and adoption of more sophisticated and permanent growth management solutions. 
Caps set absolute upper limits for annual housing development or population growth, while 
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building moratoria exert an outright stop in issuance of certain building permits. They were 
adopted in consideration of locally desired rates of growth usually based on local carrying 
capacity limitations and facility adequacy was a secondary consideration. They are growth 
control, rather than growth management strategies. When caps are adequately determined, 
growth caps can be very strict on local residential development, while temporary moratoria only 
shift growth from time to time.  
D.2.4.1 Building Permit Caps and Population Growth Caps 
According to Pendall et al. (2004) survey, building-permit caps, which pioneered in 
California, appear to be waning in popularity there while gaining ground elsewhere. The share of 
jurisdictions with permit caps dropped in all three of the California metro areas to levels as high 
as 15 percent in the San Francisco Bay Area and zero in San Diego, after levels between 10 and 
20 percent for all three metro areas in 1994. But in metropolitan Denver, 8 of our 17 repeat 
responders had permit caps in 2003, compared with just 3 in 1994. Outside Denver, permit caps 
have become slightly more popular in metropolitan Boston, where four of the 44 repeat 
responders have them, and Washington-Baltimore, with three of 24 respondents. Some states 
preclude local governments from imposing permit caps, but we lack a complete list of such 
prohibitions. Building-permit caps sometimes respond to shortages in infrastructure capacity, 
which also often prompt local governments to impose building moratoria. Moratoria appear to be 
on the rise in most of the United States, though only five percent of repeat respondents had 
moratoria in 2003. There is no clear regional pattern here, with over 15 percent of jurisdictions in 
Minneapolis, Washington, Milwaukee, and San Diego subject to moratoria in 2003. 
When caps are adequately determined, growth caps can be very restrictive on local residential 
development. In the peer-comparison study, Landis et al. (2002) conclude that annual housing 
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caps are the most stringent form of growth control. The average population growth rate during 
the 1990s in the seven case study cities with annual housing caps was 17.6 percent, compared to 
25.6 percent for their collective peers. Surprisingly, case-peer differences were much smaller in 
the case of housing than population. Given differences in household size, one may infer from 
these results that housing cap programs limit the construction of single-family homes more than 
apartment units. Still in the national study, Pendall (2000) found strong correlation between 
building cap programs, reduced rental housing construction, and lowered proportions of Black 
and Hispanic residents. However, in another analysis, Pendall (1999) suggests that building 
permit caps contributed to sprawl by displacing growth outward. In sum, housing cap programs 
are somewhat effective at limiting population growth below the levels of the unconstrained 
market.  
D.2.4.2 Moratoriums on Issuance of Building Permits/Subdivision 
Moratorium places temporary limitation on residential growth and its effects depend heavily 
on its implementation process. Pendall (2000) in the national survey found that temporary 
building moratoriums do not affect rental housing construction or racial composition. When 
moratoriums work with zoning changes together, they may bring more dramatic impacts on 
housing. An examination of the region of California with perhaps the strictest growth controls—
the South Coast of Santa Barbara County, in the 1974-1979 period—concluded that a shortfall of 
housing production resulting from water hookup moratoriums and zoning changes accounted for 
about one-quarter of the change in real house prices (Mercer and Morgan 1982). However, the 
impacts on housing price are not separated between moratoriums and zoning changes, so it is 
questionable regarding the influence moratoriums impose on housing price. Meanwhile, the 
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study suffers from a case of extreme collinearity (r=0.97) between the variable for housing unit 
shortfalls and a measure of countywide employment, which may render its conclusions tenuous.  
D.2.5 Institutional Control 
This group mainly refers to voter approval requirements, super-majority vote requirement in 
city council, review streamlining, and one-stop permitting. These measures tend to lengthen the 
approval process, make the process more complex, put further limits on elected officials, and as 
one of the results, increase the uncertainty in permit approval process. The increase uncertainty 
and transaction costs associated with these measures function to discourage new housing 
investment. To a large degree, they succeed in that they reduce new construction activity and 
thus they are stringent land use controls.  
D.2.5.1 Voter Approval Requirements 
Under this requirement, voters are empowered to accept or reject specific development 
proposals submitted by developers or certain growth measures enacted by the city council when 
these proposals or measures are referred to them by popular petition. In an analysis of 
construction activity in 63 Ohio cities between 1980 and 1994, Staley (2001) finds consistent and 
robust evidence that subjecting rezoning decisions to voter approval (in fact public 
referendums)—an essentially unpredictable growth management approach—reduced new 
housing construction activity, irrespective of whether particular rezoning requests were approved 
or rejected. Note that this result focuses on the popular referendum requirement per se, not the 
broader class of growth management devices. The argument is that referendum requirements 
introduce a large degree of uncertainty for developers, which hinders investment.  
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D.2.5.2 Super-Majority Vote Requirement in City Council 
Development proposals in most California cities may be approved by a simple majority vote 
of the city council. In a very few cities, voters have sought to put further limits on their elected 
officials by requiring that development proposals receive a super-majority or two-thirds city 
council vote. Such requirements are explicitly intended to slow the rate of growth and 
development. To a large degree, they succeed. Still in the peer-comparison study, compared 
individually and collectively, rates of population and housing growth in the three case study 
cities with voter-enacted supper-majority approval requirements were only 40-50 percent of 
those of their peers (Landis et al. 2002).  
D.2.5.3 Review Streamlining and One-Stop Permitting 
As for review streamlining and one-stop permitting, I take California Environmental Quality 
Act (CEQA) as an example. CEQA review can be one of the most unpredictable elements of the 
residential development process. Streamlining is a CEQA reform effort focusing on removing 
from the review process “environmental” impacts that can be regulated effectively through a 
city’s general plan or ordinances, such as parking, noise, public safety, and fiscal effects. Some 
jurisdictions also have reported success in moving forward a one-stop permitting process, under 
which CEQA and other reviews are consolidated into a single process, based on conditions and 
mitigation measures specified in city ordinances or the general plan (Landis et al. 1995). One-
stop permitting is intended to make the system more efficient. This procedure usually works best 
when all relevant permitting is centralized under one permitting agency. However, critics argue 
that multi-stop system can be more efficient than the one-stop system simply because developers 
can work directly with each permitting agency to solve problems face-to-face and one-at-a-time 
(Nelson and Duncan 1995). 
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These measures will reduce hurdles in permit application process and thus have little effects 
on limiting growth. Rather, they save time for developers and reduce the uncertainty in 
development process and thus encourage residential growth.  
D.2.6 Other Measures 
This group includes measures indirectly related to growth management, such as growth 
management elements of the General Plan, affordable housing programs, farmland protection 
ordinances, etc. They are part of a broad effort to manage growth, even though some of them 
may not directly respond to growth.  
Since growth management elements of the General Plan could include a spectrum of specific 
growth measures, they could, but not necessarily would, contribute to the reduction of 
construction activity. It is worth mentioning that consistency requirement between general plans 
and zoning ordinances can greatly enhance the power of local general plan. One appellate court 
in California even threw a ballot-box zoning initiative off the ballot because it would have 
resulted in a zoning ordinance inconsistent with the general plan. This requirement can thus give 
legal weight to the planning process and affect growth to certain extent.  
Linkage fees, an important measure of affordable housing program, is a form of development 
exaction requiring nonresidential development projects to contribute to the funding of affordable 
housing and other social programs (day-care facilities, job training), the need of which can be 
linked to the new development. In terms of residential development, this measure imposes extra 
cost on developers in affordable housing development process, but does not alter the level of 
uncertainty and thus may have little effects on limiting growth. It is viewed as less stringent 
among growth management measures.  
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Farmland protection aims at protecting farmland as a primary economic sector as well as 
important environmental amenities. They could be seen as a member in the growth management 
family due to their ability in prohibiting growth from farmland and other openspace. Their 
effects on growth truly depend on the implementation process. Even in the cases most 
successfully protecting farmland, they may not intend to limit the amount of growth and the 
location where development could happen. They occupy a range in the restrictiveness continuum 
regarding growth management measures.  
D.3 Conclusion  
In each group of growth management policies, measures exhibit different levels of average 
restrictive potential. I summarized this difference in Table D-3.  
Overall, some types of growth management measures, principally low-density zoning, 
downzoning, residential caps, annexation limits, voter approval requirements, and super-majority 
vote requirement in city council, do appear to significantly limit population growth in the cities 
that adopt them. Annexation limits, voter approval requirements, and super-majority vote 
requirement in city councils are most restrictive or least accommodating growth measures, 
because they increase the uncertainty in permit approval process and discourage new housing 
investment. Residential caps also limit housing construction through limiting the ultimate 
number of new residents in a city, but slightly less restrictive. Low-density zoning and 
downzoning are yet less restrictive, but can come close to residential cap measures. Subdivision 
regulations come somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Other growth management 
programs, notably UGBs and USAs, function to redistribute growth from fringe areas toward 
more central locations, while residential APFOs and impact fees do little if anything to restrict 
residential growth—In the constrained fiscal climate of Proposition 13 in California, public 
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facilities regulations are far from growth limiting; rather, they are growth-enabling unless the 
purpose of growth management measures is to limit population growth and floor space 
development.  
Table D-3. Average Restrictive Potential among Growth Management Measures 
Categories Measures (top line – most restrictive) 
building permit caps, population growth caps Pace of Growth 
moratoria on issuance of building permits/subdivision 
Institutional Control voter approval requirements, super-majority vote requirement in 
city council 
low-density zoning, exclusionary zoning, downzoning  
height limits, floor area ratio (FAR) regulations 
Zoning Ordinances and 
Subdivision Regulations 
high-density zoning, upzoning, inclusionary zoning 
annexation limits Urban Containment 
urban growth boundaries (UGBs)/urban limit lines (ULLs)/green 
lines/blue lines, urban service areas (USAs)/urban service 
boundaries (USBs)/greenbelts 
impact fees 
adequate public facilities ordinances (APFOs) 
Public Facilities Regulations 
review streamlining, one-stop permitting 
Other Measures (not assessed) growth management elements of the general plan, affordable 
housing programs (such as housing linkage fees, affordable housing 
density bonuses), farmland protection ordinances (right-to-farm, 
differential tax assessments, state income tax credits, capital gains 
taxes, voluntary districts, agricultural/forest buffers, rural land 
reassembly).  
Note: Average restrictive potential of measures decreases from upper row to lower row in each policy 
category. 
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Appendix E. Data Collection and Processing for the Quantitative 
Analyses 
 
Table E-1. List of Variables for the Quantitative Analyses 
Variables Definition Sources 
Dependent Variables 
Restrictiveness Growth management restrictiveness index (0-6) 2003 policy survey 
Permit cap Presence of building permit cap (1-yes; 0-no) 2003 policy survey 
Vote requirement Presence of voter approval requirement (1-yes; 0-no) 2003 policy survey 
Low density zoning Presence of low-density-only zoning (1-yes; 0-no) 2003 policy survey 
Mobile home and/or 
apartment prohibition 
Presence of mobile home/apartment prohibition (1-
yes; 0-no) 
2003 policy survey 
Urban containment Presence of urban containment (1-yes; 0-no) 2003 policy survey 
Facilities regulation Presence of impact fees and APFOs (1-yes; 0-no) 2003 policy survey 
Direct Democracy Variables 
Direct democracy General access to direct democracy (1-yes; 0-no) 2006 direct democracy 
survey/2006 APA 
Chapter survey/2001 
ICMA survey 
Town meeting Presence of town meeting form of government (1-
yes; 0-no) 
Same as above 
Initiative Access to initiative (1-yes; 0-no) Same as above 
Referendum Access to referendum (1-yes; 0-no) Same as above 
Resident Status Variables78 
White Percent white, over total population, 00 (%) Census 2000 
Income 80 percentile household income, 99, thousand dollar Census 2000 
Growth Variable 
Growth rate Household population growth rate 90-00 (%) Census 2000, 1990 
Interaction Terms 
White*DD Interaction of white by direct democracy access  
Income*DD Interaction of income by direct democracy access  
White*town meeting Interaction of white by town meeting  
Income*town meeting Interaction of income by town meeting  
White*initiative Interaction of white by initiative access  
Income*initiative Interaction of income by initiative access  
White*referendum Interaction of white by referendum access  
Income*referendum Interaction of income by referendum access  
Other Control Variables 
Total population Logarithm of total household population, 00 Census 2000 
Senior Percent 65 and over, over total pop, 00 (%) Census 2000 
Stability Percent owners moved-in last 5 years, over owner 
occupied housing units, 00 (%) 
Census 2000 
Region Four census regions: northeast-1, midwest-2, south-3, 
west-4 (base category) 
Census 2000 
Jurisdiction type Incorporated (1) vs. unincorporated (0) 2001 ICMA survey 
Central city Central city in a metropolitan area Census 2000 
 
                                                 
78
 As a candidate for status variable, percent educated is also tested. However, no significant relationship has been 
observed partly due to the high correlation levels between education and other variables. 
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Data from different sources are utilized to perform the quantitative analyses. See Table E-1 
for complete information. In addition to the construction of dependent variables and the direct 
democracy variables, a large set of Census data are retrieved and processed in order to construct 
control variables. Here I provide detailed information on this process.  
From Census 2000, I downloaded seven sections of Summary File 3 (SF3) data for the 48 
continental states. These data are then imported into Microsoft Access through a template 
provided by the US Census Bureau. In Access, I linked these sections through a primary key, 
selected only data with summary level 090 (State-County-County Subdivision-Place/Remainder-
Census Tract-Urban/Rural-Block Group (parts)), and exported them as DBF files. Unnecessary 
variables are removed in order to reduce file sizes. These block group data are then aggregated 
based on different types of municipal boundaries (lets call them municipal data), i.e. county, 
unincorporated proportion of county, county subdivision, unincorporated proportion of county 
subdivision, and place. Each type of municipal data for 48 states is merged into a single file. So 
in the end, I have five large files for the continental US with population and housing variables.  
In order to calculate growth rate from 1990 to 2000, I need both 1990 and 2000 population 
and/or housing data at comparable municipal boundaries. Considering the possible municipal 
boundary change during 1990s, I manually calculated 1990 population/housing based on 2000 
boundaries. I first downloaded Census 1990 data —total population, group quarter population, 
and total housing units. They are Summary Tape File 3 (STF3) files, with a summary level 
similar to 090 in 2000 data down to block group level. I also downloaded 1990 block group 
boundary files and 2000 municipal boundary files from Census website. 1990 block group 
boundaries are converted into points in ArcView. Union function is performed for 2000 
boundaries between county and place and between county subdivision and place in order to get 
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boundaries for unincorporated proportion of counties and unincorporated proportion of county 
subdivisions. Then 1990 points overlay (spatial join) with 2000 municipal boundaries. 1990 
census data are then joined to these 1990 block group points and aggregated based on 2000 
boundary codes into five files— county, unincorporated proportion of county, county 
subdivision, unincorporated proportion of county subdivision, and place. Variables in these 1990 
files are joined to the 2000 corresponding files described in previous paragraph.  
In next step, when calculating socioeconomic and growth variables, a weighted approach is 
applied under the following assumption: within the geographic boundary of an unincorporated 
municipality, such as a county, where one or more incorporated places are present, citizens from 
the incorporated part may exert influence on growth policies adopted by the unincorporated 
municipality. In some states such as California, citizens living in cities have the legal right to 
vote on county planning issues and therefore influence decisions on land use regulations beyond 
their jurisdiction, while in other states people in incorporated places are not allowed to 
participate in decision-making process beyond their jurisdiction. In order to account for the 
varying influence exercised by residents in incorporated places on planning decisions made for 
unincorporated municipalities, characteristics of the incorporated sections within unincorporated 
boundaries are weighted based on the population share of the incorporated over the total of both 
sections.79 
More specifically, percentage of total population in incorporated over that in the whole 
jurisdiction is used as the weight. Only the incorporated portion is weighted. The unincorporated 
portion is not weighted. The two portions then added to get the weighted whole. Following 
formula are then used (use white and growth rate as example):  
                                                 
79
 Census block group data (summary level 090) are used to derive the control variables. This data set makes the 
weighting process possible for cases in which only part of an incorporated place is within the geographic boundary 
of an unincorporated jurisdiction.   
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% white_weighted=(weighted white in incorporated area + unweighted white in unincorporated 
area)/unweighted total population in the whole jurisdiction;  
 
weighted growth rate=(weighted household population growth in incorporated + unweighted household 
population growth in unincorporated)/unweighted 90 household population in the whole jurisdiction, where 
weighted household population growth in incorporated = (household population 00 in incorporated – 
household population 90 in incorporated) * weight 
 
In addition to weighted median household income (50%ile), weighted 20%ile and 80%ile 
income are also calculated in order to capture more precise effects of income on growth policies. 
The calculation processes are slightly different since Census data provide only total counts for 
each income bracket. Lets take 80%ile income for example and name the person who is 
associated with that income John. First based on above weighting rule, I weighted the total 
counts for each bracket for incorporated areas. Second, by adding the weighted counts to 
unweighted counts in unincorporated areas, I have the weighted total counts for each income 
bracket for a whole jurisdiction such as a county. Then I find out the bracket in which John is 
located (count the number of persons from the lowest income bracket until the number reaches 
80% of the total).  By assuming an even distribution of individuals’ income within John’s 
bracket, I calculate John’s income, which is the 80%ile income. Similar procedures also apply to 
calculating 20%ile and 50%ile incomes.  
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Appendix F. Statistical Outputs for Chapter 5 
F.1 Mean Comparison of Growth Management Restrictiveness between 
Communities with and without Direct Democracy (Independent-Samples T 
Test) 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Direct 
Democracy 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
no 437 2.15 1.029 .049 
Restrictiveness 
yes 459 2.00 1.114 .052 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.728 .394 2.044 894 .041 .147 .072 .006 .287 
Restrictiveness 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  2.048 893.227 .041 .147 .072 .006 .287 
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F.2 For Models of Growth Management Restrictiveness vs. General Access of 
Direct Democracy and Individual Growth Management Measures vs. General 
Access of Direct Democracy 
 
Table F-1. Descriptive Statistics for General Direct Democracy Models 
Variables          N Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. 
Restrictiveness 938 0 5 2.10 1.08 
Direct democracy 1734 0 1 .51 .50 
White 1791 1.13 100.00 79.63 16.76 
Income (80%tile, thousand) 1791 45.19 702.51 104.70 64.95 
Growth rate 1791 -.81 13.82 .24 .60 
Total population (ln) 1791 4.17 16.03 10.05 1.41 
Senior 1791 2.55 86.96 11.58 5.32 
Stability (moved-in 95-00) 1791 .00 80.84 34.31 10.14 
Region 1845 1 4 2.22 1.05 
Incorporated 1845 0 1 .69 .46 
Central city 1766 0 1 .09 .29 
 
Table F-2. Pearson Correlation (2-tailed) for General Direct Democracy Models 
 
Direct 
democracy White Income 
Growth 
rate 
Total 
population Senior Stability Region 
Jurisdiction 
type 
Central 
city 
Direct 
democracy 1 -.064** .015 -.017 .048* -.002 .045 .263** .028 .042 
White -.064** 1 .138** .127** -.435** .204** .119** -.290** .047* -.226** 
Income .015 .138** 1 -.022 -.095** -.021 .001 -.091** .037 -.119** 
Growth rate -.017 .127** -.022 1 .009 -.175** .558** .226** .132** -.045 
Total population .048* -.435** -.095** .009 1 -.124** .185** .422** -.047* .386** 
Senior -.002 .204** -.021 -.175** -.124** 1 -.295** -.102** .180** .001 
Stability .045 .119** .001 .558** .185** -.295** 1 .439** .199** .020 
Region .263** -.290** -.091** .226** .422** -.102** .439** 1 .188** .145** 
Jurisdiction type .028 .047* .037 .132** -.047* .180** .199** .188** 1 .145** 
Central city .042 -.226** -.119** -.045 .386** .001 .020 .145** .145** 1 
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F.3 Mean Comparison of Growth Management Restrictiveness between Town 
Meeting Communities and Council Communities (Independent-Samples T 
Test) 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Town 
Meeting 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
no 59 2.05 1.024 .133 
Restrictiveness 
yes 39 3.28 .887 .142 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.356 .552 
-
6.136 
96 .000 -1.231 .201 -1.629 -.833 
Restrictiveness 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-
6.320 
89.138 .000 -1.231 .195 -1.618 -.844 
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F.4 For Models of Growth Management Restrictiveness vs. Town Meeting and 
Individual Growth Management Measures vs. Town Meeting 
 
Table F-3. Descriptive Statistics for Town Meeting Models 
Variables             N Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. 
Restrictiveness 121 0 5 2.59 1.12 
Town meeting 129 0 1 .37 .49 
White 182 27.42 99.18 83.89 12.93 
Income (80%tile, thousand) 182 52.16 597.34 131.86 93.61 
Growth rate 182 -.29 1.12 .02 .17 
Total population (ln) 182 7.61 13.22 9.72 .91 
Senior 182 3.64 23.42 11.21 3.79 
Stability (moved-in 95-00) 182 17.89 62.77 29.35 5.91 
Central city 108 0 1 .13 .34 
 
Table F-4. Pearson Correlation (2-tailed) for Town Meeting Models 
 
Town 
meeting White Income 
Growth 
rate 
Total 
population Senior Stability 
Central 
city 
Town 
meeting 1 .212* .061 .202* -.363** -.298** .154 -.246* 
White .212* 1 .135 .569** -.253** .154* .301** -.192* 
Income .061 .135 1 .042 -.112 .018 .047 -.205* 
Growth 
rate .202* .569** .042 1 -.026 -.027 .725** .126 
Total 
population -.363** -.253** -.112 -.026 1 .432** .047 .592** 
Senior -.298** .154* .018 -.027 .432** 1 -.174* .166 
Stability .154 .301** .047 .725** .047 -.174* 1 .218* 
Central 
city -.246* -.192* -.205* .126 .592** .166 .218* 1 
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F.5 Mean Comparison of Growth Management Restrictiveness between 
Communities with and without Initiative/Referendum (Independent-Samples 
T Test) 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Initiative/ 
Referendum 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
no 378 2.17 1.031 .053 
Restrictiveness 
yes 420 1.89 1.057 .052 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.130 .719 3.793 796 .000 .281 .074 .136 .426 Restrictiveness 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
3.798 790.946 .000 .281 .074 .136 .426 
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F.6 For Models of Growth Management Restrictiveness vs. Initiative and 
Referendum and Individual Growth Management Measures vs. Initiative and 
Referendum 
 
Table F-5. Descriptive Statistics for Initiative and Referendum Models 
Variables            N Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. 
Restrictiveness 817 0 5 2.02 1.05 
Initiative 1591 0 1 .28 .45 
Referendum 1603 0 1 .49 .50 
White 1609 1.13 100.00 79.15 17.07 
Income (80%tile, thousand) 1609 45.19 702.51 101.63 60.13 
Growth rate 1609 -.81 13.82 .26 .63 
Total population (ln) 1609 4.17 16.03 10.09 1.45 
Senior 1609 2.55 86.96 11.62 5.47 
Stability (moved-in 95-00) 1609 .00 80.84 34.87 10.37 
Region 1661 1 4 2.36 1.02 
Jurisdiction type 1661 0 1 .66 .47 
Central city 1658 0 1 .09 .29 
 
 
Table F-6. Pearson Correlation (2-tailed) for Initiative and Referendum Models 
 
Initiative Referendum White Income Growth 
rate 
Total 
population Senior Stability Region 
Jurisdiction 
type 
Central 
city 
Initiative 1 .601** -.139** .017 .030 .179** .014 .103** .511** .169** .069** 
Referendum .601** 1 -.082** .019 -.025 .061* .012 .043 .264** .047 .052* 
White -.139** -.082** 1 .131** .131** -.441** .209** .128** -.289** .030 -.231** 
Income .017 .019 .131** 1 -.007 -.086** -.022 .023 -.044 .006 -.115** 
Growth rate .030 -.025 .131** -.007 1 .000 -.185** .550** .194** .166** -.046 
Total 
population .179** .061* -.441** -.086** .000 1 -.154** .180** .437** -.030 .381** 
Senior .014 .012 .209** -.022 -.185** -.154** 1 -.309** -.123** .195** -.007 
Stability .103** .043 .128** .023 .550** .180** -.309** 1 .415** .250** .018 
Region .511** .264** -.289** -.044 .194** .437** -.123** .415** 1 .303** .170** 
Jurisdiction 
type .169** .047 .030 .006 .166** -.030 .195** .250** .303** 1 .148** 
Central city .069** .052* -.231** -.115** -.046 .381** -.007 .018 .170** .148** 1 
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F.7 Revised Growth Management Characteristics Models  
 
F.7.1 Growth Management vs. Direct Democracy 
 
Table F-7. Logistic Regression Results  – National Models without New England States and California (GM 
vs. DD) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Direct 
Democracy 1.278** 3.588 -.059 .943 -.101 .904 .079 1.082 -.120 .887 
-
1.092*** .335 
White .006 1.006 -.001 .999 .012** 1.012 -.021*** .980 .010* 1.010 .005 1.005 
Household 
Income -.002 .998 .001 1.001 .002* 1.002 .023*** 1.023 -.003 .997 .001 1.001 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) 
-
1.875** .153 -.038 .963 -.139 .870 -.084 .919 .125 1.133 .087 1.090 
Total Pop. 
(log) .179 1.196 -.293*** .746 -.536*** .585 -.410*** .664 .501*** 1.650 .329*** 1.389 
Senior -.127 .881 .024* 1.024 -.031* .969 .009 1.009 -.071*** .932 -.040** .961 
Moved-in 
btwn 95-00 .090** 1.094 -.008 .992 -.031*** .969 -.037*** .963 .012 1.012 .010 1.010 
Incorporated -.577 .561 -.097 .908 -.995*** .370 .952*** 2.592 .312* 1.366 .944*** 2.570 
Central City -.414 .661 -.396 .673 -.599 .549 -.099 .906 -.347 .707 -.837*** .433 
Constant 
-
6.901** .001 2.646*** 14.098 5.167*** 175.442 4.335*** 76.304 -6.506*** .001 
-
2.951*** .052 
N 542  1188  1248  1299  1068  928  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.156  0.077  0.255  0.225  0.157  0.201  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table F-8. Logistic Regression Results – Northeast Models without New England States (GM vs. DD) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Direct 
Democracy -15.653 .000 -.108 .897 .348 1.416 1.316*** 3.729 -.774 .461 -.347 .706 
White -.046 .955 .004 1.004 .020* 1.020 -.002 .998 .001 1.001 -.015 .986 
Household 
Income -.011 .989 .001 1.001 -.001 .999 .011*** 1.011 -.002 .998 -.002 .998 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) -3.368 .034 .437 1.548 -1.180 .307 .129 1.138 -1.784 .168 -.374 .688 
Total Pop. (log) .013 1.013 -.110 .896 -.766*** .465 -.027 .974 .603*** 1.828 .094 1.099 
Senior .118 1.125 -.019 .982 -.068** .934 -.033 .968 -.049 .953 -.081* .922 
Moved-in btwn 
95-00 .120 1.128 -.004 .996 -.023 .978 -.024 .976 .036 1.037 .009 1.009 
Incorporated -13.370 .000 .182 1.200 -.776** .460 1.281*** 3.601 .784 2.191 -.637 .529 
Central City 9.220 1.0E4 -1.266 .282 -18.810 .000 -.359 .699 1.147 3.149 .001 1.001 
Constant -3.666 .026 1.161 3.193 7.176*** 1.3E3 .359 1.431 -8.538** .000 3.073 21.603 
N 206  294  317  317  254  164  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.122  0.037  0.281  0.206  0.139  0.136  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table F-9 Logistic Regression Results – Midwest Models (GM vs. DD) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Direct 
Democracy 6.312** 551.360 .089 1.093 -.176 .838 -.437** .646 -.578** .561 -.896*** .408 
White .250 1.284 -.003 .997 .007 1.007 -.024*** .976 .024* 1.024 .019** 1.019 
Household 
Income .025** 1.025 -.001 .999 .005** 1.005 .030*** 1.030 .000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) -.758 .469 -.014 .986 -.037 .964 -.197 .821 -.517 .596 .203 1.225 
Total Pop. (log) 2.339** 10.367 -.313 .731*** -.497*** .608 -.685*** .504 .309*** 1.362 .364*** 1.440 
Senior -1.269** .281 .043 1.044* .006 1.006 .021 1.021 
-
.140*** .869 -.118*** .889 
Moved-in btwn 
95-00 -.200 .819 -.001 .999 -.018 .983 -.039*** .961 -.018 .982 .022 1.023 
Incorporated -5.751 .003 -.069 .933 
-
1.015*** .363 1.206*** 3.342 .255 1.290 2.060*** 7.850 
Central City -17.008 .000 -.683 .505 .256 1.291 .541 1.718 .172 1.188 -.803* .448 
Constant -33.339* .000 2.614 13.652** 4.030*** 56.267 6.942*** 1034.591 
-
4.120** .016 
-
5.114*** .006 
N 231  512  595  575  425  456  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.486  0.075  0.177  0.287  0.119  0.371  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table F-10 Logistic Regression Results – South Models (GM vs. DD) 
 Permit Cap1 Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Direct 
Democracy .267 1.306 -.091 .913 -.021 .979 -.069 .933 -.047 .955 -.824** .439 
White -.047 .954 -.008 .992 .016 1.016 -.034*** .966 .036*** 1.037 .007 1.007 
Household 
Income .092* 1.096 .004 1.004 -.001 .999 .022*** 1.022 -.003 .997 -.004 .996 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) 
-
15.568* .000 -.492 .612 -.516 .597 -.312 .732 .643** 1.903 -.119 .888 
Total Pop. (log) -.878 .416 -.257 .773 -.517** .596 -.344** .709 .240 1.271 .407** 1.502 
Senior .023 1.024 .023 1.024 -.104* .902 .019 1.019 -.053 .949 -.002 .998 
Moved-in btwn 
95-00 .290 1.337 .019 1.019 -.005 .995 .023 1.024 -.044** .957 .008 1.008 
Incorporated   .097 1.102 
-
1.474*** .229 .627* 1.873 -.946** .388 1.609*** 4.997 
Central City 2.320 10.171 -.656 .519 -18.533 .000 -.237 .789 -.252 .778 -1.259** .284 
Constant -6.243 .002 1.496 4.466 5.073* 159.611 2.455 11.646 -2.946 .053 -4.497* .011 
N 48  271  270  281  265  229  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.444  0.071  0.222  0.161  0.153  0.209  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
1
 Variable “Incorporated” is removed from the test due to highly multicolinearity problem. 
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Table F-11. Logistic Regression Results – West Models without California (GM vs. DD) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Direct Democracy 18.984 1.76E8 -.579 .560 -1.957 .141 1.027* 2.794 -1.644** .193 -11.630* .000 
White .062 1.064 .013 1.013 .417 1.518 -.067** .935 -.042 .959 -.344* .709 
Household 
Income -.007 .993 .001 1.001 -.144 .866 .030** 1.031 .025 1.025 .043 1.044 
Growth Rate (90-
00) -2.744 .064 .522 1.685 2.652 14.179 .591* 1.806 -.058 .944 -.698 .498 
Total Pop. (log) .004* 1.004 -.246 .782 .182 1.200 .114 1.121 -.234 .791 9.212* 1.0E4 
Senior -.036 .965 .024 1.024 .296 1.345 .004* 1.004 -.021 .979 .223 1.250 
Moved-in btwn 
95-00 .126 1.134 -.016 .984 -.485 .616 -.053 .949 .016 1.016 .252 1.286 
Incorporated .339 1.403 .177 1.193 -9.881 .000 .561 1.753 -1.208 .299 19.522* 3.0E8 
Central City -.725 .484 .923 2.516 -15.142 .000 -.830 .436 .408 1.504 -11.603* .000 
Constant -29.022 .000 1.081 2.948 -7.634 .000 .863 2.370 6.700 812.203 -87.270 .000 
N 57  111  66  126  124  79  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.241  0.117  0.531  0.187  0.242  0.704  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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F.7.2 Growth Management vs. Initiative and Referendum 
 
Table F-12. Logistic Regression Results  – National Models without New England States and California (GM 
vs. Ini/Ref) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Initiative -.171 .843 .125 1.133 -.190 .827 .298 1.347 -.031 .969 .375* 1.455 
Referendum 1.215** 3.370 -.077 .926 -.026 .975 .005 1.005 -.063 .939 -1.259*** .284 
White .006 1.006 -.002 .998 .012** 1.012 -.022*** .979 .011* 1.011 .003 1.003 
Household 
Income -.002 .998 .001 1.001 .002 1.002 .023*** 1.024 -.003 .997 .001 1.001 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) 
-
1.944** .143 -.024 .976 -.122 .885 -.091 .913 .120 1.127 .066 1.068 
Total Pop. 
(log) .198 1.219 -.303*** .738 -.526*** .591 -.419*** .657 .515*** 1.674 .333*** 1.395 
Senior -.122* .885 .023* 1.023 -.032* .969 .009 1.010 -.071*** .931 -.038** .963 
Moved-in 
btwn 95-00 .095** 1.100 -.009 .991 -.032*** .969 -.038*** .963 .012 1.012 .014 1.014 
Incorporated -.534 .586 -.121 .886 -.996*** .369 .927*** 2.527 .339* 1.404 .842*** 2.320 
Central City -.435 .647 -.390 .677 -.580 .560 -.060 .941 -.384 .681 -.832*** .435 
Constant 
-
7.198** .001 2.903*** 18.222 5.068*** 158.842 4.520*** 91.854 
-
6.742*** .001 -2.913*** .054 
N 541  1161  1230  1271  1041  900  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.151  0.080  0.255  0.227  0.159  0.206  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table F-13 Logistic Regression Results – Northeast Models without New England States (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Initiative 
-
15.873 .000 -.424 .655 -.207 .813 -1.674** .188 -.965 .381 20.250 6.23E8 
Referendum 
-
12.824 .000 .001 1.001 .429 1.536 1.831*** 6.240 -.576 .562 -.603 .547 
White -.048 .953 .005 1.005 .020* 1.021 .000 1.000 .002 1.002 -.017 .984 
Household 
Income -.011 .989 .001 1.001 -.001 .999 .010** 1.010 -.002 .998 -.002 .998 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) -3.374 .034 .443 1.557 -1.198 .302 .030 1.031 -1.861 .155 -.254 .776 
Total Pop. (log) -.001 .999 -.111 .895 -.767*** .464 .003 1.003 .619*** 1.858 .080 1.083 
Senior .122 1.129 -.018 .982 -.069** .933 -.037 .964 -.048 .953 -.078 .925 
Moved-in btwn 
95-00 .126 1.134 -.006 .994 -.025 .975 -.032 .968 .033 1.034 .014 1.015 
Incorporated 
-
13.349 .000 .172 1.188 -.793** .453 1.282*** 3.603 .764 2.148 -.650 .522 
Central City 6.317 553.685 -1.265 .282 -18.830 .000 -.472 .624 1.132 3.103 .157 1.170 
Constant -3.588 .028 1.185 3.271 7.203*** 1343.660 .252 1.286 
-
8.716*** .000 3.135 22.982 
N 206  294  317  317  254  164  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.116  0.039  0.282  0.240  0.138  0.169  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table F-14. Logistic Regression Results – Midwest Models (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Initiative -2.530 .080 .321 1.378 -.099 .905 1.385*** 3.995 
-
1.179*** .307 .606** 1.833 
Referendum 8.811** 6709.714 -.023 .977 -.175 .840 -.992*** .371 -.146 .864 
-
1.197*** .302 
White .219 1.245 -.002 .998 .008 1.008 -.022** .978 .021 1.021 .020** 1.020 
Household 
Income .030** 1.031 -.001 .999 .005** 1.005 .031*** 1.032 .000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) .050 1.051 .001 1.001 -.023 .978 -.305 .737 -.333 .717 .115 1.122 
Total Pop. 
(log) 3.026** 20.618 
-
.316*** .729 -.495*** .610 -.735*** .480 .362*** 1.437 .354*** 1.425 
Senior -1.482** .227 .039 1.040 .005 1.005 .009 1.009 -.137*** .872 -.121*** .886 
Moved-in 
btwn 95-00 -.219 .803 -.002 .998 -.018 .982 -.039*** .962 -.025 .975 .026 1.027 
Incorporated -5.341 .005 -.081 .922 
-
1.030*** .357 1.205*** 3.337 .290 1.337 2.087*** 8.064 
Central City -17.916 .000 -.656 .519 .268 1.307 .670 1.954 .083 1.087 -.763 .466 
Constant 
-
37.298** .000 2.616** 13.681 3.993*** 54.219 7.245*** 1401.277 -4.205** .015 
-
5.210*** .005 
N 230  510  593  573  424  455  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.524  0.079  0.179  0.334  0.153  0.384  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table F-15. Logistic Regression Results – South Models (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 Permit Cap1 Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Initiative -18.539 .000 .644 1.904 .266 1.304 .719 2.052 -1.226 .293 .070 1.072 
Referendum .440 1.552 .023 1.023 .346 1.413 -.009 .991 .257 1.293 -.695* .499 
White -.040 .961 -.012 .988 .015 1.015 -.034*** .967 .039*** 1.040 .007 1.007 
Household 
Income .080 1.083 .004 1.004 .000 1.000 .019*** 1.019 -.003 .997 -.004 .996 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) 
-
15.643* .000 -.518* .596 -.564 .569 -.279 .757 .561** 1.753 -.185 .831 
Total Pop. (log) -.774 .461 -.334* .716 -.540** .583 -.355** .701 .195 1.215 .333 1.395 
Senior .021 1.021 .025 1.025 -.104* .901 .019 1.019 -.053 .948 .002 1.002 
Moved-in btwn 
95-00 .308 1.360 .019 1.019 .002 1.002 .026 1.026 -.046** .955 .020 1.020 
Incorporated   -.127 .880 
-
1.609*** .200 .569 1.766 -1.039** .354 1.107** 3.024 
Central City 1.873 6.507 -.711 .491 -18.491 .000 -.246 .782 -.264 .768 -1.101* .332 
Constant -7.272 .001 2.684 14.640 5.203* 181.733 2.637 13.973 -2.534 .079 -3.764 .023 
N 48  247  254  256  240  202  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.451  0.089  0.228  0.163  0.181  0.124  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
1
 Variable “Incorporated” is removed from the test due to highly multicolinearity problem. 
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Table F-16. Logistic Regression Results – West Models without California (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 Permit Cap Vote Requirement 
Low Density 
Zoning 
Mobile/Apt. 
Prohibition 
Urban 
Containment 
Facilities 
Regulations 
 B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB B eB 
Initiative -1.170 .310 .756 2.129 24.258 3.42E10 2.182* 8.862 .397 1.487 -236.171 .000 
Referendum .298 1.347 -1.503 .222 -25.817 .000 -1.036 .355 -1.421 .242 -298.483 .000 
White .056 1.058 .004 1.004 .523 1.687 -.066** .936 -.043 .958 -34.036 .000 
Household 
Income -.009 .991 .002 1.002 -.061 .940 .033** 1.034 .027 1.028 4.098 60.227 
Growth Rate 
(90-00) 
-
2.705* .067 .567 1.763 4.258 70.641 .603* 1.827 -.037 .963 256.155 1.764E111 
Total Pop. (log) .031 1.032 -.406 .666 .140 1.150 .095 1.100 -.250 .779 458.276 1.064E199 
Senior -.110 .896 .036 1.036 .743 2.101 .016 1.016 -.017 .983 27.045 5.568E11 
Moved-in btwn 
95-00 .107 1.113 -.016 .984 -.657 .518 -.056* .945 .012 1.012 13.012 4.478E5 
Incorporated 1.348 3.852 .292 1.339 -13.675 .000 .480 1.615 -1.623 .197 1098.208 6.754E218 
Central City -.929 .395 1.110 3.035 -13.460 .000 -.951 .386 .395 1.484 -565.501 .000 
Constant -8.170 .000 3.213 24.863 -20.294 .000 .737 2.090 6.741 846.195 
-
3581.993 .000 
N 57  110  66  125  123  79  
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke): 0.230  0.173  0.563  0.210  0.215  1.000  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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F.8 Classification Tables for Logistic Models 
 
F.8-1 Classification tables for the national models 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 719 0 100.0 pop/building cap 
yes 54 0 .0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   93.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 632 174 78.4 presence of voter requirements 
yes 357 253 41.5 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   62.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 833 93 90.0 Low density zoning 
<8 222 180 44.8 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   76.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 498 254 66.2 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
190 606 76.1 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   71.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 925 60 93.9 presence of urban containment 
yes 236 107 31.2 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   77.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 156 238 39.6 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 97 597 86.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   69.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-2 Classification tables for the New England models 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 32 3 91.4 pop/building cap 
yes 4 5 55.6 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   84.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 34 0 100.0 presence of voter requirements 
yes 9 31 77.5 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   87.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 30 6 83.3 Low density zoning 
<8 5 39 88.6 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   86.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 0 12 .0 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
1 67 98.5 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   83.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 72 0 100.0 presence of urban containment 
yes 5 1 16.7 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   93.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 52 2 96.3 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 14 9 39.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   79.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-3 Classification tables for the Non-New England models 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 683 0 100.0 pop/building cap 
yes 45 0 .0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   93.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 602 150 80.1 presence of voter requirements 
yes 350 213 37.8 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   62.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 
Percentage 
Correct 
no zoning or >=8 798 78 91.1 Low density zoning 
<8 212 142 40.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   76.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 478 245 66.1 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
184 533 74.3 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   70.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 846 49 94.5 presence of urban containment 
yes 232 96 29.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   77.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 143 179 44.4 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 71 590 89.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   74.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-4 Classification tables for the national models without cases from New England states and 
California (GM vs. DD) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 517 0 100.0 pop/building cap 
yes 25 0 .0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   95.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 554 128 81.2 presence of voter requirements 
yes 315 191 37.7 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   62.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 817 73 91.8 Low density zoning 
<8 221 137 38.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   76.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 394 215 64.7 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
201 489 70.9 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   68.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 750 43 94.6 presence of urban containment 
yes 234 41 14.9 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   74.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 115 188 38.0 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 68 557 89.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   72.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-5 Classification tables for the Northeast models without cases from New England states (GM 
vs. DD) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 203 0 100.0 pop/building cap 
yes 3 0 .0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   98.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 19 110 14.7 presence of voter requirements 
yes 19 146 88.5 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   56.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 131 43 75.3 Low density zoning 
<8 50 93 65.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   70.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 42 60 41.2 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
25 190 88.4 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   73.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 232 0 100.0 presence of urban containment 
yes 20 2 9.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   92.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 3 31 8.8 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 2 128 98.5 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   79.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-6 Classification tables for the Midwest models (GM vs. DD) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 224 1 99.6 pop/building cap 
yes 6 0 .0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   97.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 245 50 83.1 presence of voter requirements 
yes 139 78 35.9 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   63.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 398 27 93.6 Low density zoning 
<8 121 49 28.8 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   75.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 134 104 56.3 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
69 268 79.5 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   69.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 346 1 99.7 presence of urban containment 
yes 73 5 6.4 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   82.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 134 62 68.4 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 51 209 80.4 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   75.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-7 Classification tables for the South models (GM vs. DD) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 42 1 97.7 pop/building cap 
yes 3 2 40.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   91.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 178 6 96.7 presence of voter requirements 
yes 81 6 6.9 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   67.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 228 1 99.6 Low density zoning 
<8 40 1 2.4 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   84.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
 279
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 147 21 87.5 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
69 44 38.9 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   68.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 164 16 91.1 presence of urban containment 
yes 58 27 31.8 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   72.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 22 45 32.8 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 16 146 90.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   73.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-8 Classification tables for the West models without cases from California (GM vs. DD) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 44 2 95.7 pop/building cap 
yes 10 1 9.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   78.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 72 2 97.3 presence of voter requirements 
yes 29 8 21.6 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   72.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 
Percentage 
Correct 
no zoning or >=8 62 0 100.0 Low density zoning 
<8 3 1 25.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   95.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 99 2 98.0 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
22 3 12.0 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   81.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 10 24 29.4 presence of urban containment 
yes 6 84 93.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   75.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 3 3 50.0 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 2 71 97.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   93.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-9 Classification tables for the national models without cases from New England states and 
California (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 516 0 100.0 pop/building cap 
yes 25 0 .0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   95.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 525 137 79.3 presence of voter requirements 
yes 304 195 39.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   62.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 798 78 91.1 Low density zoning 
<8 220 134 37.9 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   75.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 385 207 65.0 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
193 486 71.6 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   68.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 731 44 94.3 presence of urban containment 
yes 227 39 14.7 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   74.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 104 181 36.5 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 63 552 89.8 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   72.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-10 Classification tables for the Northeast models without cases from New England states 
(GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 203 0 100.0 pop/building cap 
yes 3 0 .0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   98.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 22 107 17.1 presence of voter requirements 
yes 15 150 90.9 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   58.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 131 43 75.3 Low density zoning 
<8 51 92 64.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   70.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 44 58 43.1 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
28 187 87.0 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   72.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 232 0 100.0 presence of urban containment 
yes 20 2 9.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   92.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 4 30 11.8 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 3 127 97.7 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   79.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-11 Classification tables for the Midwest models (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 223 1 99.6 pop/building cap 
yes 5 1 16.7 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   97.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 247 47 84.0 presence of voter requirements 
yes 139 77 35.6 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   63.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 397 27 93.6 Low density zoning 
<8 119 50 29.6 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   75.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 145 93 60.9 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
62 273 81.5 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   72.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 343 3 99.1 presence of urban containment 
yes 73 5 6.4 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   82.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 132 64 67.3 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 48 211 81.5 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   75.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-12 Classification tables for the South models (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 42 1 97.7 pop/building cap 
yes 4 1 20.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   89.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 157 8 95.2 presence of voter requirements 
yes 73 9 11.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   67.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 215 1 99.5 Low density zoning 
<8 36 2 5.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   85.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 132 20 86.8 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
63 41 39.4 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   67.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 152 12 92.7 presence of urban containment 
yes 50 26 34.2 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   74.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 4 45 8.2 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 7 146 95.4 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   74.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
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F.8-13 Classification tables for the West models without cases from California (GM vs. Ini/Ref) 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 pop/building cap 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 44 2 95.7 pop/building cap 
yes 10 1 9.1 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   78.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of voter requirements 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 72 2 97.3 presence of voter requirements 
yes 24 12 33.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   76.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Low density zoning 
 
Observed no zoning or >=8 <8 Percentage Correct 
no zoning or >=8 62 0 100.0 Low density zoning 
<8 2 2 50.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   97.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
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Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) 
 
Observed not prohibited 
if one or both are 
prohibited 
Percentage 
Correct 
not prohibited 98 2 98.0 Mobile Homes/Apartments prohibited 
(exclusionary zoning) if one or both are 
prohibited 
22 3 12.0 
Step 
1 
Overall Percentage   80.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of urban containment 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 6 27 18.2 presence of urban containment 
yes 6 84 93.3 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   73.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 presence of facilities regulations 
 
Observed no yes Percentage Correct 
no 6 0 100.0 presence of facilities regulations 
yes 0 73 100.0 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   100.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 292
Appendix G. Supplementary Information for Westford/Chelmsford 
Table G-1. Westford Community Profile 
 
1990 2000 2010 
 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Total population 16,392 100.0 20,754 100.0 21,951 100.0 
Household population 16,322 99.6 20,653 99.5 21,940 99.9 
White 16,042 97.9 19,444 93.7 18,678 85.1 
Asian 270 1.6 994 4.8 2,762 12.6 
Median age   36.9  42.0  
Seniors (65+) 1,171 7.1 1,501 7.2 2,178 9.9 
Total households 5,316 100.0 6,808 100.0 7,498 100.0 
Family households (families) 4,505 84.7 5,806 85.3 6,165 82.2 
Family households with own children 
under 18 years 
  3,325 48.8 3,395 45.3 
Average household size 3.05  3.03  2.93  
Average family size   3.31  3.27  
       
Median household income (dollars) 60,566  98,272    
Percent below poverty level  1.1  1.3   
Percent high school graduate or higher  90.5  94.1   
Percent bachelor's degree or higher  39.3  56.8   
       
Employed civilian population 16 years 
and over 8,974  10,885    
Management, professional, and related 
occupations 4,010 44.7 6,573 60.4   
Service occupations 757 8.4 840 7.7   
Sales and office occupations 2,739 30.5 2,184 20.1   
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations 47 0.5 8 0.1   
Construction, extraction, and maintenance 
occupations 677 7.5 561 5.2   
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 744 8.3 719 6.6   
Unemployment rate  4.2  1.4   
Mean travel time to work (minutes) 25.0  30.0    
       
Total housing units 5,530 100.0 6,941 100.0 7,876 100.0 
Occupied housing units 5,316 96.1 6,808 98.1 7,498 95.2 
Owner-occupied housing units 4,662 84.3 6,258 90.2 6,784 86.1 
Data sources: Census 1990, 2000, 2010       
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Table G-2. Chelmsford Community Profile 
 
1990 2000 2010 
 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Total population 32,375 100 33,858 100.0 33,802 100.0 
Household population 32,129 99.2 33,379 98.6 33,672 99.6 
White 31,099 96.1 31,520 93.1 29,944 88.6 
Asian 956 3.0 1,563 4.6 2,846 8.4 
Median age   38.9  43.2  
Seniors (65+) 3,135 9.7 4,418 13.0 5,467 16.2 
Total households 11,453 100.0 12,812 100.0 13,313 100.0 
Family households (families) 9,011 78.7 9,307 72.6 9,328 70.1 
Family households with own children 
under 18 years   4,403 34.4 4,149 31.2 
Average household size 2.81  2.61  2.53  
Average family size   3.11  3.06  
       
Median household income (dollars) 53,971  70,207    
Percent below poverty level 2.6  1.8    
Percent high school graduate or higher 90.2  93.0    
Percent bachelor's degree or higher 37.7  44.0    
       
Employed civilian population 16 years 
and over 18,394  18,167    
Management, professional, and related 
occupations 7,611 41.4 9,583 52.7   
Service occupations 1,413 7.7 1,872 10.3   
Sales and office occupations 6,354 34.5 4,330 23.8   
Farming, fishing, and forestry 
occupations 108 0.6 19 0.1   
Construction, extraction, and 
maintenance occupations 1,595 8.7 1,109 6.1   
Production, transportation, and material 
moving occupations 1,313 7.1 1,254 6.9   
Unemployment rate 4.1  1.9    
Mean travel time to work (minutes) 23.1  27.6    
       
Total housing units 11,812 100.0 13,025 100.0 13,807 100.0 
Occupied housing units 11,450 96.9 12,812 98.4 13,313 96.4 
Owner-occupied housing units 9,413 79.7 10,743 82.5 11,014 79.8 
Data sources: Census 1990, 2000, 2010       
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Table G-3. Westford Growth Rates 
 
1990 2000 90-00 (%) 2010 00-10 (%) 
Total 
population 16,392 20,754 21.02 21,951 5.45 
Household 
population 16322 20,653 20.97 21,940 5.87 
Total housing 
units 5,530 6,941 20.33 7,876 11.87 
Data sources: Census 1990, 2000, 2010 
 
Table G-4. Chelmsford Growth Rates 
 
1990 2000 90-00 (%) 2010 00-10 (%) 
Total 
population 32375 33,858 4.38 33,802 -0.17 
Household 
population 32129 33,379 3.74 33,672 0.87 
Total housing 
units 11812 13,025 9.31 13,807 5.66 
Data sources: Census 1990, 2000, 2010 
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Appendix H. Sample Interview Questions for Case Studies 
Your Information:  
• Name:   
• Title:    
• Phone:   
• Date and time:  
 
1. Introduce myself and the project. Read the consent form to the interviewee.  
2. Can you introduce your background?  
3. Can you briefly give me a description of your community? 
4. What is the most concerned issue or significant topic in your town?  
[Land use policies] 
5. I have conducted a document review and found Westford has several growth management 
measures. First there is a building permit cap in your zoning. The cap limits 30 units per year 
but not on affordable housing units. Can you confirm this?  
6. In the zoning code I found on your website, the cap will expire on 5/11/2009 but may be 
extended for additional 5 years. Was it extended? Any changes in its contents?  
7. I also noticed the minimum lot size requirement for residential use is at least 20,000 square 
feet, which is found in the RB district. Can you confirm this?  
8. Compared to your neighbors, do you think this minimum lot requirement is low or moderate 
in terms of density?  
9. Mobile home and apartment buildings are not allowed within the Town. Is this true?  
10. Do you require a vote from the people on rezoning or annexation issues?  
11. I found all above measures in your zoning code. Is zoning the only toolbox you have to 
manage housing development? Do you have any other tools to manage growth? Such as 
impact fees collected from the developers for such purposes as school, infrastructure, parks? 
Or adequate public facilities ordinances to control the timing of housing development? Or a 
urban growth boundary?  
12. I have asked you on the tools you used to regulate housing development. However, those 
tools are formal, written in your zoning code. At your discretion, do you think there are any 
informal tools used to control housing development?  
13. Put all the measures together and compared to the neighboring jurisdictions, would you say 
the overall growth management effort in Westford is stringent in limiting housing 
development?  
14. This question is regarding the implementation of the tools. Also at your discretion, would 
you say the tools are carried out strictly or loosely? Loosely means leaving more flexibility 
for developers.  
15. Have these tools been effective in managing housing development? For example, as a rough 
estimate, you saw less housing construction activities after the adoption of these tools.  
[Policy adoption] 
16. Were these measures adopted through town meeting?  
17. When were the cap and the low-density zoning first adopted? And when were they last 
amended?  
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18. What are the rationales for adopting an annual cap?  
19. What are the rationales for such a low-density requirement in the zoning code?  
20. Can you describe the housing development situation before these measures were adopted or 
amended? Was it a rapid development situation or a moderate one? Did the development add 
pressures on local provision of infrastructure and services? Did it bring negative impacts to 
the community such as traffic congestion and school overcrowding?  
21. According to my information, Westford does not provide public sewer and even public water 
is also limited. Does this mean the town faces less pressure from housing development in 
terms of infrastructure provision?  
22. Have there been any controversies/conflicts related to the adoption of these tools? Or any 
stories? Who were active, either supporting or opposing, in the adoption of these tools? Their 
contact information.  
23. What was the board of selectmen’s stand in above issues? Pro-growth or anti-growth? Do the 
members have conflicts? What were the arguments?  
24. Is there a mechanism through which the government can communicate with the people on its 
stand?  
25. Usually how many people attend town meeting?  
26. Are the attendants different from those who do not attend, in terms of age, income, 
education, or length of residence?  
27. What are the reasons for people not attending town meeting?  
28. What was the attendants’ attitude in above issues? Pro-growth or anti-growth? Can you give 
me some names?  
29. Any interest groups or businesses, either supporting or opposing, were involved in the 
Town’s policy adoption process? Who are they? Contact information.  
30. Do you think the tools used in your neighboring communities would encourage or discourage 
your adoption of certain tools?  
31. In your opinion, why were the cap and the low-density zoning adopted or amended?  
32. Were there any measures proposed but later defeated or did not pass? Can you talk more on 
them?  
33. I want to learn more on the stories related to the adoption of the policy tools. Can you 
recommend some people to me?  
[Affordable housing and exclusion] 
34. In your town’s housing stock, what is the share (%) of affordable housing? Is this number 
above or bellow regional composition of affordable housing?  
35. Any efforts have been employed to promote or limit affordable housing construction?  
36. Why are the market or the developers reluctant to develop affordable housing units?  
37. Why does the Town not allow mobile home and apartment construction? Do you know what 
are the government’s concerns on this issue and what are the residents’ concerns?  
[Budget] 
38. In general, other than property taxes, are there any other revenue sources for Westford? Any 
other taxes or aid from the state?  
39. Currently, are there any constraints on the Town’s revenue or budget?  
40. How much is the share in the Towns’ budget for Town employees’ direct expenses including 
salaries, health insurance, retirement, and the similar?  
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41. What public services and infrastructures does the Town currently provide? Can you rate them 
based on their share in budget? 
42. Has Westford ever reached tax levy limit in terms of balanced budget?  
43. Has the Town ever relied on housing development to offset infrastructure or public service 
expenditure?  
44. Do the residents know above information? Through what channels? 
[Free opinion] 
45. These are all my questions. Now you can make your opinion on these issues including the 
stringency of growth management measures, their adoption process, affordable housing 
provision, and town budget issues.  
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